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Abstract
Countries that come out of the “gray zone” during “third wave democratization,”
as ambiguous as they may seem politically, may not be a manifestation of a failed
democratization attempt. Rather, their “hybrid” characteristics, portraying neither a full
democracy nor outright authoritarian practices entrenched in the system, may plausibly
serve as a panacea to governing, especially in a troubled state.
Many studies that have depicted the “hybrid” political system have focused more
on its conceptualization and typology rather than how this kind of regime actually
performs and functions. However, studying this regime type only at its surface does not
help us to understand the in-depth nature of a hybrid regime nor its political setup. A
thorough assessment is needed for this purpose. Therefore, this case study evaluates the
performance of the hybrid political system that is practiced in Malaysia.
This study assesses the two democratic principles of popular control and political
equality, using the assessment framework prepared by the internationally based
intergovernmental organization, the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA), whose aim is to support sustainable democracy around the world.
The method prepared by International IDEA was based on the claim that “democracy is
not an all-or-nothing affair” but is a shifting continuum. The IDEA method acknowledges
that the democracy practiced in some countries is not perfect and is subject to the
country’s historical experiences, demographics, cultures, and realities.
ii

This study’s results suggest that having partially practiced democratic principles,
with support from semi-authoritarian apparatus, produces a political system with both
positive and negative components that both facilitate regime transition and
democratization as well as reinforce regime incumbency and dampen democratization.
This study shows that, ultimately, the interactions between the positive and negative
components may produce balancing mechanisms that help to strengthen both the
regime’s persistence and the country’s resilience.
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Chapter One: Introduction to the Study
This case study presents an “ambiguous” political system1 that is neither fully
democratic nor outright authoritarian. Countries with this type of political system are
described as “third wave democratization” and are typically viewed as being in the
process of regime change toward democracy. Malaysia is a paradigmatic case of a
country with the hybrid political configuration of a partly democratic system with
authoritarian practices. However, for many years, Malaysia has managed to endure.
Praised for its high economic growth, political and social stability, the country has proven
to be the anomaly in democratization studies.
The unconventional political system practiced in Malaysia defies the claim that
the country will undergo a linear and teleological journey under the democratization
process until it reaches the consolidation phase. Proponents of democratic transition
describe a country of this kind as an unstable “halfway house.” Instead, Malaysia
manages to remain persistent and resilient in the face of challenges and political
turbulence.
In discourses on comparative regime studies, Malaysia is categorized as a “semidemocracy,”2 “quasi- democracy,”3 “flawed democracy,”4 “partly-free”5 country, and

1

The term political system will be used interchangeably in this dissertation.

2

William Case, “Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change,” Pacific
Affairs 66, no. 2 (1993): 183-205.

1

“syncretic state”6 that is “neither democratic nor authoritarian”7 but is both “responsive
and repressive”;8 the most general term given, hybrid regime,9 portrays the common and
neutral description of regime studies on Malaysia. These categorizations are
unconventional to what is accepted as a normal political system.
The Research Paradox
To the dismay of democratic proponents, an “ambiguous” regime such as in
Malaysia is supposed to be in transition to becoming fully democratic, as proven by some
success stories of regime transition cases, such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Mexico. A
country like Malaysia has almost all that it takes to transform to being a fully democratic
country with all the “preconditions,” such as persistent economic growth that produces a
broad middle class, high educational and income levels, and a large industrial working
class. Bottom line, Malaysia has all that it takes to be in the “zone” of what Huntington
(1991) claimed is likely to transform into being fully democratic.10

3

Zakaria Hj. Ahmad, “Malaysia: Quasi-Democracy in a Divided Society,” in Democracy in Developing
Countries: Asia, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1989), 347-81.
4

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has categorized Malaysia as a flawed democracy, ranking 81 in
2007. The latest EIU ranked Malaysia 64, shows “improvement” in democracy but still categorized as
“flawed” based on the level of genuinety of the democratic process.
5

The Freedom House, a renowned organization, has ranked Malaysia as “partly free” on the rating of “4”
in the country’s level of civil liberties in 2011.
6

James V. Jesudason, “The Syncretic State and the Structuring of Oppositional Politics in Malaysia,” in
Political Oppositions in Asia, ed. Garry Rodan (London: Routledge, 1996), 128-160.
7

Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

8

Harold Crouch, “Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic,” in Southeast Asia in the 1990s, ed.
Kevin Hewison, Richard Roison, and Gary Rodan (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 133-158.
9

Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 21-35.

2

The irony is that the “political configuration” entrenched in the Malaysian regime
works in contradiction to the ideas of a liberal democracy. The case of Malaysia, as with
many other countries in the developing world, has made analysts and proponents of
democratic transition theories question their paradigm. Carothers (2002) wrote a thoughtprovoking article claiming that the transition paradigm has lost its significance as a
universal paradigm for understanding democratization.11
Case (2005) claimed that Southeast Asia is a region that sets the compound of “a
great storehouse of historical and contemporary hybrid regimes.”12 In the region that
analysts claim to be most recalcitrant,13 Malaysia is an interesting subject and a
paradigmatic case of the “ambiguous” regime.14 As a case study, Malaysia is important
because the country is a paradox in democratization theories. Having almost all of the
attributes and preconditions15 of a democratic government, the fact is that Malaysia is
everything but fully democratic.

10

Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 62-63.
11

Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, 13, no. 1 ( 2002): 521.
12

William Case, “Southeast Asia's Hybrid Regimes: When Do Voters Change Them?” Journal of East
Asian Studies 5, no. 2 (May-August 2005): 215.
13

Donald Emmerson has called Southeast Asia the most recalcitrant region to liberal democratic reforms.
Nevertheless, some country cases in this region (e.g., Malaysia) continue to stand out as a puzzle of
political development. [Donald K. Emmerson, “Region and Recalcitrance: Rethinking Democracy through
Southeast Asia,” Pacific Review 8, no. 2 (1995): 222-248].
14

Marina Ottaway has given the label ambiguous to regimes that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal
democracy with some formal democratic institutions with limited respect to civil and political rights.
However, these regimes also practice some illiberal authoritarian traits in their systems. [Marina Ottaway,
Democracy Challenged : The Rise of Semi-authoritarianism (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2003)].
15

Malaysia stands out as something that is inconsistent with the conventional ideas of regime transition to
democracy, such as theorized by Lipset in 1959. A country that, despite imitating a model of the

3

This thesis depicts Malaysia as a partially practiced democracy that is “flawed,”
in order to connote the condition of democracy in Malaysia for simplicity purposes;
however, the term actually means a democratic system that is not practiced in its full
sense.16 More accurately, the term “hybrid” signifies the mixed nature of Malaysia’s
political system, which combines the attributes of both a democracy and an authoritarian
system.
The “hybrid regime,” defined by Karl (1995), emerged at the turn of the twentyfirst century as the most widespread political system in the world.17 The Malaysian case
also seems to fit comfortably into the categories proposed by O’Donnell and Schmitter
(1986), who distinguish between liberalized authoritarianism (dictablandas) and limited
democracy (democraduras).18
Political Hybridity: Analytical Challenges
The term “hybrid regime” represents the paradox of the democratic transition
paradigm. It indicates the “messiness” of democratization linear ideas against the political
realities. The hybrid political system is ignored by democratization proponents because of
Westminster type of governing, along with successful economic growth with a growing middle class,
shows little to no progress toward becoming a fully democratic country.
16

According to Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, in flawed democracies, basic civil liberties
are still respected but they are limited. There are illiberal practices in other aspects of democracy, such as
limited media freedom, low levels of political participation, and underdeveloped democratic political
culture. In addition, “flawed” also could present democratic deficits that are generally described by analysts
as illiberal practices that disregard some important democratic main principles. Nonetheless, the flawed
democracy does not violate the democratic procedural of election. [Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave of
Democracy Over?” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (July 1996); Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal
Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (1997): 22-43; and Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective
Democracies,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 33-58.]
17

Terry Lynn Karl, “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 3 (1995): 7287.
18

G. O’ Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 9.

4

its flawed characteristics. However, the hybrid system’s obsession with democracy and
democratization within studies about regime change might be a way to account for the
lack of broader systematic comparative studies of hybrid regimes and their peculiarity.19
The assumption is that these “ambiguous regimes” are still in a transition process; hence,
no attention is given to their peculiar nature.
I have mentioned that Malaysia is a paradigmatic case of a country emerging from
the “gray zone” of the democratization process. Analysts and strong proponents of
democracy have acknowledged this “zone” and the problems that come out of it.
According to proponents of democratization, countries that are situated between the
continuum of authoritarian and democratic spheres, practicing partial liberalization, are
not stable and will not persist. Huntington (1991) acknowledged the plausibility of
countries that are emerging from “third wave” democratization, calling them a “halfway
house” that will not stand.20 He argued that these kinds of regimes have stalled in the
democratization process because of the “flawed” practices of democratic principles.
Putting weight to that analogy, Przeworski (1991) wrote that regimes with partial
liberalization are inherently unstable until they reach the goal of full democracy.21
In sum, scholars of democracy agree that the characteristics of a hybrid regime
that combine democracy and authoritarian traits are contradictory, which renders them
unstable. As hybrid regimes persist throughout the world, as shown by Malaysia and her

19

Jonas Linde, “Into the Gray Zone: The Recent Trend of “Hybridization” of Political Regimes,” The
Quality of Government Institute Department of Political Science (Working Paper Series, University of
Gothenburg, Sweden, April 2009).
20

Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 137.

21

Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 58.

5

closest neighbor Singapore, analysts like Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way agree that it is
about time “to stop thinking about these cases in terms of transitions to democracy."22 In
reality, these regimes are not transitioning anytime soon, but will persist through their
political configuration, which is maneuvered democratic institutions with illiberal
practices and control.
Some analysts say that the political system of regimes practicing partial
democracy is defective and that they will not necessarily transition into a full democracy.
For example, Wolfgang (2004) argued that a “defective” democracy is not necessarily a
regime in transition. Depending on their political power, social economics, and cultural
entrenchment in their political system, these regimes can establish themselves for a
longer time. He stated that this is the case when specific democratic defects are supported
by political power, socio-economic and socio-cultural contexts and developed within a
mutually supportive coexistence of environment and a partial control mechanism.23
Jayasuria and Rodan (2007) saw “hybrid regimes not as imperfect versions of
liberal democracies but as possible political regimes in their own right, with their own
internal dynamics and qualitatively distinct institutional forms.”24 They argued that
political regimes need to be identified and explained in terms of the organization of
conflict through various modes of political participation; that the idea of hybrid regimes
in general falls short in explaining why and how regimes take the forms they do.

22

Steven Levitsky and Lucan A Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy
13, no. 2 (2002): 51.
23

Merkel Wolfgang, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 33-58.

24

Kanishka Jayasuriya and Garry Rodan, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes: More Participation, Less Contestation
in Southeast Asia,” Democratization 14, no. 5 (2007): 773.

6

“Halfway” and “diminished subtype” regimes depicted as deficient have certain
prior institutional benchmarks of liberal democracy, yet no identifying cause for the
apparent institutional dysfunction or deficit.25 Rodan (2004) argued that political regimes
need to be identified in terms of the relationship between their institutions and the
management or containment of conflict. The form and nature of inclusion of political
participation into the mode of hybrid governance is abridged by the transition theory’s
obsessive focus on the institutional functions of a democracy;26 this theory is an advance
on the simplistic formulations of a linear transition to a liberal democracy.
“Hybridity” As an Analytical Tool to Manage Conflict
Current literature on “hybridity” discusses a peace-building program in which
hybridity is used as a tool to provide a more accurate view of the dynamic diversity of
ideas and practices that can contribute to peace-building and aid programs.27 According
to MacGinty, “Hybridity is both a process and a condition of interactions between actors
and practices. It is a process of social negotiation, conflict and coalescence and can be
found in all societies and social interactions.”28 MacGinty recommends the concept of
hybridity because it can help to detect the complexities and flexibility of internationally

25

Kanishka Jayasuriya and Garry Rodan, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes: More Participation, Less Contestation
in Southeast Asia,” Democratization 14, no. 5 (2007): 775.
26

Ibid.

27

Roger MacGinty, “Statebuilding, Peacebuilding and Hybridity” (Short paper prepared for Critical
Statebuilding Workshop, Swedish Defence College, 5-6 May 2011).
28

Roger MacGinty, “Hybridity and Hybridisation: Beyond Top-down Meets Bottom-up” (Paper prepared
for HCRI Manchester/Bradford, Seminar 22-23 June 2011).

7

supported peace-building efforts. The concept may not be a panacea to settle conflicts,
but it offers a simplicity in attempting to understand a complex phenomenon.29
This discourse on hybridity is still new, and the idea of hybridity can be used as
“dynamic model of conflict management in action.” Liberal state-builders30 regard the
hybrid form as a “policy failure.” While hybrid forms of statehood, business, politics, and
culture may be odd, dysfunctional, and seemingly unfair, acknowledging the working
mechanism could actually be useful for peace-building and conflict management.
This study analyzes the conventional view that halfway-house regimes are
unstable. This hybrid political system is found in many new democratic countries,
especially those coming out from “third wave” democratization. However, the democratic
elements and authoritarian support system of a hybrid political system do not necessarily
contradict each other; rather, this odd political setup can be mutually supportive.
According to Crouch (1996), Juan Linz claimed that these “ambiguous” political systems
cannot be adequately understood as a kind of regime that is situated at the midpoint along
a continuum between democracy and an authoritarian system. Rather, these regimes
should be understood as their own kind, with peculiar characteristics that distinguish
them from either democracy or an authoritarian system.31
In regimes like Malaysia, which is given semi-democracy or semi-authoritarian
labels by experts, there is a need to understand that Malaysia has an integrated and
coherent political system with its own peculiar characteristics. Therefore, it is necessary
29

Roger MacGinty, “Hybridity and Hybridisation: Beyond Top-down Meets Bottom-up” (Paper prepared
for HCRI Manchester/Bradford, Seminar 22-23 June 2011).
30

Ibid.

31

Harold A. Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 5.

8

to study, more precisely, the interrelationship between the democratic and authoritarian
traits, so that such regimes can be conceptualized as regime types in their own right.32
This study, therefore, does not seek to add another adjective, such as “façade”
democracy. Rather, this study’s purpose is to assess the partially practiced democracy
itself and its performance in a “hybrid” state.
Hybrid Political Mechanism in Malaysia
Different political setups with hybrid elements of democracy and authoritarian
attributes work differently in regimes around the globe. In Malaysia’s hybrid political
system, the political configuration shows how the positive components of democratic
principles (e.g., elections) and the negative components of a control system (e.g.,
electoral gerrymandering) are used simultaneously in Malaysia’s political setup. The
electoral system in Malaysia may appear to be a façade, but it is important for the
regime’s incumbency. On the other hand, a manipulated election can open opportunities
for opposition parties to contest the incumbent and to give a strong competition.
Case (2006) argued that “elections … are not intended to produce turnover but
instead to provide feedback, registering fluctuations in support so that governments might
adjust their policy course but never leave office.”33 Analysts and critics of Malaysia’s
political regime have frequently highlighted the gerrymandering of constituencies in
order to favor the incumbent government and its mal-apportionment; which explains why
rural constituencies are disproportionately represented, because Malay-Muslim

32

Harold A. Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 5.

33

William Case, “How Do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena?” in Electoral Authoritarianism: The
Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 95-112.

9

populations are greater in the rural districts.34 The Malay-dominated ruling elite
constructed the electoral system to virtually ensure that they could not be removed from
power.
Elections in Malaysia are “Janus faced.” On one side, they are used to legitimize
the incumbent party through manipulation and gerrymandering of the electoral system,
denying democratization. On the other side, elections can actually open opportunities for
the opposition parties to gather support, through electoral votes; thus, the possibility of
more democratic openings. In Malaysia, this was proven during the 2008 and 2013
general elections. However, the existence and persistence of the hybrid mechanism that
works in Malaysia’s political system seems effective in preventing a transfer of power
through election.
Institutions of Control in Malaysia
It is not just the electoral system that favors the incumbent government, who has a
wide range of political controls to restrict opposition parties and dissidents. The
mechanism of control serves as a state apparatus to protect the ruling government from
the opposition parties’ interference on government business. Thus, these control
mechanisms are institutionalized, and are often justified as necessary for maintaining
order and stability in the plural society that is Malaysia.
The most important part of this machinery of control has been the Internal
Security Act (ISA), a legacy from the colonial era that has permitted detention of
suspects (up to two years and indefinitely renewable) without proving their guilt in a
court of law. ISA was so notorious that it symbolized the “illiberalism” of democracy in
34

Jason P. Abbot, “Malaysia’s Transitional Moment? Democratic Transition Theory and the Problem of
Malaysian Exceptionalism,” South East Asia Research 17, no. 2 (2009): 175-199.

10

Malaysia. The removal of ISA has been a key demand of the Reformasi movement and
civil society. In September 2011, Najib Razak, Malaysia’s sixth premier, announced the
repeal of ISA and three emergency declarations.35
The Strong State
According to analysts, the strong state and its apparatus are used by the ruling
elites allegedly to constrain the voices of dissidents who supposedly will pose challenges
to the regime. Because the state is very strong in Malaysia, the regime can afford to
loosen its grip without losing control. Slater and Fenner (2011) argued that state power is
the stringiest institutional foundation for authoritarian regimes’ staying power, that states
are the ultimate institutional weapons in the authoritarian arsenal,36 and that the most
durable regimes are those that either stay out of trouble or have a proven track record of
putting trouble behind them.
In Malaysia, we have seen stability whenever the regime has survived a
monumental challenge. Along with its lengthy time of ruling, the regime has exhibited a
constant outcome of institutional continuity. Malaysia’s hybrid regime is exceptionally
durable not because of the lifespan of the political party, but because the regime has
steadily managed massive socio-economic transformations without altering their most
important institutional structures. Whether crises have been economic or political, they
have been few and rare in Malaysia; even when crises have happened, they have been
ably contained and effectively resolved.

35

Available at www.themalayinsider.com (15 September 2011).

36

Dan Slater and Sofia Fenner, “State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and
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In Malaysia’s hybrid system, the state has responded to political tensions by
strengthening its authoritarian control. For instance, immediately after the ethnic riots in
1969, the state exercised its control apparatus by launching the emergency provisions of
the Constitution and implementing the Internal Security Act (ISA). These riots were the
main event that changed Malaysia’s political configuration; state power was extended
and the control system was tightened.
These control mechanisms that were a winning situation for the incumbent
regime, nevertheless, were a setback to the democratization process. In 1987, Premier
Mahathir faced off challenges to his premiership by employing the Internal Security Act
(ISA) against members of organizations and groups who were critical of the
government’s policies. Hence, despite the state’s acquisition of authoritarian powers, the
system was far from fully authoritarian.37
The government in Malaysia exercises strong authoritarian powers to safeguard
its political stability and continued domination of the Malay elite. However,
countervailing social forces and regular competitive elections restrain its power and make
the regime sensitive to popular pressures; so, it often responds to challenges with a
combination of both repressive and responsive measures. For example, Prime Minister
Najib Razak repealed the Internal Security Act (ISA) in June 2012 after relentless
pressure from the masses and international communities. This act from the premier
showed a sign of give and take in the system.38
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Dominant One-Party System
The control apparatus in a hybrid political system is deeply institutionalized.
Milton Esman (1973) termed this kind of control system as being “institutionalized
dominant” and suggested that this method is basically a coercive network of controls with
the purpose of maintaining hegemony and that it is often highly sophisticated and deeply
institutionalized.39 Malaysia is a highly institutionalized hybrid regime. According to
Mauzy (2006), one of the reasons for the resilience of the dominating party in Malaysia,
the United Malay National Organization (i.e., UMNO), also known as the Alliance, is
that it is a well-institutionalized party that reaches down through an extensive system of
branch chapters and leads up to district, state, and national organizations.40 One
characteristic of the hybrid regime in Malaysia is that there is a blurring of the line
between the party and the state; when Malaysians talk about the party, we usually mean
the state and the government.
The dominant one-party system is a complex scenario under the hybrid setup.
According to Jesudason (1995), dominance is a self-conscious process and the dominant
party cannot be ignored as a strategic actor in the governmental system. We cannot
confine ourselves as structural-determinists in understanding the dominant party; nor can
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we merely see coercion and repression as key devices used by the ruling elites.41 As an
analyst and student of comparative government, I suggest that we not see hybrid regimes
as only a manifestation of a failed democracy and form of authoritarian control.
Pempel’s (1990) work on uncommon democracies in Western Europe advised that
this kind of uncommon regime type contains useful ideas because dominant parties can
act as institutions that shape the social structure as much as they are constrained by it. He
demonstrated that dominant parties are dynamic organizations that do not necessarily
decline over time. They are capable of creating new social bases of support, or
abandoning old ones in order to stay in power.42
In Malaysia’s hybrid political scenario, the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional (BN)
dominant party has made significant achievements to sustain its central power due to its
effectiveness in responding to the grievances of its key constituents, the voters; their key
advantage is help with the masses from their patron-clientele relationships. UMNO can
be assured by its political culture of support, especially the ethnic Malays who help the
dominant party sustain its political power. The mechanism that works in the Malaysian
hybrid system is that the dominant party, UMNO, provides a patron-clientele relationship
to the Malays. This is considered a legitimate practice in the political system. In response,
the Malays vote for them in general elections.
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Patron Clientele
Political management in Malaysia fits the model of ethnic patronage. This
practice refers to complex patronage networks between the political establishment and an
emerging, mostly Malay, business class. The ruling party in Malaysia almost always
enjoys the advantage of the 3M’s—money, media control, and party machinery.43 The
key to the dominant single-party (in Malaysia, UMNO) is patronage and money politics.
To provide patronage obligations, UMNO and some of the other Barisan
Nasional parties are deeply engaged in business and have cultivated close and
overlapping ties with the leaders of business and commerce. UMNO owns, or controls
through proxies, all kinds of businesses, from a major newspaper group, to mining,
television, and the state’s largest construction company. Many government no-bid
contracts have been awarded by the Cabinet to UMNO-linked companies, and wellconnected UMNO members are often awarded privatized assets.44
Analysts argue that The New Economic Policy (NEP 1971-90) and privatization
policies breed cronyism in the government and benefit politically well-connected groups
of the new rich who are nurtured by government patronage and preferential treatment.
Political patronage and clientelism play a prominent role; an increasingly authoritarian
and centralized Malay political elite employs the financial resources of the state to
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distribute control of major economic enterprises to a small circle of dependent cronies
and quasi-entrepreneurs, often by methods that are shrouded in secrecy and corruption.45
In a hybrid system, the patron-clientele networks are carefully weaved by the state
through its apparatus in the name of fixing the imbalances in the socio-economic
structure. The paradox is that, on one hand, state intervention reasonably promotes
economic growth and political competition (mistakenly assumed as democracy); and on
the other hand, state intervention is a sign of deeper authoritarianism.46
Elite Strategies
One should not underestimate the role of agency, specifically the political elite, in
determining how the regime works in Malaysia. The elites bargained during the
consociational era in Malaysia’s political collapse during the May 13, 1969 ethnic riots.
The UMNO Alliance’s disastrous outcome demonstrated that consociational inter-ethnic
compromises were less effective for the Malay ruling elite as a means of maintaining
their political power. This was one of the most crucial reasons the Malay ruling elite
sought an alternative mode of regime maintenance and shifted toward a more hegemonic
control, which led to the unambiguous UMNO-led Malay dominance.47
According to transition theories, strategies of the elites involve negotiated
agreements between ruling elites and opposition elites, which move common perceptions
of self-interest toward accepting democracy as the best possible regime form under given
45
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conditions. Elite strategies for democratization do not apply to Malaysia, whose ruling
elites are well-known for their strength and cohesiveness. Some analysts claim that the
patronage-system practice in Malaysia contributes to the elites’ cohesiveness and their
support of the dominant party, whose crucial task is to maintain the loyalties of in-groups
by guaranteeing their long-term interests.48
Thus, elites’ strategies for regime change in Malaysia do not apply to the
transition theory, which suggests that democratic transition is the result of elites defecting
from the incumbent’s party.49 This highlights the importance of patronage and the elite
cohesion in Malaysian politics. Beatriz Magaloni (2006) wrote that hegemonic parties
must have distributed ample spoils in order to deter elites from splitting.50
Internet and New Social Media
Controlling laws that limit civil rights and freedom of the people are not totally
hopeless when, at the same time, the Internet media are free from regulation. In Malaysia,
the term “netizens” is given to those in the society who rely on social media for news and
communication because the conventional print and broadcast media are tightly controlled
by the ruling government. This condition enables the people to get alternative media
sources for information and freedom of expression. Grievances among the Malaysian
communities were inflamed through an unprecedented intensity of Internet usage and
new social media (e.g., bloggers, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and others). The Internet
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media have become the most important source of independent political information in
Malaysia.
The advantage to “netizens” is that the Internet is not controlled by the
government, which has kept their promise made during Mahathir’s era not to impose any
control on Internet communications media for the sake of attracting foreign direct
investments into Malaysia. This loophole has worked to the advantage of Malaysians,
especially those in the opposition parties who seek alternative media to disseminate their
information.
The Internet-democracy relationship is not absolute, said Best and Wade (2009).51
In Malaysia, the issue is whether the Internet media can have an impact on
democratization or not. Since the Reformasi movement in late 1990s, the Internet has
been used for socialization and mobilization, but mainly as an alternative media for
information. Bottom line, the Internet and new social media so far are a positive means of
social movements in Malaysia.
Civil Participation
The liberal position on civil society proposes that the general welfare of a society
and the process of democratization are enhanced if groups, organizations, and
associations act as a buffer to prevent the state from assuming too much control of the
society. In Malaysia, the discourse on civil participation is linked to the larger question of
democracy. In a society with a hybrid political system, political participation or contest is
often minimized by ensuring that the civil society is under the hegemony of the state.
Dissent and opposing views are curbed and challenges are suppressed with the use of
51
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controlling laws.52 In Malaysia, the issues are not so much about the forces of civil
society challenging the state’s power and control, but how the state dominates the civil
society and its activities, rendering it ineffective for further democratization and regime
transformation.
Peaceful Social Mobilization
In Malaysia, pressures for change did not originate from the elites, but from the
citizens.53 According to Lee, ethnic politics is no longer considered the main factor that
shaped Malaysian politics. Ethnic politics was weakened by the new politics,
encapsulated by the Reformasi movement. Reformasi opened the door for the opposition
to challenge UMNO-led ethnic politics.54 Reformasi was initially born out of the people’s
anger at Mahathir’s ruthless treatment against his deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim.
After that, Reformasi eventually turned into a more generalized protest against
corruption, cronyism, nepotism, and the government’s abuse of power.55
These developments reflected a significant element of political transition in
Malaysia along three dimensions: (1) They signified a substantial erosion of UMNO’s
legitimacy in society. (2) Reformasi not only galvanized multi-ethnic support; it also
brought to the fore universal issues based on the need for governance reform, especially
for greater accountability, transparency, and rejection of corruption and cronyism. (3)
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Anwar’s crisis galvanized new forms of social mobilization in the country, the people’s
demand for good governance and checks on government power.56 This thesis suggests
that social mobilization should increase the likelihood of democratization and triggering
regime change in Malaysia (see the HINDRAF and BERSIH movements in chapter six.)
Another interesting issue in the transition literature is the connection between
democracy and uncertainty. The process of establishing a democracy is a process of
institutionalizing uncertainty and subjecting all interests to it. According to Karl and
Schmitter (1991), the transition period is a subject of unforeseen contingencies, unfolding
processes, and unintended outcomes.57 This is the stage where the hybrid regime
emerges. Despite not reaching the finish line of the democratization race, hybrid regimes
are showing resiliency. In stark contrast with arguments of their fragility and instability,
they are able to survive the challenges.58
The survivability of hybrid regimes can be traced back to the very combination of
authoritarian and democratic traits entrenched in their political system. The problem is
that analysts focus too much on trying to conceptualize these diminished59 democratic
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types of political regimes and categorize them under specific conceptual democratic
thresholds, in order to differentiate them from fully democratic regimes.60
There is not much focus in the literature on evaluating how countries with limited
practices of democracy actually function or why particular countries. So, this thesis
suggests that we not view hybrid regimes only in terms of the failure of transition
theories or the unsuccessful process of democratization. Instead, rather than focus on a
flawed practice of democracy, analysts should start analyzing how the hybrid political
setup works to sustain and stabilize a particular regime type. I suggest that in order to
understand how these regimes work, and their characteristics, analysts must evaluate
these regimes’ performance.
To date, the literature has focused little on measuring hybrid regimes, making this
study and assessment of “ambiguous regimes” highly relevant, especially regarding
countries such as Malaysia that are thought to have been failing the democratization
process. Now it is time to assess the hybrid character of Malaysia’s political system, its
functions, and how it works.
Measuring Democratic Quality in a Hybrid Regime
Measuring the quality of democracy is the latest field in democratization studies.
Liberalism has won and democracy has been expanded around the globe. The new
concern is the quality of these new democracies. Przeworski (2010) wrote that having
followed liberalization, transition and consolidation, we have discovered there is still
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something to improve, and that is democracy.61 Some analysts claim that the goal of the
new literature on democracy assessment and measurement is to learn what makes
democracy better or worse and to provide insights, to policymakers and other agents of
reforms, on how democracy can be improved and strengthened in their countries.62
The Challenges
The problems with democratization and regime transition theories are when they
focus too much on issues of regimes transitioning to democracy and consolidation, rather
than putting attention on how the regimes actually work even without being fully
democratic. The hybrid regime is generally described by transition experts as unstable
and peculiar and, thus, deserves extra attention in the literature. How can we know how
they really function without evaluating their performance? This is the challenge taken on
by this study, which assesses and evaluates the performance of the so-called odd and
ambiguous regime with flawed democratic practices.
Democratic transition scholars have explicitly or implicitly been adamant about
regimes such as Malaysia, who will one day transform into a liberal democratic system.
This is not surprising since the nature of these theories is teleological. I argue that an
ambiguous political regime like Malaysia may not necessarily transform to be fully
democratic, but that does not mean there will not be opportunities for that goal to happen.
This is because the political configuration entrenched in the regime through its hybrid
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mechanism will somehow facilitate openings for more democracy, while simultaneously
hindering its development.
Political uncertainty is particularly high among developing democracies that are
contributing to this puzzling empirical pattern. This is one of the main challenges in
designing a framework of research on regime change. It is hard to predict when there are
elements of uncertainty; however, we can still put hope in our predictions by analyzing
characteristics to forecast the possibilities of outcomes. Many analysts claim that
democratization is a multi-faceted phenomenon63 and that uncertainty surrounds the end
goal of the democratization process itself; therefore, it is imperative to use the right
analytic approaches in order to understand the issues and problems surrounding the
democratization process, its success stories and its failed efforts. Assessing the quality
and problems of a democracy has been the object of numerous studies. However, despite
the existing extensive literature, the multi-dimensional character of understanding
democracy and measuring its quality have made this study extremely difficult and
challenging.
For these reasons, this study does not advance specific master variables to be used
as units of analysis. Rather, I list factors that I think are significant to be the explanatory
variables to describe and explain some answers from the assessment questions. From this
analysis, I hope to show how these factors influence, either positively or negatively, the
democratization process in Malaysia. Key factors such as the electoral institution,
Internet media, and the peaceful social movement, are positive factors that can facilitate
democratic openings. Factors such as the strong state, dominant single-party system,
63
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coercion (in the form of repressive laws), manipulated electoral system, ineffective
middle class, patron-client list practices, and weak civil societies, are negative factors that
hinder the development of democracy and regime change.
If it is hard to place Malaysia in a clear-cut category between democracy and
authoritarianism, it is even more difficult to perceive the direction in which its political
system is moving. As explained previously, the link between the transition paradigm and
elements of uncertainty about the end results contradict the claim made by proponents of
transition theories, like Huntington, who wrote that a regime in transition toward
democracy will normally go every way, and if it does not, it is unstable.64 Ironically, the
Malaysian political system has been balancing between the traits of liberalism and control
since before its independence from the British, and these characteristics have remained
unchanged until the present.
Some hybrid regimes’ institutional apparatus and their relation with the behavior
of political actors can affect the political system in the long run, either positively or
negatively. That said, this study reminds us that even a partially practiced democracy
with a certain political configuration and setup can plausibly provide an institutional
framework that is capable of guaranteeing an opening for democracy development and
possible regime change. However, there still exists grounds to question the stability of the
hybrid institutional arrangements.
This research chooses to advocate for better governance. I believe that whatever
ground our political setup is based upon, without good governance it is pointless. Good
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governance not only addresses democratic government; it is equally important to a hybrid
government.
In recent years, the economic and political turmoil in Malaysia have reached the
climate of citizen discontent. Issues of bad governance are the main factors that have
brought Malaysians to the streets of Kuala Lumpur in protest to demand more democratic
openings and good governance from the incumbent regime. The Malaysian ruling
government is blamed for failing to meet the needs of the poor, disadvantaged, and
marginalized minorities in a seemingly highly inequitable society.65
Regarding citizen discontent with government performance, this study suggests to
continue pushing for good governance. Accordingly, this study opens the door for
discussion of the possibilities to make hybrid regime studies an independent field in
comparative regime literature, rather than a subfield of diminished types of democracy in
democratization literature.
The objective of this study is to evaluate the partially practiced democracy in
Malaysia and to find out how it actually works in a hybrid political setup. This study also
hopes to identify the strengths of the hybrid setup, as well as to acknowledge weaknesses,
discrepancies, and areas of limitation that need to be improved. This study attempts to
show how some principles of democracy and authoritarian practices are mutually
engaging to prepare the ground for regime stability and endurance.
On the basis of these factors, the hybrid regime seems to function not in spite of
but because of the combination of democratic and authoritarian institutions and the
combination of incentives and deterrents that result from their interactions. It is also
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reasonable to claim that hybrid regimes can be both stable and unstable in relation to the
incentives and deterrents. In addition, it is plausible to claim that the institutional
apparatus and the mechanism that balances the positive and negative components of
democracy, in a hybrid regime can somehow provide a ground for equilibrium.
Thesis Statements
The hybrid regime in Malaysia may not necessarily transform to be fully
democratic, but that does not mean that there are no opportunities for progress in
democratization. This is because the political configuration entrenched in the regime
through the components of democracy (e.g., regular elections, elite strategies, Internet
and social media, peaceful mobilization) will somehow facilitate openings for more
democracy, destabilize the regime, and trigger a possible regime change. On the other
hand, the political configuration in Malaysia’s hybrid system can also facilitate negative
components of authoritarianism; such as, control system, strong state, electoral
engineering, dominant one-party system, and patron-clientele practices that can hamper
the democratization progress and sustain regime incumbency and resiliency.
This study provides a comprehensive assessment of the democratic principles
practiced in Malaysia. One of the goals of this study is to show how democratic traits of
popular control and political equality work in a political environment that is partly
democracy with authoritarian control and how they function as a survival strategy. In
addition, this study provides valuable insights as to what makes regimes in the gray zone
worth studying.
The aim of this study is not to create another adjective to describe countries in the
gray zone. Rather, it is to describe a new dynamic in democratization literature, that a
26

“defective” democracy can actually work in a troubled country. The goal of this
assessment is to shed light for future research of a sustainable hybrid regime type in
studies of democratization and comparative governments.

Figure 1. Positive and Negative Components of Democratization in Malaysia’s
Hybrid Polical Configuration

Methodological Framework
The research framework used for this thesis to assess democracy was proposed by
the well-known non-profit organization that promotes democracy around the globe, the
International Institute of Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Their method
focuses on assessing two democratic principles: (1) popular control, and (2) political
equality.
In the democratization field, students and scholars alike are fully aware how
contested the concept of democracy is. No universal concept of democracy has been
27

produced so far in comparative politics history. Thus, according to the International
IDEA framework, popular control and political equality are the basic principles at the
root of democracy. These principles clarify how democracy is supposed to work on
behalf of the people, as well as determine how democratic institutions, mechanisms, and
values should function for the people. The framework states that the people should
ultimately control (popular control) what the decision-makers do in their name, and that
everyone should be equal in exerting that control (political equality).66
According to Professor Weir (2008), International IDEA’s framework does not
just look at the formal relations between democratic institutions (e.g., Parliament, the
executive, the judiciary); it goes deeper, into the fabric of the society, the people, the
local government, the electoral system, and popular participation, to evaluate the
country’s culture of democracy.67 The framework combines a commitment to the
fundamental principles of democracy, mediating values related to these principles, and a
comprehensive range of questions about democratic performance.68 International IDEA
stands on the ground that democracy is not perfect. In terms of the assessment framework
and within International IDEA’s general orientation toward democracy as an ongoing and
an evolving process, it is entirely to be expected that democracy is not an “all or nothing”
affair, so that certain features may be better developed than others and assessing the
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quality of democracy necessarily requires a multidimensional approach that can provide a
more nuanced and context-specific “performance profile.”69
The democratic ideals endorsed by proponents of democracy may be interpreted
differently and convey overlapping meanings, depending on who is doing the assessment
and which part of the world they come from. Thus, the International IDEA framework is
a citizen-led assessment that insists that only citizens and others who have lived in the
country being assessed should carry out the assessment. This is because only the citizens
of the country are the best source of experiences to tell the country’s history, the people
and society, the culture and their experiences with democracy, in order to shape its
democratic principles.70 The objective is to set the future of democracy in the hands of its
own citizens and not outsiders.
This method is robust, practical, and universally applicable. It has been tested all
around the world in new and old democracies, in developed and developing countries.
Since the year 2000, more than twenty countries71 have been assessed using the IDEA
framework. I used this approach for this study based on two factors: (1) IDEA’s approach
is open-ended research with flexibilities in measuring democracy. There is no compulsion
for an objective conclusion expected at the end of the assessment. The assessment
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questions are robust and do not confine the assessor’s responses into limited areas. (2)
The framework is open for further modification to suit local surroundings. With this in
mind, the assessment approach is useful for those who are facing similar complexities in
approaching an ambiguous political system, such as in Malaysia.
The IDEA framework helps to identify challenges in order to strengthen the
country’s method of governing and reform if it is needed. I hope the assessment findings
will help to inform and educate citizens on the quality of democratic processes as well as
the progress and weaknesses of democracy in their country. In addition, I hope the
assessment findings will provide some points of contribution to the existing literature of
countries that are in the gray zone and that are commonly partly democratic.
How the Framework Works
The International IDEA framework is constructed based on two fundamental sets
of democratic principles: popular control and political equality. From these two
democratic principles, the framework derives seven mediating values:72 participation,
authorization, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and solidarity.
According to International IDEA, in order for these to be achieved and realized, they
have to be adhered with a series of requirements that need to be placed via institutional
means. The combination of these values, their requirements, and institutional means is
outlined in Table 1 below. The democratic principles (i.e., popular control, political
equality) and mediating values are used to construct the four main pillars of the
assessment framework, each of which has a series of subcategories of assessment (see
Table 2). Each of the subcategories has an overarching question and a series of search
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questions (a total of 90)73 (see Summary of the Framework, Figure 1). This study
excludes the fourth pillar of democracy beyond the state because (1) Malaysia’s political
accounts are very much influenced by the domestic politics rather than international
factors, and (2) international influence is not intense in Malaysia, compared to other
countries in the region.74
How To Get the Data and Information?
This study attempts to assess and answer the fifteen overarching questions75
prepared by International IDEA using qualitative and quantitative indicators. The
answers are in a form of analysis via descriptive-analytical approach.76 For this
assessment, I collected varieties of statistical indicators on democracy, development,
human rights, and governance, in order to provide answers to the search questions across
the different subcategories of the four main pillars. Alongside these quantitative
indicators, which are necessarily limited, this research includes qualitative summaries of
the key aspects of Malaysia’s democracy, organized using the subcategories and pillars
73

See appendix.

74

According to Levitsky and Way, Malaysia is one form of competitive authoritarianism that has failed to
be affected by international linkage. For instance, in 1998, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad
was able to imprison his leading challenger, Anwar Ibrahim, and to crack down on the subsequent protest
movement without incurring large-scale external costs. Notwithstanding strong Western support for Anwar
and the Reformasi movement, the international community never seriously threatened Mahathir’s grip on
power. [Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of
Democracy, 16, no. 3 (July 2005): 20-34.]
75

The use of search questions indicates the difference between the SoD framework from other efforts to
measure and assess democracy. The objective was not to achieve an aggregate “score” for a country, nor
seek to rank the order of democratic experiences between countries; however, the framework has
acknowledged that democracy is not an “all-or-nothing” but a multifaceted affair.
76

It is a mixed-method approach in which the researcher uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative
research in the study. Descriptive research involves the collection of secondary data and the description of
the data in order to answer questions concerning the current status of the subjects being studied. Analytical
research is often called exploratory research. Analytical research can be quantitative or qualitative,
depending on whether the focus is on exploring factors, such as voter turnout, which can be assigned a
definitive value, or factors that cannot be given a definitive value, such as attitudes or beliefs.

31

(see Table 2). Data and information on discourses of Malaysian politics were gathered
through secondary sources from libraries and Internet research; including scholarly works
from academic journals, newspapers and magazine reports; and analysis of Malaysian
politics forums, the Malaysian Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, the
U.S. Department of State, UN Special Reports on Malaysia, and NGOs, as well as
blogger sites such as Malaysiakini.com, MalaysianInsider.com, and Aliran.com, all wellknown as reliable online political sources.
Plan of the Dissertation
Chapter one introduces the research framework and highlights the issues in the
democratization and transitions paradigm. It contains the issues and paradox of the
subject of “regime transition” in Malaysia, and discusses the framework of evaluating the
“democracy” practiced in Malaysia. This introductory chapter also includes the three
claims made about the regime in Malaysia.
Chapter two mainly focuses on the theoretical approaches that were relevant to
this study. It demonstrates the main approaches of democratization studies; such as
modernization theories, historical structuralist and transition theories, the background of
third wave democratizations, and some works that discuss “hybrid” regime resiliency.
The latest trend under democratization studies on how to measure the quality of
democracy is also discussed.
Chapter three highlights the trajectory of Malaysia’s politics and the important
dates since independence to the present. This trajectory is in the form of time lines of
Malaysia general elections since 1955.
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Chapter four covers two assessment subjects: (1) assessment of the issues of
nationhood and citizenship in Malaysia, and (2) assessment of the rules of law and access
to justice. This is to show how elements of democracy are intermingled with authoritarian
practices in Malaysia’s political system.
Chapter five covers the assessment of the conditions of civil, political, economic,
and social rights. It shows that some democratic rights are constrained by the practices of
authoritarian control in Malaysia.
Chapter six covers the issues under Malaysia’s free and fair elections and political
parties. The objective is to see how these democratic institutions are practiced in a hybrid
political environment.
Chapter seven covers the subject of the government’s effectiveness and
accountability, the role of the military and police, and an assessment on corruption in
Malaysia. Chapter eight covers the assessment on media and political participation.
Chapter nine covers the assessment on government responsiveness and decentralization.
Chapter ten analyzes the overall performance of the so-called flawed democratic
practices in the Malaysia’s hybrid political system, and discusses some findings from the
assessment, such as the importance of “good governance” indicators. A general policy
recommendation is highlighted and a projection of the regime’s future is discussed.
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Table 1: Mediating Values, Requirements and Institutional Means of Realization
Mediating
Values
Participation

Requirements





Rights to participate
Capacities/resources to participate
Agencies for participation
Participatory culture

Institutional Means of
Realization
 Civil and political rights system
 Economic and social rights
 Elections, parties, NGOs
 Education for citizenship

Authorization

 Validation of Constitution
 Choice of officeholders/programs
 Control of elected over non-elected
executive personnel

 Referenda
 Free and fair elections
 Systems of subordination to
elected officials

Representation

 Legislature representation of main
currents of popular opinion
 All public institution representative of
social composition of electorate

 Electoral and party system
 Anti-discrimination laws
 Affirmative action policies

Accountability

 Clear lines of accountability, legal,
financial, political, to ensure effective
and honest performance civil service
and judicial integrity

 Rule of law, separation of
powers
 Independent auditing process
 Legally enforceable standards
 Strong parliamentary scrutiny
powers

Transparency

 Government open to legislative and
public scrutiny

 Freedom of info, legislation
 Independent media

Responsivenes
s

 Accessibility of government to
electors and different sections of
public opinion in policy formation,
implementation and service delivery

 Systematic and open procedures
of public consultation
 Effective legal redress
 Local government close to
people

Solidarity

 Tolerance of diversity at home
 Support for democratic government
and popular democratic struggles
abroad

 Civic and human rights
education
 International human rights law
 U. N. and other agencies
 International NGOs

Source: Democracy Assessment: The Basics of the International IDEA Assessment Framework 77
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International IDEA, Handbook of Democracy Assessment (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003), 5.
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Table 2: Main Pillars and Subcategories in the State of Democracy Framework
Main Pillars
Citizenship, Law, and Rights

Representative and Accountable
Government

Civil Society and Popular
Participation
Democracy beyond the State

Subcategories
 Nationhood and citizenship
 The rule of law and access to justice
 Civil and political rights
 Economic and social rights
 Free and fair elections
 Democratic role of political parties
 Government effectiveness and
accountability
 Civilian control of the military and police
 Minimizing corruption
 Media in a democratic society
 Political participation
 Government responsiveness
 Decentralization
 International dimensions of democracy

Source: Beetham, D., Bracking, S., Kearton I. and Weir, S. 200278
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D. Beetham, S. Bracking, I. Kearton and S. Weir, Handbook on Democracy Assessment (Stockholm:
International IDEA, 2002).
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Framework Structure
Democratic Principles
 Popular control
 Political equality

Mediating Values








Participation
Authorization
Representation
Accountability
Transparency
Responsiveness
Solidarity

Citizenship, law and rights
 Nationhood and citizenship
 The rule of law and access to justice
 Civil and political rights
 Economic and social rights
Representative and accountable government
 Free and fair elections
 Democratic role of political parties
 Effective and responsive government
 The democratic effectiveness of Parliament
 Civilian control of the military and police
 Integrity in public life
Civil society and popular participation
 The media in a democratic society
 Political participation
 Decentralization
Democracy beyond the state
 External influences on the country’s democracy
 The country’s democratic impact abroad

Search Questions
15 Overarching questions
75 Specific questions
90 questions in total

Figure 2. Summary of the International IDEA Framework79

79

Todd Landman, ed., Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA
Framework (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2008), 13.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Approaches and Relevance
When the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, Fukuyama published his famous
thesis about the end of history and the last man.80 This claim is not worthless, because
history witnessed a surge of countries embracing democracy, one after another like the
domino effect.
Over forty countries have gone through this transition between 1974 and 2005,
with an increase from forty to eighty-nine countries becoming democratic.81 However
democratization studies are not without issues. Since the surge of democracy in the
1990s, now in the new millennium, the trend has shifted toward evaluating countries that
have flunked the process of becoming fully democratic.
Understanding Democratization
This chapter demonstrates important approaches in democratization studies and
their relevance to this dissertation. Democratization studies are very interesting and rich,
because their discourses cover almost the entire field of comparative politics. Also, they
display problems and success stories of comparative democratization not only in
developed countries but also countries in the developing and less-developed regions.
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(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 36.
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In this chapter, I show and explain four approaches to understanding how
democratization works: (1) modernization, (2) structuralist, (3) third wave, and (4)
transition or agency approaches. Along with these approaches, I also highlight the issues,
limitations and usefulness of these approaches in order to grapple with the problems of
the democratization effort in Malaysia. In addition to approaches, included in this chapter
is the latest trend in democratization literature that is studied for measuring the quality of
a democracy.
Modernization Approach
This theory is an attempt to theorize democracy in relation to Western capitalist
ideology. This approach began in the mainstream literature of comparative politics in the
1960s and 1970s.82 It underlines the particular variables and components of what make a
democracy. This process assumes a lineal and untroubled relationship between capitalism
and democracy; and tends to alienate other factors, such as history, ethnocentricity, and
the sensitivity of countries outside the western hemisphere. The modernization approach
focuses overtly on structural factors to explain democracy, since it is based on capitalist
economy. In comparative politics, the modernization approach invites a widespread and
active response from critics in this field. Critics argue that modernization theorists ignore
the particular developmental processes of the Third World; their assumptions are based
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Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 (1959); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The
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on the experiences of the Western world, and they made this the platform for others to
follow.83
The most important theory that defines modernization studies, supported by
proponents of democracy, was Lipset’s theory of social requisite to democracy. Lipset
established the theoretical link between the level of development of a particular country
and the plausibility of it becoming democratic. Lipset stated that the more well-to-do a
nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy; that a country is more likely
to be democratic if its socio-economic structure is advanced and developed.84 Critics
argue that Lipset’s research may have a high degree of correlation between a high level
of economic development and being democratic; however, this correlation does not mean
a causation of democracy.
Among prominent critics of Lipset’s thesis were Adam Przeworski and Fernando
Limongi85 who demonstrated that modernization only helps existing democracies to
survive and does not help democracy to emerge.86 Przeworski agreed that the
conventional empirical observation of validating wealth can sustain a democracy in
wealthier countries; however, wealth and gradual economic growth do not bring
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Jean Grugel. Democratization: An Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 49.
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(January 1997): 155-183.
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democratic transition from autocracy. Nevertheless, wealth remained strongly related to
democracy, and its relationship with democracy is probabilistic.87
For instance, Lipset’s theory is irrelevant to be applied in certain countries in
Southeast Asia and Latin America. Przeworski is right to claim that economic growth
does not cause a regime to transform to democracy. Evidence from Latin America (postWorld War II) further refutes the thesis of modernization theory. Instead, economic
progress in that region was associated with the persistence of authoritarian regimes.88
Analysts describe the regimes that emerge in the midst of economic modernization as the
new authoritarianism.
In Malaysia, pressures from economic growth have had a reverse impact. The
Malaysian state has been formally democratic since independence; however, it has
become increasingly authoritarian, especially after the incident of ethnic violence in
1969. Analysts argue that socio-economic development demands changes to democracy
as well as for authoritarianism.89 Therefore, in Malaysia, conditions of economic growth
are determined by state control over the economy and entrepreneurial class. Thus,
economic growth and its relations to democracy depends on the ruling elites’
commitments to democratic transition, which is hardly the case. Malaysia shows that
greater economic development has been accompanied by more authoritarianism; which

Pippa Norris, Driving Democracy: Do Power‐sharing Institutions Work? (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 79-102.
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F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of
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suggests that economic development does not fit the Lipset hypothesis, thus rendering
economic development neither necessary nor sufficient for democratization.
David Apter argued that democracy as an end should not be pursued at all levels
of modernization since it can bring about destabilization to the political process in
underdeveloped societies.90 Similarly, Huntington in his most prominent work91 criticized
and nailed the prevailing modernization theory that argued that capitalist development,
instead of generating stable democracies, affects stability in developing countries. For
Huntington, rapid social change produces mass political demands,92 which existing
constitutions find hard to contain; and this results in jeopardizing order in a society. In
this context, according to Huntington, economic development increases political
mobilization at a faster rate, thus leading to instability.93
Fukuyama claimed that modernization ignores the particular development
processes of the Third World; and that, extrapolated out of the experiences of the
Western world rule for the entire planet, is also inherently ethnocentric. The critique from
the left says that modernization theorists have enshrined an ethnocentric European or
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North American model of social development as a universal one for humanity to
follow. 94
Structuralist Approach
Historical structuralism is the macro approach to understanding democratization.
Similar to modernization, which emphasizes economic structure and development of
democracy, the structuralist approach focuses on long-term historical patterns, such as
colonial heritage, the state, class, societal fractionalization,95 political culture,96 and
international influence.97 The difference is that the modernization thesis concentrates
more on short-term calculations of democracy; whereas, the structuralist approach
explains long-term predictions of democratization.98 According to Teorell (2010), the
structuralist approach is distinguished from other approaches in that it explains
democratization progress independent of human agents or actors.99
The state-centered view under the structuralist approach is part of the academic
response to the excessive focus on the society-centered view toward understanding
democratization.100 According to statists, the “society-centered” perspective is outdated
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and the state should be the new actor to explain policies and political activities. Important
writings on the state, such as Bringing the State Back In by Skocpol et.al. (1985),
emphasizes the state (in a Weberian101 sense) as an explanatory variable in its own right
to dictate the organization of a society itself.102 Structuralists use states to explain state
relations with social classes and how they interact over phases of time in history in
shaping a political system.
In Malaysia, the state structure itself became an important explanatory variable
for understanding how democratization works, or stalls, in Malaysia. Dan Slater (2012)
called the situation in Malaysia a strong-state democratization.103 According to Slater,
state power in Malaysia has served as the main source of the absolute-power mechanism
in order for a regime to maintain its incumbency. Thus, the regime in Malaysia will strive
hard to make sure that they will not lose political control over the state apparatus.
However, the extent of the arsenal used by the regime in Malaysia, to sustain its power, is
far greater than would be considered normal and acceptable in a fully democratic country.
Thus, we can understand why the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) in Malaysia has not lost
any general elections since independence.
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Jesudason104 (1995) claimed that the position of the state in Malaysia as a statist
democracy that represents the situation where power holders have much of the leverage
in determining the rules of political competition, and that allows the incumbents to
entrench their dominance in the society without employing a high degree of coercion.
This point is interesting because the concept of a state in Malaysia overtook Weber’s
definition of a legitimate use of physical force; hence, it marks the characteristics of
Malaysia’s political system of semi-authoritarian.105
Institutionalism Approach
Under the structuralist approach is the institutionalism approach. Some analysts
claim that studies on institutions are related to agency106; others, like Teorell (2010), see
that institutionalism still bears a strong relevance to structural theories of
democratization.107 Also, institutional explanations as determinants of democracy can be
seen under areas such as forms of government, electoral system, constitutional
frameworks, and regime types; these examples are relevant to an institutional explanation
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that is exogenous to human agency.108 I include the institutionalism approach under the
historical structuralist approach to explain further the roles of institutions as one of the
many variables for explaining and analyzing democratization and, possibly, also regime
transition in Malaysia.
The Social Forces and Democratization
A seminal work by Moore (1966) provides a milestone for a socio-historical
understanding of democratization. Structuralists like Moore focus on factors that are
distinctive to particular cases, like his comparison of the eight major countries Britain,
France, the U.S., Germany, Russia, Japan, China, and India.109 The studies focused on
how historical accounts of the roots of democracy and dictatorship have influenced
democracy in the modern world. One important claim that Moore has made is that the
bourgeoisie class was an important variable that can bring democracy in a country: No
bourgeoisie, no democracy.110 However, later research found that in developing societies
the middle class does not necessarily work to the advantage of a democracy. For
example, in Latin America, the middle class actually supports the militarized dictatorship,
instead of working toward a democratic system.111
Lipset’s middle class and Moore’s bourgeoisie both support the structuralist
approach, explaining how democracy is achieved. However, this connection is irrelevant
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in some areas, such as Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, for example, a huge portion of the
middle class supports the authoritarian regime, instead of demanding regime
transformation. Thus, the claim that growing the middle class creates pressures for
democracy is questionable, at best. The middle class in Malaysia is relatively large, but
they are divided along ethnic lines. Government policies that positive discrimination
responds more to the demands of Malays has alienated ethnic non-Malays. Thus, the
ethnic divisions in Malaysia have forestalled any unified middle-class or working-class
action against the dominant regime.112 A divided and a weak middle class in Malaysia
renders them ineffective to push for democracy or to resist authoritarian government.
The strength of the structuralist approach is that it is more grounded and
explanatory and it provides comparisons across countries and regions. Yet, critics claim
that this approach is old school and obsolete for explaining regime change. They
acknowledge agents like classes and states, but they do not sufficiently explain
institutions, individuals, and elites as agents of change. Their view on structures has
determined that outcomes are too simplistic and predetermined, thus lack of a microfoundation.
Third Wave Approach
Samuel Huntington,113 the great scholar of democratization, named the post1974114 period the “third wave” of global democratic expansion.115 This prompted him to

112

John Girling, “Development and Democracy in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Review 1, no. 4 (1988): 332333.
113

Huntington, however, changed his views on modernization to some degree after his influential 1991
work The Third Wave. He does consider modernization as one of the factors driving democratization.

46

write the Third Wave theory116 to validate those events. Since then, Huntington’s wave
theory has been widely accepted as providing a basis for analysis. In addition to
confirming the liberalization of many countries, he acknowledged that the wave also
involves countries that are not fully democratized, some which previously had made the
transition but reversed back to non-democratic rule.117
The Third Wave theory118 was not, however, a manifestation of a broader crosscultural modernization process that eventually would encompass all societies, but one
rooted in a particular set of cultural values inherited from Western Christianity119; also
that the dissemination of the ideologies of democracy will have positive implications
from transnational activities. This is where the problems are realized regarding
Huntington’s Third Wave theory in particular, and the democratization paradigm in
general. Huntington is criticized due to the weakness of the Third Wave theory’s
assumption that democratization is the result of positive transnational activities.
Historically, even though the origin of modern democracy may be rooted in Western
Christianity, globalization and the West do not represent the vanguard of a universalizing
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democratic movement.120 In addition, critics say that Huntington’s prediction narrowly
focuses on untainted elections instead of including effects of the fallacy of electoralism.
Critics also say that by overemphasizing the global aspects of democratization,
Huntington has ignored actual causes for democracy that seminally involve the
configuration of domestic politics of nation states; including historical legacy, institutionbuilding, class structure, civil society, and the power of state.121 The important factor that
comes out of the democracy third wave is that ambiguous regimes got stuck in the
continuum between authoritarian and full democracy.
Transition Process-oriented Agency Approach
In response to the relative inability of modernization and structural approaches to
explain the third wave democratization processes, new literature on democratic transition
emerged in the 1980s, adopting an agency or process-oriented approach. This literature
emphasized the importance of political actors and their ideas and ability to interact with
each other (incumbent and opposition) to peacefully bring about a democratic transition.
A huge part of transition theory has focused more on the strategic choices of
agents or actors such as political elites. According to Howard and Roessler (2006), elite
strategies and “incumbent-opposition dynamics” are more important to “competitive
authoritarian” regime than structural factors for determining political liberalization.122
However, the agents/elites approach on democratic transition is irrelevant to Malaysia,
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because there is no obvious cooperation between the ruling elites and opposition elites
when it comes to negotiating a regime transition. The ruling elites have so far remained
strong and unified under the regime. It is the opposition elites that are weak, due to
different ideologies.
Transition theory emphasizes the importance of political change and focuses on
liberalization, transition, and consolidation. Rather than focusing on economy, history
and development as in the modernization approach, the transition school believe that it is
individual actors such as elites (either from the incumbents or the oppositions) who are
responsible for regime transition to democracy. This is where the problem lies. Too much
focus on agents neglects other variables that are also part of explaining how and why a
regime succeeds or fails to become democratic.
Rustow (1970),123 one of the main critics of Lipset and structural literature in
general, claimed that they neglect the micro or genetic aspect of how democracy comes
into being.124 To address this neglect, Rustow came up with a model of democratization
that emphasizes certain stages/phases that a country must go through from authoritarian
to democratic rule. These phases are: the preparatory -> decision-> habituation.125
Many recent works on transitions have continued this emphasis. Twenty years
after Rustow, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) came out with strong research on the
relevance of political actors as agents in democratic transition in Latin America. In other
123

Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2
(April 1970): 337-363.
124

Ibid., 340.

125

Jan Teorell, Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 19.

49

words, what matters is not that political elites have a normative commitment to
democracy, but that they are willing to accept it as a compromise. Huntington (1984) and
Karl (1986c) likewise argued that democracy has been an unintended consequence and
that political elites have viewed democracy as a means of realizing other objectives.126
Critics and analysts argue that the transition stage of democratization is regarded
as a period of great political uncertainty; that regimes can reverse, re-becoming
authoritarian rather than transforming into fully democratic. According to Karl and
Schmitter, the transition period is a subject of unforeseen contingencies, unfolding
processes, and unintended outcomes.127 This is the stage where the hybrid regimes
emerge; instead of going through the end process of democratization, these regimes get
stuck in-between the continuum.128
One of the interesting issues in the literature is the connection between democracy
and uncertainty. Przeworski’s contributions have highlighted the uncertainty of
democracy. The process of establishing a democracy is a process of institutionalizing
uncertainty and subjecting all interests to uncertainty. In an authoritarian regime, some
groups, typically the armed forces, have the capacity to intervene whenever the result of a
conflict is contrary to their program or interests. In a democracy, no group is able to
intervene when outcomes of conflicts violate self-perceived interests. Democracy means
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that all groups must subject their interests to uncertainty.129 This tradition stresses the
uncertainty and possibilities that surround transitions to democracy. 130
The wave of democratic optimism after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
triumph of capitalism around the globe, has given way to more somber appraisals about
the current condition of democratic systems in the developing world. There is a growing
awareness that elections alone do not guarantee the full quality of a democratic system. In
addition, only a few countries that were supposed to transition to democracy have
actually reached the stage of consolidation of the system. Instead, most of the countries in
Africa, Asia, and ex-Communist states, have come to occupy an uncertain middle ground
between complete authoritarian and full democracy. Some have even reversed back to
becoming authoritarian.
These so-called ambiguous democracies have been variously described as flawed,
illiberal131 or more generally hybrid regimes132; what Ottawa 2003 claimed was an
ambiguous system that combined rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy … with
essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits. Academics and policymakers have
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focused increasing attention on the challenges and dilemmas of these gray-zone
countries: hybrid regimes.133
Resilient Hybrid Regimes
While others in democratization studies have attempted to analyze the failed
process of democratic transition, lamenting regime defects with façade democracies that
disguise authoritarian practices; others claim that these regimes will not stand and that
‘‘liberal authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not
stand.’’134 How is it that so many countries around the world, Malaysia being a classic
example of a regime with mixed/ hybrid system,135 have endured for more than fifty
years?
Much discourse in the transition literatures discusses how a country can be
democratic and end up with a democratic consolidation. However, not many have given
thought to regimes of this kind that have endured challengers and critics and have
thrived; not only surviving, but are stable and resilient. The transition paradigm limits the
further understanding and reality of regimes in the gray area. These limitations in the
democratic transition paradigm should be given some reflection.
Regimes like these are not in a transitional mode; they are here to stay. According
to Hobson (2003), the assumption that the current status of regimes in the gray area is
only temporary and the idea that they will eventually become either a democracy or
133
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reverse back to authoritarianism is problematic. He does not agree that regimes at this
stage should be called democracies, because these regimes do not meet all the definitional
criteria of what a democracy is. For those who assume that these regimes will end up
reverting to authoritarianism, serving the teleological pitfalls and normative judgments,
Hobson further argued that viewing these regimes from the dichotomy of a “democracy +
elections’ mindset” obscures the real nature of these entities. Only by removing this
mindset can analysts progress toward a fuller understanding of what these regimes truly
are.136
Merkel (2004), in his analysis,137 showed that defective democracies are by no
means regimes in transition. They tend to form stable connections to their economic and
social structures and are often seen as considerable parts of the elite population and as an
adequate institutional solution to the specific problems of governing effectively. These
regimes will remain for a long time, he says, as long as there is equilibrium in the
system.138
Brownlee (2007) commented on regimes that are partially democratic and
partially autocratic, which Huntington labeled halfway houses. Instead of being unstable,
wrote Brownlee, this kind of regime has, in fact, become “a fortress – not a way station
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but a way of life.”139 According to Brownlee, comparative scholars have thrived on
political change, especially the installation of democracies after years of dictatorship.
However, Brownlee also stressed that, in order to explain regime change, regime
continuity should be taken into consideration as well.140
Since the end of the Third Wave theory, there has been increasing skepticism
about the outcomes of many regimes that were thought to be in transition. The gray-zone
and hybrid regimes seem to be dominating the condition of those countries, especially in
the Third World. Bogaards (2009), in his study of hybrid regimes, claimed that the
prospect of democratic consolidation for these kinds of regimes are farfetched; thus, that
these regimes must be considered a type of their own rather than categorized as regimes
that are undergoing the process of transition.141
Dan Slater (2009) argued that, in order to study a regime, one must directly
observe how stable and resilient to challenges and crises those regimes have proven to be
over time. Slater described Malaysia as a regime with endurance capacity; not because it
has lasted more than five decades, but that it is durable because it has shown a
remarkable capacity to manage conflicts.142
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Countries in the gray area have been given many labels, such as “partial
democracy,’’ “semi-democracy,’’ “façade democracy,” “illiberal democracy,” “soft
authoritarian,” “competitive authoritarianism,” and “electoral authoritarianism.” To date,
there are many emerging interests in the studies of this ambiguous regime type, and my
project is one of them. This study, therefore, will fill the opening in the democratic
transition discourse on why a regime can remain a hybrid and survive for a long period of
time without reaching the destination of becoming democratic or fully authoritarian.
Measuring Democracy
The wave of democratization around the world in recent decades has brought
about a rising need for a means to assess, measure, compare, and explain democratic
progress cross country, cross region, and over time. The issues in democratization studies
no longer focus on democratic transition and its consolidation. Focus in contemporary
democratization studies is on how to measure the qualities of these democratic regimes
that have undergone the transitioning stage, as well as democracies that are already well
established.143 According to analysts, three challenges face the new interests of
measuring democracy: conceptualizing; measurement and aggregation.144
All of these challenges are very poorly resolved by existing measures of
democracy. Regarding democratic concept specification, existing measures are based on
a conception of democracy that is too simple and lack a sound conceptual logic that can
be standardized to be used in other cases. Aside from conceptual inadequacy, the method
143
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of measuring (the measurement) used to create indices that do not demonstrate high
validity or reliability and some cannot be imitated. Finally, researchers who have used the
existing measures neither discuss nor justify their aggregation level and rules.145
A number of composite indices were developed to measure democracy. Coupled
with the advancement of statistical methods, democratic indices became powerful tools of
social science research and an important factor of political decision-making. Wellestablished democracy indices, such as Freedom House and Polity IV, are criticized for
not being sensitive enough to measure the delicate differences among established
democracies. For instance, well-established indices like Freedom House, Vanhanen, and
Polity are more relevant to be used to distinguish a democratic country from nondemocratic country; thus, they are not designed to measure the quality of established
democracy. The reason for this is their minimalist concept as a basis for democracy.146
The reason for measuring democracy is to establish where democratic countries
stand on a scale of democratic quality. O’Donnell criticized mainstream political science
on democracy for regime bias. Political science can rely on predominantly narrative or
statistical methods for observing and understanding democracy. Important recent works
in narrative traditions—O’Donnell et al. on measuring democracy in Latin America,
Diamond and Morlino et al. on measuring comparative democracy across the world—
focused on the complexity of democracy and the need to look beyond the regime type in
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the assessment of quality, stating that observation should focus on the situation of the
citizens.147
A sample study in Norway on democracy assessment drew on large-scale surveys
of attitudes and beliefs among political, business and cultural elite; as well as surveys of
citizenship and political behavior, in addition to analyzing political processes and
structures. O’Donnell et al. developed a theory of democratic quality that links
democracy with human rights. Diamond and Morlino et al. identified a range of
dimensions for assessing democracies, including their responsiveness.148
Lijphart studied thirty-six countries, comparing two types of democracies—
majoritarian and consensus democracies—to show how they differ in performance.
Political scientists agree that consensus democracies should be better in
representativeness, and majoritarian democracies should be better in terms of efficiency
of rules. Lijphart found that consensus democracies tend to outperform majoritarian
democracies in both representativeness and efficiency of governance, indicating that
democracies do differ systematically in quality and performance.149
The main issue in measuring quality of democracy is how to actually measure it.
What framework should be used? Must the method be standardized so that it applies
universally? Can different cases use different measurement method? Lastly, how should
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democracy be graded? Is democracy a property that can be graded in terms of having
more or less of it, or is it an either/or phenomenon?
Measuring the quality of a democracy is the latest new field in democratization
studies. Various types of measurements and assessments have been designed and applied
to new and old democracies, displaying different degrees of consolidation. The goal of
this new literature on democracy assessment and measurements is to learn what makes a
democracy work better or worse and to provide policymakers and other agents of reforms
insights on how democracy can be improved and strengthened in a country.
The issues surrounding this new literature are on how to untangle the concept of
democracy vs. its quality. When assessing the quality of democracy, one should bear in
mind that levels of understanding about the structure and process of democracy are
substantially different across geography and societies. Different socio-cultural, economic
system, and institutional patterns explain democracy in variations of ways and standards.
In developing countries of late, people have started to demand more government
accountability, transparency, and social justice. Citizens are beginning to understand that
elections alone are not sufficient to make a good democracy.
In Malaysia for example, decades of semi-authoritarian rule, rising socioeconomic inequalities, rising corruption among government officials, and preferential
treatments that benefit few have made Malaysians demand good governance from the
ruling regime.
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International IDEA and Democracy
This method maintains a more dynamic position that sees democracy as an
ongoing process in all countries, which cannot be imported or exported but must be
supported. To this end, the International IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment, and
the revised edition Assessing the Quality of Democracy: A Practical Guide, both adopt a
wide and substantive definition of democracy that is built on fundamental principles and
mediating values; the fundamental principles being (1) popular control over decisions and
decision-makers, and (2) equality of respect and voice between citizens in the exercise of
that control.150
The International IDEA framework of assessing democracy does not yield
comparative quantitative measures; the move from higher-level theoretical concepts and
democratic principles to analytical categories and search questions represents an adoption
of virtually the same principles. The IDEA approach is broadly inclusive of the
constitutive elements of democratic development; however, it lacks an explicit theory of
how these elements are related to one another and how democratic development occurs
and is sustained.151
The surge of democracies since the end of the Cold War has been acknowledged
and noticed. New interest in comparative politics literature has arisen in seeking to
explain the conditions for the emergence, breakdown, or survival of different regimes;

150

IDEA (2008): 23.

151

George Perlin and David Sully, “Literature Review of Applied Research on Democratic Development,”
(Paper prepared for the International Development Research Centre [IDRC], Canada, 2008): 14.

59

and to address questions regarding the quality of these new democracies and issues
surrounding the stages of democratic consolidation of transitional regimes/countries.
The quality of democracy is a multifunctional phenomenon, and it does not make
sense to measure the quality of democracy in non-democratic countries. The literature on
the quality of democracy is in an early stage; there are no well-established hypotheses
about the causes (or consequences) of a good democracy.152 The assessment of a
democracy’s progress may not be sufficient to be explained holistically by concentrating
on statistical measurements without an explanatory approach. By using a case study
approach, research can go in-depth in analyzing and measuring how a democracy
functions in a particular country. A statistical approach or quantitative approach should
go well with large-N studies; however, for a single case study like Malaysia, a qualitative
study is more relevant.
Democracy assessment can be used for analyzing the problem of consolidation as
well as different trajectories, processes, and outcomes under democratization.153 I believe
that democratization should be explained holistically and, thus, use all four approaches in
analyzing democracy in Malaysia.
Conclusion
I have displayed the approaches under democratization studies that I believe are
important to understanding how democratization (third wave democracy) can plausibly
bring about regime transition or regime stalling in the process. I argue that these
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approaches are important for understanding why some regimes transform to democracy
and why some do not and, instead, pause in the process. I also argue that each of these
approaches may be relevant and can provide sufficient explanation if applied to particular
cases, but may not fit to explain other cases. Hence, taking one approach in isolation will
not provide a satisfactory explanation for the outcomes of regime transition. Different
approaches under transition theory should be considered complementary to each other,
instead of competing with each other or dominant against the other approaches, in
explaining certain cases or many cases, given that each of them has their own strengths
and limitations.
In conclusion, I have determined that all approaches for understanding the
democratization process—modernization/economic, historical structuralism, and
transition approaches—are relevant and play a part in understanding the political system
in Malaysia. By using all of these approaches, we can discern what variables cause
democratic achievement and what hinder its realization. Democratization requires a
collective action of classes and social movement, more than just an agency- and actorsoriented approach.
Teorell (2010), in his studies on regime change in the world, found that it is
important to have an integrated theory of democratization for measuring democratic
quality. Singling out one or two approaches is not enough to fully describe the
complexities of democratization, especially in countries that are different than the
original hypotheses used in successfully developed Western countries, Latin America,
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and Southern Europe.154 All of the approaches are important; each has its own strengths
and limitations in explaining the issues and advantages of democratization in developing
countries. For instance, economic growth theories alone cannot be used to analyze
democracy in a country such as Malaysia or Singapore or the oil-rich Gulf states. This
explains why these cases are as important and intriguing as the democratization
paradigms studied.155
What works will necessarily depend upon national circumstances; and what works
in one country will not necessarily work in another. However, successful cases of
democracy practices that benefit the people can be emulated by others, as long as they do
not disturb the equilibrium of the socio-economic construct of the polity. The main
advantage of having methods to measure the performance of a political system and its
governance is always beneficial to know; from these assessments, policy and decision
makers can improve the quality of their government performance.
Bottom line, there is no single correct research strategy for researching political
and social phenomenon. As Lakatos (1978) wrote, a theory is evaluated not only on the
basis of parsimony but also on the grounds of the comprehensiveness of the explanation
advanced and the extent to which it provides a promising foundation for future
research.156 Each strategy has its own strengths and weight for explaining particular
issues in particular cases. Some may not have the advantages of explaining and resolving
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paradox due to limitations; however, this does not mean that some approaches are
completely useless. In practice, both the researcher and the analyst must be ready to be
more open to venturing different approaches than conventionally used.
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Chapter Three: Malaysia’s Political Trajectory Since Independence in 1957
Politics in Malaysia is influenced by two forms of governing: (1) partial
democracy, and (2) controlled mechanism used by the state as its apparatus to manage the
country. These sets of ruling have continued since the tragedy of ethnic violence that has
marred Malaysia’s history as a plural society. Malaysia since then has used the incident
to mark its politics as based on communalism. On this ground, politics in Malaysia
presumably, cannot be managed under fully liberal democratic ideas alone and instead
has to be supported by control apparatus to stabilize the whole political structure.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the backdrop of the establishment of
Malaysian regime’s157 experiences and to provide an understanding of the subsequent
trajectory to trace any kind of political change experienced by Malaysia after colonialism
ended in 1957. The backbone of this time line is the twelve general elections that have
taken place since 1955.
1955
This is the only general election held under the then federation of Malaya on July
27, two years before independence. Voter turnout was 82.8 percent and the Alliance Party
won about 80 percent of the total vote. The election resulted in a decisive win for the
Alliance; comprised of United Malay National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian
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Chinese Association (MCA), and Malaysian Indian Council (MIC).158 The outstanding
issue was the independence factor, which allowed the Alliance Party to secure
outstanding victory against the opposition. The only opposition candidate was from the
Malayan Islamic Party, later known as Pan Malaysian Islamic Party or Parti Islam seMalaysia (PAS) and was nicknamed Mr. Opposition.159
1957
In 1957, Malaya, the old name for Malaysia before its official formation in 1963,
gained independence from the British. However, the independence of Malaysia is
different from the independence of other countries. It was a peaceful independence,
attained by holding talks with the British. One can claim that Malaysians, especially the
Malays are non-confrontational people who are likely to accommodate and who practice
a politics of give and take.
The UMNO became the bastion of Malays’ political power and the protector of
Malay communities; the MCA found potential support from the Chinese business
community and joined the Alliance right before the independence, mainly to protect the
interests of the elites. The Alliance party (now Barisan Nasional, BN) demonstrated the
political stability and multi-ethnic harmony that were essential for the new nation-state’s
survival. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister, set the pattern of administration
for future prime ministers. In his government, as one observer claimed, the essence of
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Alliance bargaining was not equality but mutual dependency, combined with a
willingness to cooperate and accommodate.160
1959
Malaysia’s first general election after independence was held in 1959. Tunku
Abdul Rahman’s administration had managed to put aside the sensitive issues such as
education, language, and the Malays’ special rights; and focused more on calling for
communal harmony. During campaigning, they pointed to their good record over the past
four years, promising further progress. The party stood for tolerance and amity among the
ethnic groups of Malaya’s plural society. The Alliance won successfully in 1959, because
they succeeded in convincing the people of their main role as the best safeguard of the
nation’s domestic peace. 161 It is claimed that the period from 1957 until the 1969
ethnicity riots is generally regarded as a harmonious period in Malaysian history.
1963
On 16 September 1963, the formation of Malaysia consisted of the formally
propagated Federation of Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore. Brunei declined to be
under Malaysia. Singapore, then, was a state in Malaysia, until it seceded in 1965.
1964
Malaysia’s second general election after the independence was held April 25,
1964. The Alliance party won 89 of the 104 seats. The People Action Party (PAP) headed
by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore won only one seat. Every Alliance Minister was returned,
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with an even bigger majority. The result, according to Lee, came as a shock. The
resulting victory of the Alliance is believed to have been due to the Tunku’s leadership
and his call for patriotism and public support in the face of Sukarno’s confrontation.162
Even though the PAP leadership was keen to establish a partnership with UMNO in the
Alliance, its intention was doubted by leaders in the Alliance. The mutual suspicion
between PAP and UMNO resulted in an intense ethnic antipathy in Malaysian society.
The manifestations of these were the two ethnic riots that took place in Singapore in July
and September 1964.163 The speech by Lee Kuan Yew in 1965, calling for Malaysian
Malaysia, further strained the relationship between the Malay elites in the Alliance and
the PAP. This was considered the most serious threat ever to the framework of a Malay
nation-state; hence, it contributed toward the “expulsion” of Singapore from Malaysia.
1965
Singapore seceded from Malaysia in 1965. In the beginning, the Alliance’s idea to
include Singapore under Malaysia was a wise thing to do in order to contain its leftleaning Singapore politics.164 However, shortly after the formation of Malaysia, the
wisdom of the idea was challenged. As widely claimed, the incorporation of Singapore
into Malaysia created an unstable balance of power between the state of Singapore and
federal government in Malaysia in addition to conflicts of interest socially, economically,
and politically.
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The People Action Party (PAP) led by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore created an
alliance of its own under the new Malaysia, proposing Malaysian Malaysia which was
against the aspirations of Malaysia’s own Alliance Party.
Since Malaysia is a heavily plural society, the then ruling elites, especially
premier Tunku Abdul Rahman, were widely known for their peaceful nature and beliefs
that communal solidarity is an extremely dominant force in Malaysian politics. The threat
of communal violence was apparently the crucial factor that made the federal government
make the crucial decision to oust Singapore from Malaysia.165 Some critics (mostly the
ultra-Malay nationalists) argued that Tunku’s act of letting Singapore slip away was a
mistake. Nevertheless, ethnic violence did not end in 1964; it happened again in 1969.
1966
As a result of the official formation of Malaysia in 1963, after almost four years
of confrontation166 with Indonesia, the two nations agreed to a peace treaty in 1966;
although Indonesian President Sukarno believed that the formation of Malaysia had been
colonial clandestine to maintain British colonial rule behind the cloak of peaceful
independence given to Malaysia in order to maintain their colonial possessions in
Southeast Asia. It was also claimed that the formation of the Malaysia federation
destroyed Sukarno’s ambitious plan to create Melayu Raya or Greater Indonesia.167
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Nevertheless the confrontation (1962–1966) was an “undeclared war,” with most
of the action in the border area between Indonesia and East Malaysia (Sabah and
Sarawak). Malaysia was assisted by the Commonwealth armies, mostly from Australia
and New Zealand. In October 1965, Sukarno was toppled in Indonesia and the “New
Order” was begun under General Suharto. In late May of the following year, his foreign
minister, Adam Malik, met Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia’s deputy prime minister, for
peace talks in Bangkok, and the Peace Agreement was signed 11 August 1966.168
1969
Malaysia’s third general election on 13 May 1969 is renowned for the ethnic riots
that followed, marring the peaceful history of Malaysia’s plural society. The consequence
also included the collapse of Malaysia’s consociational practices, plus a return to power
for the Alliance Party (comprised of UMNO, MCA, MIC), although with a reduced
majority. The Alliance Party’s seats fell from 89 in 1964 to now 66, and its popular votes
declined from 58.4 percent in 1964 to 48.5 percent.169 The opposition parties, such as
Gerakan and Democratic Action Party (DAP), had campaigned on the highly sensitive
issues against Malay privileges that were outlined by Article 153 of the Constitution,
causing major gains in the election. On May 12, jubilant Gerakan and DAP supporters,
mainly Chinese, took to the streets of Kuala Lumpur in a victory celebration, ridiculing
the Malays and predicting future Chinese successes. A counter-rally by UMNO
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supporters the following day led to unprecedented and uncontrolled ethnic violence. The
official result showed the death of 196 people (could be more than reported), 406 injured,
and unaccounted properties destroyed.170
Ethnicity had been a strong factor in Malaysian political life long before 1969.
However, the scale of violence on this day radically changed not only the political system
but the wider social consciousness. Following this episode, the consociational model of
the pre-independence era developed into a hegemonic party system,171 with UMNO
establishing itself as a dominant party supported by growing Malay nationalism. The
ascending groups of Malay nationalists had lost faith in the leaders of the Alliance and
were pressing for a stronger Malay government.172 These groups blamed the election
results, and the violence that followed, on the ongoing economic hardship of the Malays
and called for policies to address this economic imbalance.173
As a result of the ethnic violence, a state of emergency was declared. The
Parliament was suspended and an emergency government—the National Operation
Council (NOC) under the directorship of the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak—
took over. Tunku later resigned as premier and Tun Abdul Razak took over as Malaysia’s
second prime minister.
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It is claimed that the era of complete Malay political dominance took effect after
1969. Tun Abdul Razak and the groups of Malay nationalists demanded a new
affirmative policy to correct the perceived discrepancies in the socio-economic system in
Malaysia, in an effort to manage the opposition and dissidents. This usually involved
government actions that curtailed human rights, with repressive instruments such as the
Draconian Law of ISA, which had been used to contain a Communist threat some fifty
years previous and this time was used against the opponents.174 As such, the political
system ceased to be one of consociationalism and became one of control exerted by a
UMNO-led BN coalition. Nevertheless, observers claimed that, aside from the repressive
measures to manage constraints in the country, the government combined them with
responsiveness.175
1971
The most radical change in the wake of 1969 was the establishment of the New
Economic Policy (NEP). May 13, 1969 had confirmed the fear of many in Malaysia’s
fragile plural society, where ethnic tensions were high, that only a strong state could
prevent the society from plunging into the abyss of societal collapse. The ethnic violence,
hence, initiated a state-run social engineering program known as the NEP, whose
objectives were two-pronged: first, to eradicate poverty; second, to restructure the society
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through rapid expansion of the economy over time, in order to eliminate identifying one’s
ethnicity with economic function.176
Aside from these two objectives, critics claimed that the interventionist
affirmative policies of the government at all levels of society had perhaps caused the
greatest creation of wealth in the shortest span of time by peaceful means in the history of
the world.177 Analysts also claimed that the NEP were providing the government the
accumulation of resources in order to support their patron client relations within the
society. Although the NEP discriminated against the non-Bumiputeras, NEP proponents
claimed that NEP was a positive discrimination policy that helped to correct the
inequality and socio-economic imbalance that had been entrenched in the society since
independence. Nevertheless, the UMNO-led government was flexible to allow a free
market economy to develop, and the government gave the non-Bumiputeras a free hand
in the economy as long as quotas and shares were allocated to Malays.178
1974
In Malaysia’s fourth general election in 1974, the result was a victory for Barisan
Nasional (BN), the coalition ruling party (formerly known as the Alliance Party)
established in 1973. BN managed to capture 135 of the 154 seats in the Parliament. This
meant the BN was much stronger now at the federal level than the Alliance had been in
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1959. The main reason for the victory was the strong support the BN got from the main
ethnic composition in Malaysia: the Malays, Chinese, and the Indians.179
1978
In Malaysia’s fifth general election in 1978, as expected, the BN comfortably
maintained their majority in the Malaysian Parliament, with 131 of the 154 seats
contested. The premier during that time was Tun Hussein Onn, the country’s third prime
minister. Despite PAS’ withdrawal from BN, the UMNO still won by losing only four
seats, and Kelantan lost to UMNO. MCA lost to DAP, winning only 17 of 28
parliamentary seats. The issues used by DAP to attack BN were the 1961 Education Act,
the Merdeka University, and the Industrial Coordination Act. Nevertheless, despite
garnering 42.8 percent of the total votes, the opposition as a whole only won 23 seats.
Critics and analysts claimed that those were the effects of electoral gerrymandering.180
Analysts claimed that the decade after 1978 saw the consolidation of BN’s rule, in
particular UMNO’s hegemony over the ruling coalition’s party.181
1981
In 1981, for health reasons, Hussein Onn relinquished power to Mahathir
Mohamad, who then became Malaysia’s fourth prime minister. It is significant to include
this moment in the time line of Malaysian politics, because for the next twenty-two years,
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he would preside over a repressive-responsive182 state that tightly guarded the preferential
status of Malays, curbed civil liberties, destroyed judicial independence, and delivered a
steady economic growth with plenty of patronage to go around. In addition to Mahathir’s
authoritarianism and the growth of illiberal democracy,183 post-1969 political
developments were marked by an expanding middle class, competition within the Malay
community between UMNO and the opposition PAS, Sino-Malay tensions, and the slow
but steady growth from 1998 onward of a civil society movement that began to transcend
communal barriers. One or more of these factors has been responsible for most of the
major shake-ups in politics over the last four decades.184
It was in Mahathir’s administration that the mechanism of control and executive
dominance increased in an effort to manage constraints in the system. One of the
methods, for instance, was controlling mainstream media. The existing control of the
media became even stronger under Mahathir’s leadership. By the end of the 1980s,
UMNO and its coalition partners were able to control all the mainstream media, in both
publishing and broadcasting, through ownership. In addition to direct ownership of the
media, Mahathir’s administration increased control by tightening regulations that affected
freedom of the press. After Mahathir came to power, many opposition-oriented
publications lost their printing permits and journalists were occasionally punished for
their contributions that negatively portrayed government policies.185
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1982
Malaysia’s sixth general election in 1982 was held more than one year early,
before the term of the Parliament elected in 1978 was due to expire. It was claimed
necessary to provide a mandate for Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, who had taken office in mid1981.186 As expected, the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) won the overwhelming
majority of seats, 132 of the 145 parliamentary seats (91.0%).187
Factors for the big win were, aside from the natural advantages accrued by
controlling the resources of government, BN’s claim of an impressive long-term record
of achievement, economically and in terms of political stability and overall ethnic
harmony. In addition, they were proud of the strong government, which the BN claimed
was necessary to maintain the country as evidence of a major economic takeoff. The
opposition parties, on the contrary, were disorganized, underfinanced, traumatized by
infighting, lacked credible alternative programs and policies, and were unable to ignite
issues or to get their various messages across convincingly.188
1986
Again, as expected, in Malaysia’s seventh general election in 1986, the UMNOled BN achieved an unprecedented victory, particularly in the rural areas which are
predominantly Malay states. BN won 148 seats, DAP 24, PAS 1, and independents 4. Of
all the BN component parties, UMNO performed the best, winning 83 of the 84 seats
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contested. MIC also performed well, winning 12 of the 13 seats allocated. DAP’s
performance was their best ever in Malaysia’s election history. This made DAP the only
opposition party in the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat). The main reason for
DAP’s achievement, particularly in urban areas, was that they successfully articulated
their criticism of the government on ethnic issues, economic mismanagement, financial
scandals, and corruption. MCA lost their appeal for its pro-government’s policies.189 The
BN component party that performed badly was MCA and Gerakan; they suffered a
humiliating defeat, winning only 17 of the 34 parliamentary seats allocated.
1987
Malaysia’s economic recession in 1987 resulted in a more controlled flow of
patronage, and rewards to new elites. Thus, the economic downturn can be seen as the
catalyst for a split waiting to happen. Mahathir was challenged for the presidency of
UMNO, and effectively the prime ministership, by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah.190 The
post of president provided an effective accession to the prime ministership. Hamzah’s
new party, Semangat 46, teamed up with Party Islam se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian
Islamic Party), PAS, and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) to form an opposition
alliance called Gagasan Rakyat Malaysia. The opposition bloc campaigned on an anticorruption platform within the context of UMNO and NEP patronage.191
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Also this year, in October, the Internal Security Act (ISA) again took effect, in
Operasi Lalang. Under this repressive law, 106 persons were detained for allegedly being
involved in activities prejudicial to the security of Malaysia. These included Lim Kit
Siang, leader of the opposition, and Dr Chandra Muzaffar, a prominent human-rights
activist (both were detained for two years), as well as university lecturers,
environmentalists, businessmen, and some members of UMNO. All had been critical of
the government.192 From there on after 1987, tighter authoritarian rules were applied to
strengthen Mahathir’s centralized political control.
1988
There were two important events in 1988. First, the split within UMNO, revealing
not just a power struggle but a hegemonic crisis, which signified a fundamental shift in
the political basis of the union. UMNO was split in two: UMNO Baru (new), known as
Team A, led by Mahathir; and Semangat 46, known as Team B, led by Razaleigh
Hamzah.193
The second major event was the sacking of the Tun Salleh Abbas, the Lord
President (highest judicial figure in the land) by Mahathir, for gross misbehavior and
conduct. This action was taken because the judge had written a letter of protest to the
Agong in disagreement with Mahathir’s decision to increase the power of Parliament to
remove the general power of the High Court to conduct judicial reviews. A tribunal set up
by Mahathir found Salleh guilty and recommended to the Agong that Salleh be
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dismissed, along with five other judges who supported him, which the Agong did. This
most blatant intrusion of the separation of power that had ever happened in Malaysia’s
political history, according to Milne and Mauzy, destroyed the independence of
Malaysia’s judiciary.194
1990
Following the split in 1988, in Malaysia’s eighth general election in 1990, the
UMNO-led BN political hegemony was still intact. The dynamics of the split had created
a more centralized political union. Although the unpopular feelings against Mahathir
were high, they were balanced by the economic recovery. This was proven by the BN
winning the election again, as expected, in which it won 127 of the 180 parliamentary
seats (70.6%).195 Despite the high expectation that the Gagasan Rakyat would do well in
the election, voters decisively rejected them. One of the main reasons was the dispute
over goals between DAP and PAS and Semangat 46. For instance, PAS’s platform to turn
Malaysia into an Islamic state was totally incompatible with DAP’s secular view of a
multi-cultural and multi-religious society.196 In addition, the Semangat 46’s relation with
the PAS was never smooth. In sum, all three parties were hopelessly divided to oppose
the dominant UMNO-led BN coalition.
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1995
Malaysia’s ninth general election in 1995 had no surprises. The BN won 162 of
the 192 parliamentary seats (84.4%) contested,197 easily surpassing the two-thirds
required for amending the Constitution. Some claimed that this was the Reaffirmation of
Barisan Nasional dominance.198 Despite predictions that Mahathir would face stiff
opposition in three states, his coalition government—the BN—won the election in a
landslide victory. The result was the best for the BN since Mahathir had come to power
in 1981, and the political landscape had changed significantly since the 1990 general
election. One change was the disappearance of the opposition alliance, the Gagasan
Rakyat.199
The most distinctive feature of the 1995 general election was the considerable
shift in Chinese votes in favor of the BN. Observers found that, in this election, the BN
was courting Chinese voters due to the fact the UMNO Baru (the new UMNO) could no
longer take the Malay vote for granted because of the divisions within the Malay
community, especially in the rural areas of Kelantan and Trengganu where the PAS held
power. Thus, cultivating the Chinese vote was not simply a short-term solution to
problems faced by UMNO Baru in the northern Malay states; it also reflected a concern
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with the steady erosion of popular support for the BN since 1982. In this regard, the 1995
election rightly portrays the dominant party regime as a strategic actor.200
1997
The 1997-1998 East Asian crisis, triggered by the collapse of the Thai baht in July
1997, led to a currency crisis, a financial crisis, then an economic recession in most
countries of the region. However, the Malaysian economy and population were not as
adversely affected as their counterparts in Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia. Thus,
Malaysia was the only country involved in the East Asian crisis that did not involve the
IMF.201
The currency crisis in 1997 triggered the tension between Anwar Ibrahim’s
faction and those who were opposed to his rapid rise in UMNO. Tensions also escalated
due to Anwar’s opposition to the government’s desire to bail out a crony’s firm,
particularly those who had ties with Mahathir and UMNO, including Mahathir’s own son
Mirzan Mahathir.202 Anwar’s positions against Mahathir’s policies during the currency
crisis are said to confirm rumors that he was plotting to oust Mahathir. However,
worrying more about a palace coup than ideological differences, Mahathir sacked Anwar
from UMNO and from the vice-president position. Anwar’s debacle led to creating an
informal coalition, which became the main opposition to Mahathir’s government; it was
based on the PAS, the DAP, the small Malaysian People’s Party led by Husin Ali, and
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about a dozen NGOs. In addition to defending Anwar, the group was also championing
reform, particularly opposition to nepotism, corruption, and cronyism. They lacked
coverage by the mainstream media; however, they got to exercise some influence through
the Internet and the new media.203 Then Anwar was arrested under ISA in September
1998, after numerous political speeches that criticized Mahathir and the UMNO-led
government on corrupt practices, nepotism, and cronyism. The charges brought against
Anwar were very demeaning and shameful, and brought a revolt by the Malays under a
movement called Reformasi.
1998
The Reformasi movement in 1998 is considered a unique moment in Malaysia’s
political history where a sense of unity was felt by Malaysian society. Observers and
analysts claim that Anwar’s imprisonment and demonizing accusations against him were
politically motivated by Mahathir and his cronies. The Malay communities, sensing some
sort of injustice done to their favorite political leader, took to the street to protests.
Whatever it meant to different groups, the Reformasi movement was more than just a call
to justice for Anwar. It was a call for change in government policies, including concerns
of Chinese and Indian activists; and it was a call for social justice, human rights, and
Malaysians who felt excluded from the system.204
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1999
Discontent was obvious but insufficient to topple Mahathir during Malaysia’s
tenth general election in 1999. BN still won and kept a two-thirds majority, but they lost
14 seats and won only about 56 percent of the votes cast. The UMNO was the biggest
loser in this year’s election. Their share of the parliamentary seats decreased from 88 to
72, losing mainly to PAS and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People Justice Party).205
The result of this election was the creation of the multi-ethnic Alternative Front
(Barisan Alternatif) comprised of PAS, DAP, and Keadilan into a short-lived opposition
coalition. Though they lost to BN, nonetheless, the oppositions in this election scored a
symbolic victory, ensuring that calls for good governance (transparency, accountability,
eliminating corruption) would continue in the future.
2003
In 2003, Mahathir stepped down as prime minister and Abdullah Badawi took
over as Malaysia’s fifth premier. Mahathir continued to be the focus of criticism, until he
stepped down in October 2003, turning power over to his deputy, Abdullah Badawi.
Badawi’s mild-mannered and low-key style were a welcomed change from Mahathir’s
harshness and arrogant attitude. Badawi’s adoption of some of the key planks of the
Reformasi platform, especially a commitment to curb corruption and his promotion of
Civilisational Islam (Islam Hadhari), suggested a non-threatening evolution to greater
communal harmony and a little more justice, with the stability that ongoing Barisan
Nasional patronage could buy.
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2004
In Malaysia’s eleventh general election in 2004, the BN coalition captured 198 of
219 seats in Parliament, on the way to their most convincing electoral performance since
1974. BN also managed to increase their share of popular support from 56.5 percent in
1999 to 63.8 percent in 2004. Likewise, opposition votes declined markedly from 44
percent in 1999 to 30 percent in 2004. Most notable was UMNO’s return to prominence;
as the dominant party in the Barisan coalition, they managed to secure 109 of the 219
parliamentary seats contested, only one seat shy of an absolute majority.206
It is claimed that the BN coalition had won the 2004 general election before it
even began. This is because the advantage of incumbency had always offered UMNO and
the BN several avenues through which to create an electoral environment that would
work in their favor. While much attention was focused on parties and personalities during
the 2004 elections, the role of civil society slipped quietly to the sidelines of Malaysian
politics, marginalized once again by the state as well as by other political forces and
interests that intended to showcase the titanic struggle between UMNO and PAS as the
centerpiece of the elections. Indeed, civil society movements, so proactive and politicized
merely five years before with the growth of the Reformasi movement, were
conspicuously absent in 2004.207
Thus, Malaysia’s eleventh general election proved to be a monumental triumph
for Abdullah Badawi, UMNO, and the Barisan Nasional. The extent of the victory was
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largely attributable to the personality and policies of Abdullah.208 Most important,
Abdullah’s creed to curb corruptions in his government had given hope to the Malaysians
that, this time, their government would be more accountable and clean. In addition, this
election witnessed major lapses in opposition strategy. However, a careful investigation
into the issues that surfaced during and after the election indicates that much remains
vague about the trajectory of Malaysian politics.
2007
In this year of the Bersih and HINDRAF movements, in November Kuala
Lumpur witnessed tens of thousands of protestors take to the streets, calling for electoral
reform. The police claimed that the protesters did not have the permit to gather in
Merdeka Square and they dispersed the crowd with tear gas and water cannons. However,
the crowd claimed that they had the right to express their views.
This event had been organized by a group called Berish (Clean) and comprised of
a mixture of NGOs, CSOs and opposition parties. The issue they demanded was electoral
reform and prevention of fraud in the electoral system.209 It was in this context that civil
society and opposition politicians organized the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections
(Bersih), with the goal of getting the opposition a more even playing field for the twelfth
general election coming up in 2008. Some 245 people were arrested.210
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The second largest gathering that same year was the country’s ethnic Indian
community, who protested against the government’s ethnic discrimination policies. They
drew attention to the fact that ethnic Indians lived under poor socio-economic conditions.
This second protest was regarded as the largest mass demonstration by ethnic Indians in
decades. It mobilized 10,000 protestors under the banner of the Hindu Rights Action
Forces (HINDRAF).211
2008
On March 8, 2008, Malaysia held its unprecedented twelfth general election,
which resulted in what became known as the political tsunami212 in Malaysian politics.
This is because for the first time since 1969,213 the coalition government lost to the
opposition their two-thirds majority in the Parliament and their control of four state
governments.214 No analyst had foreseen this event, given the strength of the BN
machinery so far. This was a disaster on a major scale for BN and UMNO and was
perceived as a sea change that eventually could spell the end of Barisan dominance.215
The largest swing of votes away from the BN came from the non-Malays. By
2008, the BN was being criticized for undermining the interests of the Indian community.
The issue that hurt the Indians was the government’s demolition of several Hindu temples
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in 2007 on the grounds of being illegally constructed. Also, increasing poverty and
marginalization of the Indians aggravated multiple problems facing the community.216
Abdullah’s reputation for weak leadership and flip-flopping on important decisions
alienated the three main ethnic groups, with close to 70 percent of Indians voting against
him. Rampant corruption and abuse of power further angered the voters. Abdullah
promised to clean up the system under his National Integrity Plan and to set up an
independent Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA). However, he was caught between staying
in power and agreeing to his promises, and personal weakness and a lack of conviction
led to corruption reforms going downhill.
The March 2008 election signaled the idea that the BN could not remain in power
forever simply by mobilizing ethnicity-based politics. The opposition parties won, not on
ethnicity issues but across a range of issues that cut across ethnicity lines.217 In addition
to credibility problems of BN leaders, the public were tired of rampant corruption,
scandalized politics, and issues on the government lacking transparency and
accountability.
2009
By 2009, the political landscape had changed again. Prime Minister Abdullah
Badawi was forced to step down after the huge loss in the 2008 general election. He was
replaced by his deputy, Najib Tun Razak, who was frequently referred to as an UMNO
prince because of his privileged background and the fact that his father had been prime
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minister in the 1970s. Compared to Badawi, as the sixth prime minister, Najib
demonstrated stronger authoritarian tendencies, exemplified by the government’s
response to the anti-Internal Security Act demonstrations in August 2009 and his move to
take over the Perak state government earlier in the year. Najib understood that the only
way to keep hold of a restive electorate was to move toward reform in many areas, such
as his bold effort to abolish ISA and OSA in 2011; however, he was still not ready for
electoral reform.218
2011
Dismantling—or being seen to dismantle—the state’s machinery of repression
was a carefully considered strategic move by Prime Minster Najib Tun Razak . The most
important part of that machinery was the Internal Security Act (ISA), a holdover from the
colonial era, which allowed preventive detention of security suspects for two-year
periods, indefinitely renewable. More than anything else, the ISA symbolized the
illiberalism of Malaysian democracy, and its removal had been a key demand of the
Reformasi movement and civil society. On 15 September 2011, Najib announced plans
for the ISA’s repeal.219
2012
Prime Minster Najib Tun Razak introduced into Parliament: (1) in April,
amendments to the 1971 Universities and University Colleges Act, to allow students to
take part in political activities; (2) in July, his planned repeal of the Sedition Act; (3) in
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August, liberalization of the Printing Presses and Publishing Act, to allow greater
freedom of expression; and (4) in November, a Peaceful Assembly Act. All of these
actions were lauded in the government-controlled media as evidence of Najib’s
credentials as a reformer. Criticism, however, came from all sides: from the UMNO right
wing, including Mahathir, that the reforms were a sign of weakness; to the opposition,
saying the reforms did not go far enough. Even a reformist member of UMNO
acknowledged that, on close examination, the reforms were less than they seemed.220
2013
Malaysia’s thirteenth general election—in April 2013 221—was the most
anticipated in Malaysian history. The Barisan Nasional (BN), led by Prime Minister
Najib Tun Razak, and Pakatan Rakyat (PR), led by Anwar Ibrahim, were the main
contestants. BN had been the longest-ruling coalition in the world and everyone was
asking whether Najib could sustain his premiership and the UMNO-led BN dominance
against the opposition coalition which was gaining momentum in terms of support from
potential Malaysian voters.
As predicted, the BN won again, for the thirteenth consecutive time since
independence from the British. However, this latest election witnessed the most unified
challenge ever from the coalition opposition parties. The ruling party may have won but
it was by a more narrow margin than they had ever experienced. For the first time in
BN’s history, the opposition coalition party won the popular vote, showing a
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vulnerability in the incumbent’s position. Also very significant, the BN captured only 133
of the 222 seats in Parliament; thus, denying them—for two elections in a row and only
for the third time since independence—the needed two-thirds majority (first in 1969, then
2008, now 2013).
The Economist has described Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak’s win in the
2013 election as a cheap victory, that only brought to the fore a system that is skewed
toward the BN. Analysts say that this was the dirtiest election in Malaysia’s history; that,
tired of the unfairness, cronyism and corruption, the voters, especially the young and the
growing urban middle class, abandoned the BN.222
Conclusion
This chapter staged the time line of the Barisan Nasional (BN) regime in Malaysia
since its establishment in 1963, based on the years of the general elections since 1955.
This discussion shows the regime’s persistence under six premiers. In twelve general
elections, only twice did the BN lose their super majority in the Parliament, 1969 and
2008. Chapters four, five, and six address the practices of democratic principles and the
control mechanisms at work in Malaysian politics.
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Chapter Four: State of Democracy Analysis
Citizenship and Nationhood
This chapter examines dilemmas regarding common citizenship and nationhood
in Malaysia, and assesses the overarching question: Is there public agreement on a
common citizenship without discrimination? Malaysia’s pattern of politics and
governance, which combine democratic procedures with authoritarian practices of control
and repressive rules, are categorized here in what is broadly understood as a hybrid
system or political regime.223 Two main issues that allegedly contribute to these
dilemmas are: (1) Malaysia’s social contract, and (2) the Affirmative Action Policies.
The issue of citizenship has tainted the smooth rolling of Malaysian democratic
politics since before and after independence. This main issue has caused debates,
arguments, and fights among Malaysians, especially when a general election is
approaching.
Malaysia is well-known as a plural society that is deeply divided along ethnic
lines: economically, politically, culturally, and socially. After more than fifty-four years
of independence, Malaysia did not score well as a “melting pot” society that can be
proud, as experienced in the United States, for example.224 However, Malaysia scores a
high grade for being relatively peaceful, stable, and prosperous, in comparison to other
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plural societies that have a history of colonialism; for example, Indonesia, India, Rwanda,
Sri Lanka, and many other post-colonial states with histories tainted by ethnic conflict
and violence. This is not to say that Malaysia has not experienced ethnic grievances at all.
The most major, and the last one, that is considered a tragedy in Malaysia’s political
history was in 1969. This event is also considered a national tragedy, because it disrupted
Malaysia’s consociational democracy.225 This ethnic tragedy of May 13, 1969 is claimed
by many experts and pundits as the main event in Malaysia’s ethnic history that changed
and shaped the Malaysian political system until now.
The Roots of the Nationhood Paradox
Before Malaya became a united Federated Malays state, there was the Malayan
Union. According to analysts, the idea of the Malayan Union was propagated by the
British in 1946, which galvanized Malay’s sentiment toward nationhood. It is said that
without consultation with the Malay elites and masses, the British came up with the idea
of the Malayan Union, which called for liberal citizenship terms for non-Malays, to end
special rights of the Malays, and to eliminate the power and status of Malay sultans.
Reactions from the Malays to this idea of a Malayan Union were swift, intense, and
confrontational. Due to fierce protests, the British abandoned the plan. However, this
episode highlighted the sensitivity of the issue of non-Malay citizenship.
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According to Chandra Muzaffar, the Malay elites believed that a political system
that offered a common citizenship and equal political rights for all would destroy the
Malay race and would unjustly strip the Malays of their inherent rights as the historical
community.226 Hence, the foundation of the Malayan Union’s ideas were somehow
relevant to what have been demanded by non-Malays, especially on the right to equal
citizenship status without preferential treatment given to any specific ethnic groups.227
Another significant occurrence that resulted from the Malayan Union idea was the
creation of a central Malay political organization (United Malay National Organization,
UMNO), which became the primary political party to protect and promote Malay
interests, and continues even today. The UMNO constituted the core and undisputed
leadership of the Malay society as a whole. It was the most powerful party, and pushed
through a plan for a federation with centralized powers and Malay special rights; the
powers and special position of Malay rulers were restored and citizenship regulations
were made complex and strict.228Now the question, who could belong to the Malaysian
nation? Was it just the Malays? What about the non-Malays who had been born and bred
in Malaysia for generations?
It is claimed by analysts that the Malays have constantly been reminded by the
Malay elites that, unlike the Chinese and Indians, they had no other homeland but the
Malay land (the Federation of Malaya). Thus, they were the rightful sons of the soil.
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Whereas, the non-Malays had been brought in by the British and were immigrants who
maintained a loyalty to mainland China and the Indian subcontinents.229
This may have held true in the early years of the formation of Malaysia; however,
after five decades of independence, the descendants of the immigrant Chinese and
Indians, who had lived in Malaya all their lives and intended to live the rest of their days
in Malaysia, who had known no other country and who pledged allegiance to the Malay
states as their one and only “homeland,” they too wanted to be regarded as rightful sons
of the soil of Malaysia. The problem, could the Malay nationalists accept this? I believe
that if a Malaysian nation is to be established, these points must be taken into serious
consideration.
Therefore, one must ask, what is the source of discrimination? It is the social
contract argument, in which the non-Malays claim that they have been discriminated
against on the basis of race, or being non-Malay. So, who are the Malays? According to
the Constitution of Malaysia, the Malays are those who are from the Malay race, speak
the Malay language, practice the Malay culture, and hold Islam as their faith.230
A key feature of Malay nationalism has been a sense of otherness; the Malays
have regarded non-Malays as the “other” who poses a threat to the essential survivability
of the Malay nation. Therefore, boundaries were created to being a Malaysian nation, in
which “the other” must be differentiated from the Malays, with a highly developed sense
of us versus them. In other words, the Malays must protect, by whatever means,
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everything considered Malay. However, the non-Malays were on the defensive; and,
upon gradually realizing that Malaya is in fact their homeland as well, the “others” in
their view were the Malays, who were given a special position and who conferred upon
the non-Malays (usually referred to as the Chinese and Indians) the status of being
second-class citizens.231
After the failure of creating one Malayan nation through the Malayan Union in
1946, the British realized they could not cultivate a civic nationalism in Malaya as the
country progressed toward independence. The vast majority of Malays did not agree on
the idea of granting political equality and common citizenship to the non-Malays;
however, the British insisted that in order for independence to be granted to Malaya, the
Malayans must prove to the British that they could co-exist peacefully with the nonMalays.
By this time, the communities were already mobilized on the basis of ethnic
political parties: the Malays with UMNO and Party Islam Setanah Melayu (PAS), the
Chinese with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and Indians with the Malayan
Indian Congress (MIC). The British supported a multi-ethnic political party and
considered transferring power to the Malayans only if they would form an Alliance. The
first president of UMNO, Dato Onn bin Jaafar, was influenced by this idea and, in 1950,
proposed openness toward the non-Malays to becoming members of UMNO.232
However, this idea by a prominent Malay leader was strongly rejected by the Malays,
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causing Dato’ Onn to be expelled by UMNO. This consequence proved how the idea of
opening UMNO to the others was feared by the Malays.
Dato’ Onn went on to establish an Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), with
membership open to all Malayan communities. However, the party was decisively
crushed during the next municipal election and was dismantled shortly thereafter. This
occurrence also proved the Malays’ position regarding accepting the “others” under the
banner of Malayan nationhood.233
UMNO was set up to serve as the protector of Malay interests and their special
position. Tunku Abdul Rahman, elected as the UMNO president in 1951, was one of the
founding fathers who had worked to achieve independence for Malaya. The Alliance
Party, founded in 1953 in an effort to get independence from the British, was comprised
of the elites in the three ethnicities—Malays, Chinese, Indians—and were from the
various parties, UMNO, MCA and MIC, respectively.
These ethnic “bargains”234 shaped the form and fate of Malaysia. In the
negotiations, the leaders of the three dominant ethnic communities (Malay, Chinese,
Indian) reached an understanding: that the Malays would be dominant in the government,
and the non-Malays were granted citizenship and assured that their position in the
economy would not be disturbed.235
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Specifically, the “bargain” offered liberal citizenship status to the non-Malays on
the basis of jus soli236 as the major concession by the Malays, in return for acceptance by
the non-Malays of the Malays’ special position as the rulers, of Islam as the state religion,
and of Malay as the sole official language. This bargain237 established an informal
understanding among the elites that UMNO and the Malays would be the “first among
equals” in politics; in return, the Chinese could pursue economic dominance free of
restrictions and persecution. Although much was purposefully left vague in the
constitutional bargain, these terms satisfied the major claims of each of the communities
and led to ethnic solidarity, favoring independence in 1957.238 This concession was
enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution under Article 153, which entitles Malays to their
special rights and, to the non-Malays, citizenship.
This act of bargaining among the three main ethnic groups was widely claimed as
Malaysia’s “social contract.”239 However, critics argue that the “social contract
provision” is nowhere to be found in the Constitution and that it only surfaced in the
1980s when the phrase was widely used by UMNO politicians. Also, this social contract
is said to be detested by non-Malays (e.g., Chinese and Indians), who charge that it is an
“apartheid system,” because the contract or bargain’s foundation is based on ethnic
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discrimination against those who are non-Malay; and who charge that the government
divides the people into Bumiputeras240 and non-Bumiputeras, who are to be treated
differently, all in the name of the social contract. It is claimed that the classification does
not augur well with the objective of creating one Malaysian nationhood, because it is
bound to create prejudice among the people, which will keep them apart. Hefner (2001)
has argued that the foundation of the social contract is what triggered the debate and
criticism of the citizenship issue in Malaysia, that what is conferred to the non-Malays is
not equal citizenship but a form of differentiated citizenship.241 So what is the social
contract that some Malaysians say is the main problem that is blocking the creation of
one Malaysian nation?
The Social Contract aka The Bargain
The Malays were recognized as having a fundamental stake in the political
system; while the non-Malays were assumed to be concerned primarily with a dominant
position in the country’s economy. In effect, the communal compromises involved some
trading of economic power for political power, with the objective of equalizing the
proportionate distribution of power and wealth. The demands of non-Malays for
increasing political participation were met by acceptance of the principle of jus soli,
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whereby everyone born in Malaya after independence would be counted as a citizen.242 In
return, the Malaysian Chinese and Indians accepted the Malays’ special rights.
The Malays’ special rights were a peculiar part of the communal compromises,
because they were designed to both improve the economic position of the Malays and to
ensure the latter’s dominant role in the political system. The non-Malays were told that
special rights were necessary only because of the Malays’ inferior economic condition;
also, it was implied that, once the Malays achieved economic parity with the non-Malays,
the special rights would be reconsidered and, presumably, would be eliminated and no
longer necessary. Thus, throughout the years, these two contradictory sets of expectations
have been generated among the Malays and the non-Malays as to whether the Malays’
special rights are temporary and transitional, or permanent and inalienable.243
When the Constitution for Malayan independence was being drawn up, the issue
was again reexamined by Lord Reid who was charged with the responsibility of drafting
the new Malaya Constitution. However, the Reid Commission found it impossible to
reconcile the two principles of the bargain: (1) providing a common nationality, and (2)
safeguarding the special position of the Malays. The first principle presumed the equality
of all citizens, while the second involved the creation of separate rights for two classes of
citizens. The Commission expressed its preference for the principle of equality, but it
acknowledged that the Malays would suffer if special privileges were suddenly
withdrawn. To resolve this contradiction, the Commission did not give the Malay special
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rights constitutional status; rather, they allowed the system to continue by law, thus
permitting termination or diminution by legislative enactment.244
The Reid Commission’s most controversial proposal provided that the Malays’
special rights would be continued for a substantial period, but that, in due course, the
present preferences should be reduced and should ultimately cease.245 Accordingly, the
Commission recommended that the existing Malay privileges should be reviewed fifteen
years after independence, with the objective of preparing for their eventual abolition.246
These suggestions by the Reid Commission were vehemently rejected by the
Alliance government, which mounted a successful campaign to include a constitutional
guarantee of Malay rights and to delete all provisions regarding their future reevaluation
or eventual reduction. Thus, in the final Constitution of Malaysia that came into operation
in 1957, the Malay special rights received specific constitutional sanction and protection.
So that, Article 153 authorizes a system to safeguard the special position of the Malays
through a system of quotas applied to the public service, to scholarships, to training
privileges, and to licenses for any trade or business. Article 89 sanctions the system of
Malay Reservations, and permits the state legislatures to add to a land area that has been
declared a Malay Reservation. The only limitation is that at least an equal area should be
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made available for general alienation and that the new area added to a Malay Reservation
should include no land already owned by non-Malays.247
To ensure that the operation of the democratic process would not erode or
terminate Malay special rights, the latter were given a unique constitutional status. Article
153 begins: “It shall be the responsibility of the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong [Paramount
Ruler]248 to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of
other communities.…”249 Similarly, approval of the Conference of Rulers is required for
any change of policy relating to the special position of the Malays and Malay Rights as
defined in Article 153; and any amendments to Article 153 require agreement from the
Conference of Rulers. As a result, these provisions make the Malay special rights more
difficult to amend than the Constitution itself.250
For these reasons, it is no surprise that Article 153 is one of the most controversial
articles in the Malaysian Constitution. Critics consider it to create an unnecessary
distinction between Malaysians of different ethnic backgrounds. In response to Article
153, proponents argue that the protective provisions were written into the Constitution
not with the intention of pulling back the advancement of the non-indigenous peoples but
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with the intention of securing the advancement of the indigenous peoples who, through
no fault of their own, were educationally, socially, and economically less advanced.251
Following the establishment of the Malaysian Federal Constitution in 1957, in
1963 Malaysia was created and the Chinese, under Singapore’s People Action Party
(PAP) led by Lee Kuan Yew, challenged the foundation of Malay nationalism and Malay
claims to dominance. The Chinese-dominated party called for a Malaysian Malaysia
based on ethnic equality rather than a Malay Malaysia that gives special rights and
privileges to the Malays.
This PAP challenge angered the Malays and the settled issues were stirred again.
The language issue became a focal point when the Chinese demanded a wider official use
of the Chinese language and to elevate it to co-official status. This effort was countered
by a Malay determination to secure the full implementation of “the bargain” over
language. UMNO youth said if language was to be reconsidered, so should be
citizenship.252
Nasty riots followed in Singapore in the summer of 1964, which led to Singapore
being dispelled from Malaysia. The official separation was announced in 1965. Fortunate
for the Singaporeans, the Malay leader during that time was Tunku Abdul Rahman, who
was well-known for his soft spot toward the Chinese.253 When the UMNO ultras
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demanded him to send an army to get the island back from Lee Kuan Yew, Tunku
rejected this idea.
Singapore’s expulsion did not resolve ethnic problems in Malaysia, however.254 In
1969, a few days after the election results were announced, the opposition, mainly the
Democratic Action Party (DAP), made significant gain. During the victory rally, the
opposition who were mainly Chinese were jubilant; and, during the celebration, they
provoked the Malays through demonstrations on the streets of Kuala Lumpur, mocking
the Malays to go back to the jungle. As retaliation, the Malays made counterdemonstrations, telling the Chinese to return to mainland China. These insults and
provocations led to the worst race riots Malaysia had experienced so far; hundreds were
reportedly killed, and thousands of Ringgit in property were lost.
These riots caused the government to declare a state of emergency255 and they
suspended the press and the Parliament. A National Operations Council (NOC) was
established, which functioned as a de facto government for about two years. With
parliament suspended, the NOC became the supreme decision-making body (19691971). The NOC implemented security measures to restore law and order in the country,
and peace was gradually achieved. In February 1971, parliamentary rule was re-
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established and, to restructure the wounded society, affirmative action policies were
established.256
The Affirmative Action Policies (AAP)
Since the riots in 1969, ethnic issues have gripped Malaysia’s political culture.
The government had struggled to find acceptable reasons for what had caused the ethnic
riots and, finally, confirmed that the deteriorating socio-economic and political situation
in the 1960s had caused it.257 This led to establishing the Affirmative Action Policies. In
Malaysia, these policies were government-mandated preferences for governmentdesignated groups.258 The Malays were designated as the disadvantaged group at varying
levels of economic and social development; thus, making it imperative for the
government to intervene to help some of them to overcome their economic
disadvantages.259 In addition to the AAP were government remedies to the socioeconomic imbalances, which existed due to the British colonialists’ policy of divide and
rule among the three major ethnic groups.
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Proponents of these policies still argue that many constitutions empower
schemes260 of preferential treatment in order to elevate the status of those who are
economically, socially, and culturally disadvantaged; such as women and children,
aborigines, “untouchables,” and other marginalized groups and communities in society.
The AAP was awarded to the Malays for being the bumiputera (sons of the soil), stating
that they had suffered from socio-economic inequality inherited during the colonial
period and consolidated in the post-independence years. Obligations were placed on the
State to take charge of the AAP actions, to restructure the deprived Malays; thus, State
paternalism was needed to promote the economic and social welfare of the Malays as the
disadvantaged community.261
The AAP became a compensating, as well as remedial measure, to undo the
effects of past discrimination. Today, it still operates broadly, mandating special
privileges for the politically dominant but economically depressed Malay majority,
protecting minorities like the Orang Asli (Malaysia’s indigenous peoples) and the native
communities of Sabah and Sarawak, and conferring special privileges to underdeveloped
regions in Sabah and Sarawak.262
Although these services are part of the “social contract” in which the non-Malays
have rights of citizenship and cultural and linguistic protection and the Malays are
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guaranteed a continuation of their special position, critics say that these policies cause
ethnic division and segregation which will hinder the plan for Malaysian nationhood. The
goal of the AAP policies was to put the Malays (the natives) on a more equal footing with
the immigrant populations (mostly ethnic Chinese), for fear of reverting to the social
imbalances that had been set during the centuries under colonial rule; which had started
with rule by the Portuguese, then the Dutch, then the Japanese, and ended with the
British.263
With regard to inter-ethnic income inequality, although there were claims that the
AAP had diminished such inequality in Malaysia, some indicators contradict these claims
and show, in actuality, a worsening situation of inequality between various income
groups within the nation as a whole and within each ethnic communities.264 Although the
AAP often has been portrayed as providing measures that increase social cohesion,
according to some critics, such policies actually have reinforced ethnic division,
antagonized the less favorite ethnic groups (especially the Chinese), and exacerbated
ethnic tensions. For instance, since the enforcement of the National Cultural and
Educational Policies in 1971, which favors the Malay language and culture, especially in
terms of getting government support, there have been growing tensions between the
Malays and the Chinese communities.265
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In addition, claims of abuse and corrupt practices have rendered the AAP to be
poorly distributed and to be concentrated in the hands of a few in the societies. Instead of
benefitting the poor Malays, the AAP has morphed into cronyism and has widened the
gaps between the haves and haves not; a lack transparency in the implementation has
caused unchecked corruptions by those in power.
Critics strongly argue that these privileges are entrenched in the Constitution and
they are against repeal in many ways. First, they state that any Bill to abolish or curtail
these privileges may be caught by the law of sedition.266 Second, under Article 159(5),
any amendment to Article 153 will require a special two-thirds majority of the total
membership of each House of Parliament plus consent of the Conference of Rulers.
Third, any change in policy affecting administrative action under Article 153 requires the
government to consult with the Conference of Rulers.267 Fourth, Article 10(4) of the
Constitution permits Parliament to prohibit questioning of any matter, right, status,
position, or privilege protected by Article 153.268
Ethnic affirmative action policies implemented and enforced in Malaysia have
associated the interests of entire ethnic groups with their respective elites; thus,
generalizing resentments associated with inter-ethnic and intra-class competition. Thus, it
is unlikely that the ethnic affirmative action policies will achieve the end of improved
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inter-ethnic relations. An alternative approach needs to be found in order to create more
lasting conditions for improved inter-ethnic relations.269
Jomo (2004) claimed that a comprehensive alternative solution must be taken in
order to engage ethnic issues, stating that partial solutions cannot work in tackling a
complex ethnic integration paradox in Malaysia. For instance, one cannot wish away
ethnic discrimination without tackling the existing problem of inter-ethnic inequalities
and prejudice to which discriminatory policies and actions respond.270
Maznah (2005) argued that appropriate “ethnic management” is important in
tackling ethnic issues in Malaysia. According to Maznah, Malaysia’s development policy
was clearly predicated on a group-based framework, as opposed to a group-blind policy
that places individual well-being as the core concern. While group-based policy has
predominated, the motives for such a policy may have been driven by multiple concerns
rather than just group benefit. The notion of “horizontal inequality”271 has become a
persistent tool for justifying unequal allocation of resources, rights, and privileges among
contending forces.272
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Proponents of the AAP argue that, despite widespread non-Malay resentment of
many existing policies, Malaysia has not experienced the trauma of the race riots in 1969.
In response to this, some analysts have claimed that direct interventionist policy by the
State, such as the AAP, is the basis for Malaysia’s stability. For whatever it is worth, and
no matter if the policy is successful at bridging disparity gaps, it has had the effect of
quelling mass inter-ethnic dissatisfaction. Therefore, the AAP, such as the New
Economic Policy (NEP), must by necessity take on the form of an hegemonic discourse,
accompanied by an array of state-coercive mechanisms that will mute dissent. The
politically powerful group is the preferred group and is pacified by the policies. For the
un-preferred group, the fear factor is usually explained as the reason behind the absence
of dissent against the plan or a lack of opposition toward the ruling party that implements
it.273
What explains stability in Malaysia since the race riots of 1969? To understand
Malaysia’s sense of ethnic peace, one relates it to the social condition of
multiculturalism, or ethnic co-existence. Each group has actually existed separately but
within parallel systems in a cultural and economic sense. Thus, as long as each group
feels that their interests are not being threatened, and deprivation gaps are prevented from
being unduly widened, there is stability, even if ethnic tension prevails. The pillars of this
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framework include the logic of security, the ethnic “bargain,” the social contract, and
planned development that enables Malaysia to exist in a state of stable tension.274
Critics argue that, although there has been no recurrence of the ethnic violence of
1969, the resentment among the non-Malay population (i.e., Chinese and Indians) having
to endure the AAP remains widespread and profound. With the sedition acts and
government censorship on sensitive issues, “race relations” is still a politically sensitive
subject, which shows that Malaysian society is far from harmonious.275
Crouch (2001) seems to have certain positive impressions about the preferential
policies, despite the injustices and resentments created among non-Malays; stating that
these policies have contributed to conflict-management and social cohesion in Malaysia,
which have become evident in the relative absence of ethnic tension. However, he
suggests that the main factors behind this stability in Malaysia are the country’s
uninterrupted economic growth as well as the repressive measures against ethnic
violence, such as the Sedition Act.276
Recent development in Malaysian politics have seen some openings in revision of
the AAP; for example, when the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN) lost significantly
against the opposition coalition Party Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) during the 2008 general
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election. Also, Malaysia’s sixth premier, Najib Tun Razak,277 is the first Malaysian leader
to argue that Malaysia’s structural problems have been caused largely by the failures in
implementating the AAP. Najib has claimed that the policies that served the purposes of
the previous era are now becoming impediments to success.278
Despite the proponents and critics who support or challenge the AAP, there are
various constraining factors that prohibit a complete policy reversal. In addition to the
historical legacy of ethnic division, segregation, and special rights introduced under the
British colonial rule, which continue to affect all domains of state policies in Malaysia,
many prevailing issues prevent the state from taking any drastic measure to de-racialize
the whole policy regime.
The problems are that many beneficiaries of the AAP include the high income of
Malay families, who benefit from Malay special rights, and the non-Malay business
elites, who profit from close relations with Malay officials; also, the UMNO-led BN
coalition has relied on the “political and social contract” between UMNO and the Malay
elites to remain in power since the implementation of the APP in 1971. These Malay
political, bureaucratic, business and social elites, along with some sections of Chinese
businessmen close to the UMNO patronage and clients, have been the ones who will lose
the most from any genuine revision of long-standing affirmative action policies.279
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Disbanding Ethnic Politics
After more than four decades since its establishment, the mission of building one
multicultural Malaysian nation remains unrealized in Malaysia. Today, the country seems
to be even more divided along ethnic lines. Thus, many liberal Malaysians have started to
realize that the strict AAP is cancerous to a plural society and economic growth, and they
recommend revision of the AAP.
On the issue of making one Malaysian nation, the important questions are: Should
ethnic politics be disbanded? Are the Malays and non-Malays willing to accept a one
Malaysian nation, regardless of race, culture, and religion? I believe that the goal in
making one Malaysian nation will continue to be jeopardized because of the ethnic
polarization and because the Malaysian people are still not ready to accept a multi-ethnic
dimension to this country.
As long as we continue to harbor our identity based on our ethnicity, Malaysia
will not grow into a nation but will remain a squabbling society of dissatisfied peoples.
Sure, we can never remove our ethnic origin, but we can stop behaving as if by becoming
a Malaysian we cease to become a Malay, whether we are Chinese or Indian. We just
need to celebrate our diversity through equal treatment; and stop politicizing race and
religion, because these issues are really divisive and cannot contribute to building a one
Malaysian nation, which is way overdue.
Rule of Law and Access to Justice
Now we discuss the symptoms of the weakening of the rule of law in Malaysia. I
argue that despite the proliferation of the 1957 Constitution, which established the main
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legal and institutional framework280 in Malaysia, there have been significant problems in
implementing the rule of law and persistent problems with reasonable and reliable access
to justice, as practiced in Malaysia so far in contrary to the ideals and conventional
meaning of the rule of law as manifest in Western countries.
Although the Malaysian government sometimes obeys, even promotes, the
elements of the rule of law, they do so only when it is in their interests. When the costs of
obeying the laws outweigh the benefits, the laws are discounted, which gradually is
leading to the deterioration of the rule of law itself. With this claim, I here try to answer
the main question set by the International IDEA regarding the rule of law and access to
justice: Are the state and society consistently subject to the law?
Countries differ in their cultures, political systems, economic systems, and how
they implement rules of law. In the Western liberal system, rule of law is widely
considered necessary for sustained economic development, the implementation of
democracy and the protection of human rights. However, these fundamental values
adhered to by Western countries make some people question if they are likely to take root
fully in a different cultural, in the economic and political context of a non-Western nation
as in Asia.281
The rules of law generally subscribed in Malaysia do not prevail to the same
extent as in Western democracies. In a country “whose significant democratic and
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authoritarian characteristics are inextricable mixed,”282 the ideals are just on paper. The
reality in Malaysia is that authoritarianism has been manhandling the rule of law. For a
government that places greater emphasis on maintaining stability and ethnic harmony,
this could not be avoided.
In Malaysia, the 1957 Constitution provides the main legal and institutional
framework of the rule of law and access to justice. For instance, Article 8(1) states that all
persons are equal before the law and entitled to its equal protection. However, despite
these provisions, questions arise on the issues of its supremacy, as against the supremacy
of Parliament, which in Malaysia is controlled by the executive body. Ideally, there
should be a fundamental difference between the Parliament and the laws of the
Constitution, as practiced in Britain. Hence, in Malaysia, the fundamental difference is
irrelevant because the powers of Parliament, in theory, are supposed to be limited by the
Constitution; yet, in practice, are unlimited. This paradox questions the credibility of the
Constitution, which is supposed to be the most powerful law of the land.
The idea of the rule of law in Malaysia was adopted from the Westminster form
of government and the legacy of British colonial rule,283 which are clearly embodied and
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expressed in many of the Constitution’s provisions; for instance, Articles 5 and 8284
outline the principles of the rule of law prescribed by Dicey (1970).285
In Malaysia, since independence in 1957, the idea of the rule of law was not
subjected to extensive public debate or rigorous analysis until the 1980s. According to H.
P. Lee (1986), a significant factor can be attributed to the backgrounds and personalities
of the prime ministers in power during those times. Almost all of the predecessors of
Mahathir were British-educated, with exposure to Britain’s political system and laws,
which were most likely indoctrinated with a greater sense of their importance.286
Tun Mohamed Suffian, the Lord President of Malaysia from 1974 to 1982,
commented in a public lecture that, so far, the independence of the judiciary had never
been in jeopardy, thanks mainly to the fact that Malaysia’s first three prime ministers
were lawyers who understood the importance of having a judiciary that enjoys public
confidence.287 The rule of law in Malaysia was deeply tainted, however, during
Mahathir’s era, who was educated in Singapore. This may explain why he disregarded
the importance of separation of powers between the judiciary, executive, and legislative
bodies, as well as the limits of government regarding the implementation of the rule of
law and access to justice.
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Two main issues regarding the rule of law are (1) emergency laws; and (2) the
separation of power, or judicial independence.
Emergency Laws
Emergency laws display a set of provisions that empower the government to
summon extraordinary powers to cope with a crisis. In the Malaysia Constitution, such
power is under the provision of Article 150.288 For example, it is provided that if the
Yang di-Pertuan Agung (YDPA):
is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security, or the economic
life, or public order in the Federation or any other part thereof is threatened, he
may issue a Proclamation of Emergency, making therein a declaration to that
effect.
A Proclamation of Emergency may be issued even before the actual occurrence of the
event that will threaten the security or economic life or public order, if the YDPA is
satisfied that there is imminent danger of the event occurring. When a proclamation of
emergency is issued, it has full force and effect as if an act of Parliament.289 The
proclamation of the emergency laws may enlarge the scope of the law-making power of
the Parliament. Regardless of provisions in the Constitution, “the Parliament may make
laws with respect to any matter if it deems crucial by reason of the emergency”290 and
such laws cannot be invalidated on the grounds of inconsistency with any provision of the
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Constitution. Hence, the broadening of the Parliament’s power cannot be applied to
issues of Islamic Law, Malay customs, or with respect to any matter of the customs of the
natives in the states of Sabah and Sarawak. Also, emergency laws that are contradictory
to the constitutional provisions relating to religion, citizenship or language will not be
valid.291 Apart from these specified exceptions, all of the fundamental rights granted in
the Constitution can be derogated in times of an emergency. In this matter, the power of
the judiciary to monitor the exercise of emergency rules is prohibited by the provisions of
Article 150(8).292
The emergency powers have been invoked four times since independence. They
were used in 1966 and 1977 to overcome political crisis in the states of Sarawak and
Kelantan, respectively. The 1964 state of emergency was proclaimed during the
confrontation with Indonesia during the Sukarno era. The most important emergency
declared, however, was during the 1969 race riots in Kuala Lumpur. In order to control
ethnic disturbances during this period, an Emergency Ordinance was promulgated, which
widened police powers to detain and arrest ordinary persons for sixty days, two years for
a minister.
These emergency ordinances became the most controversial debate, were fiercely
debated by pundits and analysts, and have become the target of people’s unease with the
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government’s intention and policies. Some of the ordinances enacted were with no real
security problem obviously affecting the stability or ethnic harmony in the country; they
were just instruments used by the federal authorities to serve their own interests and
political advantage to secure control of the State.293 The fact that these ordinances have
been made the norm in government actions can have atrocious consequences upon the
administration of justice, not only in Malaysia but other countries that maintain
emergency laws. Therefore, these laws need to be repealed.294
Another observation about the 1969 assertion of the emergency laws is that even
though the laws were proclaimed over forty years ago, they still have not been revoked or
annulled. They are still operative, even though no serious ethnic disturbances have ever
taken place since their origin. It appears as though the emergency laws have become a
permanent fixture in legal settings, which casts doubt on the continuing relevance of the
rule of law in Malaysia.295
Ong Hock Thye, once a federal court judge, said in the Ningkan court case that
Article 150 of the Constitution does not serve as an award for the Cabinet to cause an
emergency to be declared with untrammeled discretion just to fit their whim and fancy,
saying that it appears the Cabinet has carte blanche to do as they please.296 Enactment of
Article 150 weakened the judiciary, whose power has been crushed because it is not able
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to remove any court’s decision in relation to the validity of a proclamation of emergency
law or ordinance; whereas, the Cabinet has unrestricted power to act unchecked.
Constitutional Amendments
The Constitution in Malaysia is regarded as the highest law of the land and even
this was not spared from the frequency of amendments that have diminished its
reputation as the most revered document. While some amendments were justified as a
basis for changing circumstances, like the exclusion of Singapore from the Federation of
Malaysia, many other amendments have been motivated by political consideration. For
instance, during in 1983, Article 150 was amended to provide for the issuance of a
Proclamation of Emergency by the YDPA “if the prime minister is satisfied” that a grave
emergency exists whereby the security, or the economic life, or public order in the
Federation, or any part of thereof is threatened. This amendment replaced the satisfaction
of the YDPA to, instead, the satisfaction of the prime minister. This amendment was,
however, subsequently annulled, by amendment, in the Constitution Act 1984 as part of
the agreement reached between the Mahathir government and the hereditary rulers, to
bring an end to the constitutional crisis of 1983-1984.297
The Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence
The Malaysian Westminster-type constitution does not explicitly mention the
independence of the judiciary; there is also no clear line separating the bodies of the
executive and legislative branches against the affairs of the judiciary. In the Constitution,
the articles merely refer to the administration of justice and do not have specific Acts
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about upholding the “Separation of Power” (SoP). However, the SoP is essential in a
democratic government in order to maintain the existence of the rule of law.298
Regarding the position of the executive body, the Malaysian Constitution follows the
British tradition in which the executive is part of the legislative body.
Specific provisions about the extent of each power are not provided by the
Constitution but are found in the subsidiary and other legislation.299 Furthermore, the
executive who is head of the federal government, in this case the prime minister, has
succeeded in retaining its power that it acquired during the enactment of the emergency
laws in 1969.
One of the main principles of democratic government is the accountability of the
executive ministers to the Parliament. However, in Malaysia, the ministerial
responsibility is frequently traded off in favor of party unity and party discipline. The
ministers are not accountable to the Parliament; but, instead, to their component party
within the leading ruling party, that is the Barisan National (the National Front).300
The Judiciary Trampled by the Executive
The year 1988 is written down as an unfortunate judicial event in the history of
judicial independence in Malaysia. It marked government’s reneging from its
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commitment to uphold “the rule of law.” What happened was a complete standoff
between the government (Mahathir’s administration) and the Lord President (top judge in
the country). It all started over the dispute about the 1987 presidential election results.
After a recount, Mahathir’s team narrowly had won over the opposing team. The losing
team, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), filed a suit questioning the
legitimacy of the elective process. The High Court ruled that the ramifications arising
from discrepancies found in the registration of its branches under the Societies Act
rendered UMNO an “unlawful society.”301
UMNO then brought the case on appeal to the Supreme Court. Hanging on to a
thread for political survival, Mahathir hoped the judiciary would dismiss the case in favor
of his team. Instead, the country’s highest judge, Lord President Tun Salleh Abbas,
motioned for the appeal to be heard by a bench of nine judges on the Supreme Court.302
This angered Mahathir and his team and there were bitter exchanges of criticism between
the prime minister and members of the bench. Mahathir made contemptuous attacks
toward the judiciary, declaring them to be too sternly independent, to a point of
jeopardizing the security of the nation. The judicial branch was uneasy about this
accusation from the executive branch, judges wanting to be above criticism.
At the end of the dispute, Mahathir was successful in manipulating the
mechanism for removing the Lord President and two other judges from office. This
episode in the history of Malaysian politics has been described as unconstitutional
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interference with judicial independence, stating that it undermined confidence in the
independence of the judiciary. This incident also contributed significantly to the notion
that the present Constitution was no longer viable and that the actions of the government
no longer carried the legitimacy enjoyed before 1988.303
Since this event, the judiciary body has gradually weakened, and the Mahathir
administration has made an effort to scrutinize appointments of every officer to the
higher courts. In fact, it is reported that less reputable figures were given high judicial
positions. In July 1996, a High Court Judge, Syed Hamid Idid, resigned from office after
accusing colleagues on the country’s highest benches of 39 incidents of corruption, 27
cases of abuses of power, and 52 acts of misconduct. An example of such misconduct
was the controversial libel lawsuit, in which crony capitalist Vincent Tan who had a close
relationship with Mahathir’s administration and was awarded RM 10 million (US$2.6
million) in damages against journalist M.G.G. Pillai. It was later found that Tan’s
counsel, V.K. Lingam, had sponsored holiday trips to Italy and New Zealand for Eusoffe
Chin, the presiding judge who later became Lord President.304
Another prevalent example of executive power defeating judicial power is the
Anwar Ibrahim305 case. Anwar’s trial was an attempt on the executive’s part to legitimize
the humiliation of a political dissident by interweaving legal principles with moral
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standards that had been generally accepted by the society. The government sought to
articulate that Anwar had committed a crime that was demeaning. The case was brought
to a hearing of the court, so as to give Anwar the so-called fair hearing. On the other
hand, Anwar believed that the court had been turned into a political tool to destroy his
political career. The most lethal of Anwar’s political conspiracy assertions were his
insinuation that the court was not neutral and that the country’s highest ranking judge306
was incorporated in the plot to tarnish his reputation, thus shattering the whole basis of
the court as a legitimate arena in which to try a case fairly. Anwar asserted that the trial
was a “political persecution hiding behind the cloak of law.”307
Anwar’s trial is said to have awakened the spirit of resistance among Malays
against their leaders, which had been limited since the Malay Union proposal by the
British in 1946. Many Malays began to question the actions and accountability of the
Malay leaders and became more comfortable discussing Western politico-legal jargons,
such as the rule of law, access to justice, and the separation of powers.
Access to Justice
Access to justice is a fundamental human right, rooted in civilized values,
religion, the common law, and a constitution. The attainment of justice has been the
cherished goal of all civilized societies.308 In lieu of the dark event that befell the
judiciary in 1988, when the judicial body was trampled by the unchecked power of the
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Parliament and the executive, the active use of the Internal Security Act to silence
dissent, and other repressive laws and authoritarian practices against the populations,
analysts are baffled by the “official vision” proposed by Premier Mahathir Mohamad
that, by year 2020, Malaysia should be categorized as a developed nation.
The issue of rights to access justice, whether provided in the Constitution or not,
have come under a storm of explicit judicial debates. Although the judicial discourse has
downplayed the rights of access to justice and deprived the “right” of any constitutional
significance, the marked difference in views between the Malaysian Court of Appeal and
the Federal Court have generated interest in constitutional law; because access to justice
involves being able to access the courts and judicial remedies as well as legal
representation, and also involves the right of ordinary citizens to challenge administrative
decisions that affect their legal rights.309
A proactive judiciary, in implementing access to justice programs in a particular
jurisdiction, may be associated with relatively weak constitutional provisions on the right
of access to justice. It is argued that the practice and implementation effort to develop and
improve access to justice should be informed and undergirded by a well-considered
notion of rights and constitutionalism. Hence, if the rights of access to justice are absent
or not recognized and protected by the legal system, it is possible that beneficial access to
justice programs may one day cease to exist or be challenged by aggrieved parties.310
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Issue: The Parliament’s Increased Power over the Constitution
In the case of Malaysia, which has a written Constitution, the Parliament is not
empowered to abolish the right of access to justice. Judicial review is a basic and
essential feature of the Constitution, which no Parliament can take away. However, the
Malaysian Federal Court,311 in the case of Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. Sugumar
Balakrishnan, subsequently reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal.312 The Federal
Court held that the constitutional rights are not absolute. In this respect, it should be
noted that Malaysian federal courts have rejected the basic doctrines in the Constitution,
wanting to remove the power of judicial review from it. The Court held that the effect of
the ouster clause was clearly intended by the Parliament to remove judicial review. Thus,
the right of access to justice cannot be sustained in the face of an express statutory ouster
of judicial review.313
In the case of Kekatong Sdn Bhd v. Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd, the High Court’s
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal, who ruled that Section 72 was
unconstitutional as it violated article 8(1) of the federal Constitution. What is important in
this ruling is the Court of Appeal’s detailed examination of the right of access to justice
in the Constitution. In this case, the judge ruled that the definition of law in the
311

The federal court is the highest court in Malaysia and has exclusive powers to declare an act of
Parliament void. Perhaps it is this provision that brought the judiciary to a head-to-head collision with the
executive. In Malaysia, tensions between the executive and judiciary bodies materially began surfacing
during the tenure of Mahathir Mohamad.
312

The Court of Appeal is appointed by the Agong, acting on the advice of the prime minister.

313

Judicial review is a court’s power to review, and possibly nullify, laws and governmental acts that
violate the Constitution and higher norms. It is a way to assure that governmental actors respect the
Constitution and do not use the powers granted to them by the Constitution to seize illegitimate power.
Judicial review is generally the final word by a governmental institution on a law’s validity.
[http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuiding/oldpdfs/E23SummaryConstitutional%20Court%20Judicial%20Revi
ewAHaq.pdf]

124

Constitution is not exhaustive but open-ended by reference and entrenched in Article
160(2). The learned judge, among others, said that the government is according to the
rule of law; thus, there must be fairness in State action of any sort, legislative, executive
or judicial and, in simple terms, that no one is above the law.314
In overruling the Court of Appeal’s decision, on the same case the Malaysian
Federal Court contended that the common-law right of access to justice cannot amount to
guaranteed fundamental rights.315 According to the Federal Court, the common law could
be modified by written law; thus, the right of access to justice is one provision that can be
modified by written law (in this case, the Danaharta Act).
The Federal Court also emphasized Article 121(1) of the Constitution that the
High Court shall have such jurisdiction that every citizen should have a constitutional
right of access to the courts of justice in order to obtain remedies. However, the Federal
Court referred the access to justice in the Constitution under Article 8(1) as a general
right,316 in contrast to the Court of Appeal’s treatment of access to justice as a
fundamental liberty under the Constitution. While the Federal Court stated that Articles
8(1) and 121(1) complement each other, the powers of the Court are clearly the dominant
element that determines the boundaries of access to justice. Thus, access to justice shall
be available only to the extent that the Courts are empowered to administer justice.317
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The Federal Court proceeded to add that the right is determined by the
justifiability of the matter. If the matter is not justifiable, there is no right to access to
justice in respect of that matter. Thus, Parliament can enact a federal law pursuant to the
authority conferred by Article 121(1) to remove or restrict the jurisdiction and power of
the Court. This unrestrained power of parliamentary law-making in derogation of judicial
power has been applied in subsequent Malaysian cases.318
The Federal Court has been subjected to fairly strident criticism. One critic has
claimed that the Court has failed to appreciate the difference between laws enacted by
Parliament in pursuit of powers given under the Constitution and the constitutional
provisions themselves.319 Abdul Kader (2005) argued that the right to justice embodied in
Article 8(1), although of common-law origin is not dependent on it, stating that the right
flows from the Constitution itself, which is sui generis.320
In a nutshell, the search for constitutionalism and rights in the context of access to
justice in Malaysia has not been an entirely fruitful one. Judicial discourse in Malaysia
garnered from the case law and extra-bench pronouncements suggests that access to
justice, while broadly construed, has not been accorded constitutional status, thus is
subject to interpretation of Parliament’s acts and other Acts outside the Constitution.
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Conclusion
The strength of the rule of law in the context of administration of justice in
Malaysia varies, depending on the degree of government interest in the cases before the
courts. In the vast majority of cases that come before the court daily, there has been no
display of public concern over the manner in which these cases are handled, the integrity
of the presiding judges and magistrates, or the eventual outcomes. Regardless of whether
the cases involve commercial or family-law litigation or criminal prosecution, the Justice
in Jeopardy (2000) report stated that there were well-founded grounds for concern as to
the proper administration of justice in Malaysia, in cases of particular interest, for
whatever reason, to the government:321
Plainly, this is only a small proportion of the total number of cases which arise,
but they are of vital importance to the well-being of the entire system of justice in
Malaysia. The central problem appears to be in the actions of the various branches
of an extremely powerful executive, which has not acted with due regards for the
other essential elements of a free and democratic society based on the just rule of
law322 (p. 77)
Politics are played in Malaysia by using the ethnicity of politicians in the
incumbent ruling party. It’s the same “old politics,” say analysts, with the purpose of
preserving the status quo; all in the name of stability, ethnic harmony, and economic
growth. All actions and policies undertaken by the government are for the good of the
people; to impose on this policy, the State must be strong with its apparatus, backed by
coercive policies.
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The talk of national stability and ethnic harmony by the incumbent government is
actually propaganda for the people to continually support and give mandate to the
existing ruling coalition party, the Barisan Nasional (BN), stating that keeping the BN in
power is essential for maintaining economic and social achievements. Hence, goes the
argument that the price to be paid for stability is some dwindling in the strength of the
rule of law, that fundamental liberties may have to be constrained, and that the executive
power must be strong and powerful for the benefit of the people and the country.
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Chapter Five: Civil, Political, Economic, and Social Rights
Are Civil and Political Rights Equally Guaranteed for All?
This chapter analyzes several different issues that brought dilemmas in
implementing civil and political rights in a full sense in Malaysia. Since independence in
1957, and with the enactment of the nation’s Constitution in the same year, Part II of the
nation’s Constitution, titled “Fundamental Liberties,” included the right to life and liberty
of the person; equality under the law and freedom from discrimination; freedom of
movement; freedom of speech, assembly, and association; and freedom of religion.323
Malaysia’s Constitution epitomizes the fundamental human rights, civil and
political liberties that are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UNDHR). However, Malaysia is a semi-democratic country, with apparent authoritarian
practices. The government has maintained that it is realistic to have these rights restrained
in order to maintain stability and harmony in the system and country. The irony is that
those restrictions are also entrenched in the Constitution through amendments made by
Parliament to limit the provisions of human rights in the Constitution.
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This phenomenon places human rights in Malaysia under the mercy of state
power324 and is the dilemma facing the full implementation of civil and political rights in
Malaysia. For the last fifty-four years, many Malaysians and critics have expressed
concern that there has been an incremental development of an array of preventive
detention laws and other restrictive laws that were inherited from the colonial
government, which have allowed authorities to deny or place unjustified restrictions upon
the enjoyment of fundamental human rights.325 These laws have given more unrestricted
power to the state, especially the executive body, to carry on with the repressive laws to
stifle opposition parties and dissidents who are against the state’s agenda. These have
affected many Malaysians and have created intimidating effects on the development of
civil and political life in Malaysia.
Due to the inflammatory nature of ethnic and religious issues in Malaysia,
discussing and criticizing hypersensitive issues (e.g., the Malay privileges, the citizenship
status of non-Malays, and language issues) for the purpose of inciting hatred and
confrontation in the society is sanctioned as a criminal act. The Ministry of Home Affairs
has the power to order detention without trial under the Sedition Act,326 and the
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government has progressively tightened its grip on all critical institutions,327 to the point
of rendering them useless. Mahathir wrote in his 1970 book that the manner, frequency,
and trivial reasons for altering the Constitution was reducing the supreme law of the
nation to a useless scrap of paper.328
To explain the dilemma of the peoples in Malaysia in practicing civil and political
rights, it is important to evaluate Part II of the Constitution, titled “Fundamental
Liberties.” The nine Articles (i.e., the right to life and the right to liberty of the person,
including habeas corpus329; equality under the law and freedom from discrimination;
freedom of movement; freedom of speech, assembly, and association; and freedom of
religion) are not absolute rights. Although the Articles pertaining to freedom from
discrimination (Article 8) and freedom of speech, assembly and association (Article 10),
in particular, contain a number of clauses that give more power to the Parliament to
legislate any restriction on freedom of expression, association, and assembly that it
“deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation ... public

or excite disaffection against the government or engender feelings of ill-will and hostility between different
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order or morality,”330 these clauses have allowed the fundamental principles of the
Malaysian Constitution to be comprehensively undermined. Through legislation,
Parliament has given more power to the executive body.331
A legislative and administrative structure has emerged, posing a grave threat to
the rights and liberties safeguarded in the Malaysian Constitution as well as under
international human-rights law. For instance, Article 149 in the original 1957
Constitution allowed for Parliament, in the event of serious subversion or organized
violence, to pass laws that are repugnant to the fundamental rights safeguarded elsewhere
in the Constitution. Then, in 1960, authorities amended Article 149 to expand the
definition of subversion, and removed the one-year time limit on such Emergency
Ordinances by providing that they could continue indefinitely, unless both Houses of
Parliament passed laws revoking them.332
In addition, Article 150 of the Constitution empowered the executive body to
exercise extraordinary powers if a State of Emergency was proclaimed, but only for
periods of two months at a time. Article 150 was also amended in 1960 to allow
Proclamations of Emergency, and any Ordinances issued under them, to continue
indefinitely unless both Houses of Parliament annulled them. In 1981, in further
amendments to Article 150, the Cabinet was authorized to declare an Emergency when it
perceived a potential threat, and not, as previously, when such a disruption was actually
330
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taking place. No judicial challenge to the legitimacy of the Proclamation, or the validity
of the subsequent Emergency Ordinances, was permitted.333
Why Civil and Political Rights Cannot Be Practiced in Full
Analysts and critics contend that certain unavoidable factors influence the
development of the culture of human rights in the country. These factors involve
historical realities, the political system, economic importance, and the social and cultural
attitudes of the people who generally lack an understanding of how important these rights
are.334 Five factors regarding this must be highlighted:
First, the incumbent government, in power since independence in 1957, continued
to be given the mandate to continue ruling,335 giving the incumbent the authority to
maintain its hegemonic rule and to sustain the repressive colonial-era laws. Such
repressive laws from the colonial era that are still being implemented today are the
Sedition Acts of 1948, the Emergency Laws of 1948, and the Internal Security Act of
1960. These laws were used during the colonial period to stifle dissidents, especially
Communist insurgents. They are still in use today to suppress legitimate political
dissidents and to generate a culture of fear to freeze critical speech and debate on
sensitive issues.336
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Second, Malaysia is a plural society threatened by an ethnic-religious fissure, and
maintaining public order is of paramount importance. The Malaysian government
considers maintenance of social harmony and stability vital for securing economic
growth and foreign direct investment, which are excuses for curtailing the civil and
political rights of the people. The state believes that exercising too much freedom in a
plural society like Malaysia, if unchecked, causes destruction to public order. This goes
back to the paradigm of “Asian values”337 for understanding the democratic and human
rights practiced in countries in Asia and the East, where stability and harmony are more
valued than individual basic rights and freedoms.338 Thus, a strong state that is armed
with coercive tools and the political will to accomplish national growth and development
is considered essential for tackling poverty and managing the politics of envy that is
fueled by growing wealth and income disparity.339 In Malaysia, the New Economic
Policy is one of the Affirmative Action Policies practiced through the state authoritative
policies.
Third, the separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judiciary
bodies is not fully realized in Malaysia. Critics claim that Malaysia’s judicial system
allows a wide scope for executive intrusion, and the extent of judicial independence has
been placed in serious doubt since the dismissal of the Chief Justice and five other
337
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Supreme Court judges in 1987-1988.340 The judiciary can reasonably claim that it
operates in strict accordance with the law; however, Malaysian law has been increasingly
framed to restrict the Court’s freedom to determine their own procedures, interpret laws,
and exercise review of legislation.341 Several times, Malaysia’s fourth premier342 has
criticized the notion of judicial review as giving judges open-ended powers to oppose
government policies and to throw out laws they dislike.343 Until 2008, the incumbents in
Malaysia enjoyed the Parliament’s power of the two-thirds super majority to amend or
restrict the power of the courts. Lately, since the opposition coalition won big in the 2008
general election, the power of the Malaysian Parliament has been checked. Good news
for democracy.
Fourth, Parliament and state legislatures share the power to make laws over
matters under the “Concurrent List” stated in the Constitution344; however, Article 75
provides that, in the event of conflict, federal law will prevail over state law. In Malaysia,
the division of powers among federal, state, and local governments reveals a central bias.
While each state is recognized as an independent tier of government exercising legislative
and executive powers within constitutional limits, federal laws take precedence over
those of the states if for any reason there happens to be a conflict or inconsistency. It has
been observed that, in practice, the states have little real autonomy. Although some
340
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federal functions have been decentralized, most decision-making remains at the national
level. State and local governments in Malaysia operate within a framework of being
politically, financially, and economically subordinate to the federal government.345 This
situation has created a subservient relationship on the part of the states in relation to the
central government, which presents an unhealthy atmosphere for practicing political and
civil liberties. Such a state of affairs, in the context of federalism, has contributed to an
environment that can stifle free speech.346
Fifth, various draconian laws specifically enacted to limit the practice of civil and
political rights are the legacy of the May 13, 1969 ethnic riots that took place more than
four decades ago. In the 1969 general election, the opposition parties won big, denying
the two-thirds Parliament majority to the incumbent, resulting in riots on the streets and
many casualties and losses. The Malaysian government has always used this incident to
use restrictions to stifle civil and political rights as a justification for stability. The
incumbent faced another setback after almost four decades, in the 2008 general election
when they lost the super majority. However, no ethnic riots occurred. The point here is
that the Malaysian government can stop using the rhetoric that stability will be
jeopardized if the rights of the people are practiced in full. The societies in Malaysia are
mature societies, even though pluralistic in nature, and do not want to stick to the
ethnicity card when defining politics in Malaysia.
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Despite the provisions in Article 10 of the Constitution, freedoms of assembly and
association, laws such as the Trade Union Act 1959, the Societies Act 1966 and the
Universities and University Colleges Act 1971, impose a straightjacket on the exercise of
freedom of association and further undermine freedom of expression. In addition, below
are several other significant legislative laws that, if un-repealed, pose even greater threats
to peoples’ rights in Malaysia.
Internal Security Act (1960)
The Internal Security Act (ISA) enacted in 1960 is one of two outdated
controversial draconian laws that most undermine the fundamental rights and liberties of
the people in Malaysia. The other is the Emergency Ordinance of 1969 discussed below.
The state has many stringent laws347 at its disposal to stifle basic civil and
political rights of the people. Many of the draconian laws overlap; that is, for the same
act, a person may be charged under different Acts. Among the most notorious ones is
ISA. This preventive detention law was enacted as a substitute for the 1948 emergency
regulations used to fight the Communist insurrection. ISA was intended to be a temporary
detention law, merely to finish off the Communist insurgency; however, it has never been
repealed and has become a permanent law.348
Under ISA, government officials may order persons to be detained without even
the most basic due process of rights. Most importantly, the government may detain
347
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individuals whom it deems a threat to national security, for as long as it sees fit and with
no meaningful judicial review.349 Under Malaysian criminal law as it normally operates,
police officers and others are allowed to detain individuals only if they have a reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. ISA requires that an officer have reason to believe that an
individual is acting, or about to act, in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia. In
order to engage in long-term detention under Section 8, the minister must be satisfied that
such detention is necessary for Malaysia’s continued security and stability. No attempt is
made in the Act to further define specifically what constitutes a true security threat under
ISA; and, without the possibility of narrowing the language of ISA through judicial
interpretation, the government is left with a free hand to pull almost any behavior into the
scope of ISA.350
In the 1960s and 1970s, ISA was used as a tool against left-wing political parties
such as the Labor Party of Malaysia and the Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia. In October
1987, police arrested 107 people in Operation Lalang (weed), including prominent
leaders and parliamentarians of the opposition Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), the
Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. ISA was later
used against human-rights defenders, students, teachers, journalists, religious clerics,
union officials, and political opponents. Indeed, ISA gained further international
notoriety in the late 1990s when political differences led to the arrest of then-Deputy
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Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim under ISA, before he faced trumped-up charges of
sodomy and corruption.351
After September 11, 2001, former premier Mahathir Mohamad publicly prided
himself for Malaysia’s conscience in using ISA. He described the U.S. Patriot Act352 as a
sign of U.S. endorsement353 of Malaysia’s ISA. The event that happened in New York
City on September 11 gave some governments the opportunity to reinforce their antiterrorist legislation and measures. Often, such legislations have served domestic-politics
purposes, especially for silencing voices of the opposition, rather than effectively aiming
at eliminating terrorist groups. In Malaysia, ISA is skillfully used, especially against
Malaysia’s prominent Islamic party (PAS), which the incumbent government has
considered a political threat.
Individuals detained under ISA have been regularly denied access to lawyers and
their families. Some have been told that their families would be harmed if they did not
cooperate. There are reports that ISA detainees had been physically and mentally
assaulted and subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.354 According to
Amnesty International, ISA remains the core of the permanent arbitrary powers to detain
one without trial. Beyond the violation of basic rights experienced by particular
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individuals, ISA has a wider intimidating impact on civil society and a marked influence
on the nature of political participation and accountability in Malaysia.355
Human-rights groups locally and internationally have worked tirelessly to push
Malaysia’s latest premier356 to reform the laws under ISA. According to human rights
watch, reform in Malaysia requires more than repealing ISA. The minister in charge of
legal affairs has said that detention without trial would continue under two new
counterterrorism laws even after a repeal of ISA and other laws, but that the detention
periods would be shorter.357
The Emergency Ordinance (1969)
The Emergency Ordinance (EO) was enacted in 1969 as a temporary measure to
respond to the race riots on May 13th that year. For the past forty-two years, however, the
EO has been used to detain persons without the government having to prove any charges
against them. As with ISA, the EO is a preventive detention law that allows the
government to detain individuals whom it (and not a court of law) believes to threaten
public order. Due to amendments to the law in 1989, the courts have been stripped of the
right to review the virtues of EO detentions. Detainees may challenge their detention on
procedural grounds, but that has limited use. Even when detainees file a habeas corpus,
petitions are ordered released by the court and the government often re-arrests the
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detainees on the same charges, thus rendering futile any procedural challenges to the EO
orders. In October 2005, the government ordered the arrest of eight individuals under the
EO for the same offense that they had been acquitted of only minutes earlier, violating
their rights under the principle of double jeopardy.358
The EO has not been limited to actions necessary to restore public order.
According to Amnesty International, “it has become an extraordinary law to deal with
categories of suspected criminals who are regarded as difficult to bring to justice by the
ordinary process of law.”359 The EO also has been used by the police to justify the
detention of persons under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). Having failed to solve a
case, the police will use an EO order to continue detention of a suspected criminal. This
is done without the detainee being brought to court or proven guilty. EO detainees are
held incommunicado and denied access to counsel during the initial sixty days of
detention. They usually suffer serious beatings and ill treatment from the authorities.
However, in May 2005, the government appointed the Royal Commission to
Enhance the Operation and Management of the Royal Malaysia Police. The Commission
concluded that the EO violates international human-rights laws, and recommended repeal
of the EO, stating that it facilitates the abuse of fundamental liberties. To date, however,
the Malaysian government has shown no sign that it intends to repeal this draconian
law.360
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The Sedition Act (1948)
The Sedition Act places wide limitations on freedom of expression, especially
concerning the sensitive issues involving the Malays’ privileges, the non-Malays’
citizenship, language issues and culture. The original Act, adopted by the colonial
government, was intended to address offenses such as sedition against the government,
inciting contempt for the administration of justice, and provoking conflict in the societies.
Thus, the Act has been used extensively against opposition parties and government
dissidents.
The Printing Presses and Publications Act (1984)
This is one of the Acts introduced during the colonial era during the period of
emergency against Communist insurgents. It required all newspapers and printing presses
to obtain a license that must be renewed annually. The Ordinance was revised as the
Printing Press Act of 1971 to provide more power to the government to revoke the
licenses of newspapers that aggravated national sensitivities or were detrimental to
national development goals. This Act had wider impact on the freedom of expression, the
media, and the development of civil society in Malaysia. Authorities continue to use this
Act to intimidate writers and publishing companies toward self-censorship. Publication of
“malicious” or “false” news renders publishers, printers, editors, and writers, who fail to
take reasonable measures to justify an item’s truth, liable to prosecution.361
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The Official Secrets Acts (OSA) 1972
This Act, based on the British OSA of 1911, also imposed wide, largely
unjustified, restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, especially for opposition
parties when discussing public issues and concerns. This Act gave power to the
government to conceal virtually all government documents, which are subject to the
discretion of ministers, meaning this Act weakens the public’s ability to hold the
government accountable and transparent.
The Societies Act 1966
This Act provided the executive body with the means to block or impede the
formation of any organization that it considers undesirable. This Act strongly impacted
the development of an independent civil society. Amnesty International remains
concerned that the Societies Act can be used to deny the rights of individuals and groups
to associate freely and to express their opinions about government activities.
The Universities and University Colleges Act (UUCA) 1971
This Act was enacted in 1971 to help establish new universities. However, in
1975, the government introduced a range of amendments imposing restrictions on
students’ rights to freedom of association and freedom of expression. This Act also
applies to university staffs and lecturers, in the government’s effort to clamp down on
political activism on campuses. Students are not allowed to hold posts in political parties
or trade unions and are barred from expressing support, sympathy, or opposition to any of
these groups. An observer wrote:
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The raison dieter of universities is to promote learning; intellectual freedom
should be encouraged, nurtured and cultivated. If ones do not allow university
students the freedom to think, reflect and express themselves, what hope is there
for thinking and reflecting intelligentsia?362
In 1979, the government added Discipline of Staff Rules under the powers of the UUCA,
which limits the possibility for university staff to engage in political activity.363
The Police Act 1967
This is another Act that constrains the freedom of assembly of the people in
Malaysia. This Act was tightened through amendments in 1987. It limits the citizens’
constitutional right to assemble peacefully. Under this Act, all public assemblies of three
or more persons require a police permit, and a police officer may refuse the permit if he
believes the three persons are representing an organization. Police officers are also
empowered to arrest without warrant and to use force if participants ignore an order to
disperse. In July 2001, the government issued a blanket ban on all political gatherings,
once again on the grounds of national security. Critics from SUARAM (the voices of
Malaysians) strongly denounce this ban, because it not only severely affects the normal
process of democracy in Malaysia but seriously restricts the activities of human-rights
defenders.364
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Conclusion
It is clear that all the restrictions to the civil and political rights in Malaysia
through the legislative acts and executive powers affect the implementation of these
rights to Malaysians, which impacts the development of democracy in the country.
Economic and Social Rights
This section highlights the source of social and economic grievances among
ethnic groups in Malaysia, with examples of ethnic grievances. Analysts and experts on
Malaysian politics say that the policies of the Affirmative Action Policies (AAP) and the
New Economic Policies (NEP) are the cause of these grievances and the discrimination
toward not only non-Bumiputeras (sons of the soil) but also Bumiputeras.
The central question is, are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all
in Malaysia? Because Malaysia is a plural society, with a history of ethnic segregation
during the colonial era on the basis of occupation, and with corrective policies that are
affirmative and discriminatory in nature implemented by a post-colonial state with strong
state apparatus, the issue of fairness regarding distribution of the country’s wealth is
unavoidable. Analysts and critics claim that the source of the unfairness is enshrined in
the NEP.
The ethnic disturbances in 1969, and vocal demands from the ethnic Malay for a
greater share of the country’s wealth, forced the new post-colonial state to rethink the
country’s economic policies. In the First Malaysia Plan in 1966-1970, a special provision
was made to promote the Malays economic development; however, none of the measures
adequately addressed the issue of Malay poverty. In 1970, the incomes of 49.3 percent of
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all households in Peninsular Malaysia were below the poverty line, estimated then at
M$33 per capita monthly; of these, 75 percent were Malays. These data show that the
goal of eliminating economic disparity between the major ethnic groups simply was not
being achieved.365
In 1971, under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak, father of the present Msia
premier, took a drastic measure in an effort to make right what presumably had been
made wrong by the colonial master; that is, implementing affirmative action policies
(AAP) in the form of NEP, to ensure that more resources and more opportunities would
become available to the Malays. More than any other measure, the NEP has been
responsible for the immense changes that have occurred in Malaysia for the past forty
years. Implemented through four five-year plans, from 1971 to 1990, the NEP had two
principal objectives: (1) to eradicate poverty irrespective of ethnicity, and (2) to
accelerate the restructuring of society to reduce and eventually eliminate identifying
one’s ethnicity with an economic function. This second principal caused the stir among
the non-Malays, because it gave more advantage to the Malays.
Because the Malays (Bumiputeras, sons of the soil 366) were overwhelmingly
underrepresented in higher education and as professionals and equity owners, the NEP
was designed to empower them as the disadvantaged group through the upper echelons of
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society. The Malaysian government believes that the disparity between the economic and
social positions of the poor and disadvantaged Malays populations, against the rich and
advantaged Chinese, was the cause of the ethnic tensions and would be the major threat
to political stability in the future. By reducing and finally eliminating the disparity, it was
believed that the plural society in Malaysia would be in harmony and that future ethnic
conflict would be avoided.
Critics have an opposite view of NEP and do not see it as a method to correct
imbalances in society. They state that even though the discriminating affirmative action
policies may have a positive outcome, the policies further alienate a plural society,
because the government focuses on special ethnicities to determine and allocate
government subsidies, scholarships, funds for business, and contractor licenses, etc. So
that, the critics see the NEC policies as simply discrimination against ethnic groups who
are not Malays. Thus, instead of integrating the plural society, the government is further
alienating one ethnic group against another.
For example, Malay equity ownership has risen dramatically, from 1.5 percent in
1969 to 20.3 percent by 1990; while Chinese equity ownership rose from 27.2 percent in
1970 to 44.9 percent in 1990. All groups shared in the prosperity; however, the rise in
Malay and Chinese ownership came at the expense of foreign holdings.367 Then in the
1970s to the 1990s, a new generation of middle-class Malays emerged, burgeoning from
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18 percent to 28 percent of the population; in addition, the Malay agricultural population
decreased from 65.2 percent to 33.5 percent.368
In order for the NEP to take full effect, the government set a target that, within
twenty years (1971-1990), the Malays and other Bumiputeras groups would manage and
own at least 30 percent of the total commercial and industrial activities in all categories
and scales of operation.369 This 30 percent target was a serious political issue with critics,
especially from non-Malays. The government maintains that the Malays still have not
reached the 30 percent target and, therefore, says that the NEP must be continued.
Whereas, some analysts, mostly non-Malays, say that the Bumis has reached its target
and, thus, the NEP should not be continued.370
NEP May Cause Strain in the Plural Society
Positive outcomes of the NEP are widely reported.371 However, analysts have
identified two main strains on society, regardless of the NEP’s success or failure: (1) the
strain from different ethnic groups (i.e., Malays and non-Malays), and (2) a strain among
the Malays themselves. According to Milne (1976), the non-Malays might be
antagonized by the fact that the NEP is doing more for the Malays than for them,
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particularly in areas where there may be inter-ethnic competition for scarce resources
such as small manufacturing businesses and entry into university.372
Fundamentally, the NEP identifies Malaysians in two main groups: Bumiputeras
and non-Bumiputeras. The Bumiputeras are given special privileges in many aspects;
including economic rights, higher quota to entering universities, and public sector
employment. These conditions make the non-Bumiputras feel like second-class citizens.
The NEP’s first prong, to eradicate poverty irrespective of ethnicity, drew
attention to the poor Chinese. The Gerakan parties especially referred to the plight of the
New Villages set up during the twelve years of the national emergency period. There had
been little development and improvements in these settlements. The economic plights of
the settlers were being neglected by the government. Also, some Chinese leaders from
the DAP claimed that the government was overemphasizing the rural poor and tended to
neglect the urban poor which comprised a large number who resided in towns where
conditions were worse than in rural areas.373 The Chinese-based parties and organizations
expressed unhappiness over the Bumiputeras/non-Bumiputeras distinction in the NEP
and in all government policies. Lim Kit Siang, a Dap veteran leader, questioned whether
the NEP policy with such an ethnic approach would bring national unity to the plural
society and stated that the policy might backfire.
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Intra-ethnic Strains
Despite the apparent success of the NEP in restructuring society, especially the
Bumiputeras, many Malays have remained unhappy about the policy because of the
widely held perception that the policy has helped only some Malays and not all, which
has resulted in creating two distinct classes of Malays: those who have benefitted from
the NEP and those who have not. Thus, some Malays have become rich and affluent,
while the rest have remained entrenched in poverty. Dissatisfaction with the NEP also
originated from the widespread corruption and cronyism that took place during
implementation of the policy.374
A study conducted on Malaysian Universities in 1986 by Ozay Mehmet and Yip
Hat Hoong showed that only 12 percent of the Bumiputeras students who had received
government scholarships had come from poor families. The study found that poor Malay
families had far less opportunity of having a child at university than Chinese and Indian
poor families.375 Also, social interactions between inter-ethnic Malays and non-Malays
on campuses has been deteriorating under the NEP. This is blamed on a lack of trust and
legitimacy in the system. Thus, the NEP has not been a successful instrument for
overcoming ethnic inequality and integration issues.
The UMNO-led BN has used issues of Malay poverty as the backdrop to their
political whims, and they have politicized the NEP to create money politics. Also,
members of UMNO are trying to buy votes for position in the party and/or promoting
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respective crony capitalists. In a wider context, Gomez (2007) described Malaysian
money politics as including favoritism, conflicts of interest, and nepotism in the award of
rent seeking by disbursing material benefits in order to secure votes during state and party
elections.376 For power to be sustained, NEP is also a source of UMNO money politics.
As protector of the Malays, UMNO vocally criticized PAS about the poverty of
the Kelantanese Malays under its rule. However, critics fired back with empirical and
statistical data that shows clearly that after eighteen years of PAS rule, the Kelantan were
no longer the second poorest Malay state in Malaysia; whereas, the state of Terengganu,
which is under UMNO and BN rule, was suffering much higher levels of absolute
poverty, with more people living below the poverty line.377
According to Gomez, practice of UMNO political business has been facilitated
through the extensions of authoritarianism, characterized by the centralization of power
of the executive body with no checks and balances from the judiciary,378 which has led to
the belief that the Malays poverty is not because they are being denied their rights to
economic success by non-Malays; they are poor because their share of the economic
prosperity is being snatched by the UMNO-putra.379
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It is through the NEP that the UMNO has been able to rebuild its credentials and
legitimacy among Malay constituents. Through the dispensation of political patronage
and access to material resources, the NEP created another opportunity structure for
UMNO to build its power bases. The growth of money politics built around the largesse
of the NEP has made the UMNO 380powerful and the UMNO has become the trustee and
gatekeeper of the distribution process. Thus, the NEP has been a crucial instrument for
distributing political patronage, which is used as a reward to gain loyalty from the
Malays.381
Inter-ethnic Strains
The NEP is largely about inter-ethnic redistribution. Since the main redistribution
objective is to reduce inter-ethnic economic disparities, it was assumed they would also
improve inter-ethnic relations and, thus, contribute to national unity. However, this
assumption might have been simplistic and naïve; thus, the effectiveness of the main NEP
prong—to restructure society—is questioned.
Poverty eradication measures mainly seem to involve Malay peasants; in
particular, the target groups such as rubber tappers, rice farmers, and fishermen. NonMalays, like the Orang Asli and the aborigines in Sabah and Sarawak who are also under
the Bumiputeras categories, complain that they have been neglected by the NEP policies.
Similarly, most of the urban poor from both the Malays and non-Malays feel that poverty
eradication measures are not directed at them.
380
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The discourses on ethnic inequality in Malaysia always concentrate on the
Bumis382 and non-Bumis; and this dichotomy, by default, refers to ethnic Malay (Bumis)
and Chinese (non-Bumis) issues. Because both Malay and Chinese polities have evolved
over time, their issues are homogeneously acknowledged, as compared to other nonMalay ethnics (e.g., the Indians) and the other Bumiputeras (e.g., the Orang Asli).
Recently in Malaysian politics, the country was stunned by the 2008 general election
results when the opposition coalition party, the People Justice Party (PKR), succeeded in
denying the incumbent BN the two-thirds majority of parliamentary seats. This was a
huge blow to the government, because it meant they could not amend the Constitution at
will.383
One of the factors contributing to the incumbent BN getting a “black eye” for the
first time in forty-two years of general elections was because a large section of the
society were angry with the government’s policies and the leaders misbehaving.
Throughout 2007 and early 2008, large-scale protests over unequal government
distribution policies were held in the Kuala Lumpur city center, mostly led by officials
from the opposition coalition parties—Parti Islam (PAS) , Democratic Action Party
(DAP), and National Justice Party (PKR). Among the protestors were the ethnic Indians,
organized through the Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF).
It is claimed that, unlike with the Chinese, who are already successful in
Malaysia’s economy, and with the Malays, who are protected by the government, the
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Indians have been left to fend for themselves in an unfair social and economic
environment. According to reports, over 300,000 poor Indians were displaced during the
last two decades, when the plantations that traditionally had provided them modest
livelihoods were acquired for property and township development. It is reported that
FELDA, the country’s most successful poverty alleviation program, failed to take in large
numbers of rural Indians who were displaced from plantations.384 Consequently, the
Indians lost their basic livelihoods. Research indicates that the highest rates of suicide in
Malaysia are in the Indian community, and Indian youths have resorted to gangsterism
and crime. The combination of socio-economic exclusion and deprivation forced the
Indians to shift their votes to the opposition in the 2008 general election.
Also, according to the 2011 World Bank report on Malaysia’s “brain drain,”
better career prospects, compensations, and social justice385 outside of Malaysia are
draining the country of its best minds. For example, 88 percent of Malaysian diasporas in
Singapore are of ethnic Chinese origin, and 54 percent of all Malaysians are moving to
Singapore; as well as 15 percent to Australia, 10 percent to the U.S., and 5 percent to the
UK.
Two other issues have marked the sincerity of the state on eradicating poverty
irrespective of ethnic origin. First, among non-Malays, the non-Muslim indigenous
groups on Malaysia’s east coast in Sabah and Sarawak have long claimed they are being
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treated as third-class Bumiputeras and that they have limited access to NEP economic
benefits. More significantly, even some Malays are being disenfranchised; in particular,
Malaysia’s aborigines, the Orang Asli.386 Within the ethnic mosaic that comprises
Malaysia, the aborigines of the Malay peninsula are today both the most deprived and
under-represented community in the country. The controversial issues of Malay special
rights and Bumiputra (indigenous) rights become even more complex and contentious
when applied to the aboriginal peoples whose claim to indigenous status antedates387 all
other communities.
It is also important to highlight the East388 and West389 Malaysia divide. On
peninsular Malaysia (West Malaysia), the issue of Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras is
given more attention by the federal government than to the East Malaysian Bumiputeras
and intra-Bumiputeras of Sabah and Sarawak. Tensions between Malaysia East and West
are becoming more acute with increasing inequality in federal allocations and widening
socio-economic disparity gaps.390
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Conclusion
The active role of the state in its effort to socially engineer Malaysia’s plural
society through the NEP has provoked many social and political contradictions. The
inter-ethnic sensitivities and intra-ethnic deprivations have caused strain as NEP quotas
and targets are imposed in many areas of social and economic life. Proponents of the
NEP argue that its benefits cannot be seen only with economic successes but also with
social integration.
Since the ethnic riots in the late 1960s, almost all policy issues in Malaysia are
bound with ethnic issues. The role of the state has expanded in managing, engineering,
and enforcing ethnic identities in Malaysia. Because of the ethnic-laden nature of the
Malaysian state, implementing the Affirmative Action Policies is seen as the only way to
correct the imbalances in the society that caused ethnic disturbances in the 1960s.
Proponents of the NEP say that one cannot wish away ethnic discrimination without
tackling the existing problem of inter-ethnic inequality and prejudice, to which
discriminatory policies and actions respond.391 NEP is considered a state tool for society
engineering. Thus, comes the question, is the NEP the right tool to socially engineer a
complex society like Malaysia?
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Chapter Six: Assessing Representative and Accountable Government
Electoral System
This chapter focuses on Malaysia’s electoral system, which is incompatible with
the idea of a fully liberal democracy, and assesses the question: Do Malaysia’s elections
give the people control over their government and its policies?
Critics of the electoral system in Malaysia claim that it contains elements of
unfairness, that although elections are free, they are not entirely fair. Crouch (1996) wrote
that:
Malaysian elections have not been characterized by widespread fraudulent
practices such as ballot-box stuffing or blatant physical pressure on voters.
However, the electoral system was significantly biased in favor of Malay parties
and the government coalition.392
The electoral system in Malaysia greatly favors the incumbent coalition
government party, the Barisan Nasional (BN) (National Front), at the expense of the
opposition parties. In twelve general elections since Malaysia achieved independence in
1957, the BN has not lost even one election, and only twice has lost two-thirds of the
seats in Parliament, in 1969 and 2008; which has brought some optimism to democracy
proponents in the country.
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In 1995, Malaysia’s fourth premier, Dr. Mahathir, said a democracy is a “means
to choose the government393 … if the people prefer another government, they are
welcome to it”394 and if they choose to retain the government “eight times consecutive” it
is their “democratic right to do so.”395 Observers claim that factors that have kept the BN
in power twelve consecutive times may be due to the maneuvering of the electoral
process, which makes it impossible for opposition parties to win.Malaysia uses the simple
majority process in which the candidate with the most votes gets elected. This method,
inherited from the British, favors a stronger government rather than proportional
representation. Analysts of the simple majority system claim that the inherent effect of a
plurality election is its big-party bias, which awards considerably more seats to the
biggest party relative to its share of votes won. Proponents of this plurality system claim
that it is a valuable contribution to a strong and stable government; the ruling party has
always argued that a strong government is needed to maintain stability in the country’s
plural society and to promote economic development.396 By contrast, analysts like Reilly
(2002) state that a society divided by ethnic diversities will fare better with proportional
representation.397
SUARAM and many other observers point out that unfair constituency
delineations and gerrymandering also have made a mockery of the one-person one-vote
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democracy, which is fundamental in any electoral system that claims to be democratic:
“For the one-person one-vote system to function, the disparity in numbers of voters
between constituencies (whether at state or parliamentary level) must be controlled.”398
Constituency Boundaries
Elections in Malaysia are competitive and a number of parties compete in the
process. However, the way the electoral system is maneuvered, it has always sided with
the ruling government’s party, the Barisan Nasional (BN). The UMNO-led BN has never
lost an election because the electoral boundaries favor this governing coalition. In
addition, the UMNO is the largest party in the BN, because it represents the Bumiputeras
and the most votes are from the rural Malays. Critics claim that over-representation of the
Malays in the electoral constituents is the key factor behind the BN’s consistent victories
in the federal general elections.399
The 1957 Constitution allocated a provision that there should be some weight in
favor of the rural areas because of the size and difficulties of communication compared to
urban constituencies. The political significance of the disparity between rural and urban
constituencies lay in the fact that the rural areas were predominantly Malay and the urban
areas were predominantly non-Malay.
Since 1963, the bias of the electoral system against non-Bumiputeras in the
peninsular (West Malaysia) was reinforced by inclusion of the two East Malaysian states
and, as expected, the Bumiputeras majorities in both states (Sabah and Sarawak)
398
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generally, although not always, aligned themselves politically with the peninsular
Malays. Thus, the electoral system contained a built-in advantage for the Malay
community.
Also, dissatisfaction is likely to be more widespread among the Chinese than
other ethnic groups, and there has been no realistic possibility of a non-Bumis party or
coalition “going it alone” and winning the election. The only way for Chinese and Indian
politicians to participate in the government has been by allying themselves with the
Malays.400
Evidence of Occasional Manipulation During Elections
The UMNO-led BN has a majority stake in most press and media in Malaysia.
Given their ownership of the mainstream media, it is not surprising that opposition party
members have complained repeatedly that they are not able to get their manifestos
publicized during campaign periods. Very often, their messages have been falsely
reported and their statements taken out of the context. Whereas, the press has heavily
favored BN campaigns and manifestos, giving them wide coverage and positive
advertisements401 The major influencing factors, commonly termed the “3Ms,” are
money, media, and machinery. There have been many complaints about the BN’s
excessive use of funds, abuse of its control of Malaysia’s leading newspapers, television
and radio networks, and misuse of the government’s machineries.402
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The UMNO, the dominant party in the BN, has been able to use its control of the
government to win votes in many ways. In the 1978 general election, Razaleigh Hamzah
(when he was in the UMNO before the split in 1988), revealed how the BN had won the
majority against the PAS: “In cases where PAS had a majority of 80 votes in the last
election, I brought in 100 new UMNO supporting families. That’s how they (PAS) lost
their majority.”403
Other factors that have benefitted the party in power (the coalition BN) include
the shortness of the electoral campaigns, a ban on open rallies, and the application of
state funds. The Election Commission decides the length of the campaign period and
ensures that it is kept very short, normally just over a week, presumably to maintain
public harmony. Since 1978, open rallies have been banned, especially toward opposition
parties. Nonetheless, BN leaders have extensively campaigned at huge rallies and used
government functions for campaign purposes.
Compared to the opposition parties, the BN’s campaign machinery, especially that
of the UMNO, has been efficiently and effectively run during elections and is partly
attributable to its easy access to funds. Through their control of federal funds, BN leaders
have often promised new development projects and distribution of state largesse to party
supporters.404 The most common allegation made during elections is that funds are used
to buy constituency support.405
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Electoral Outcomes
All twelve general elections in Malaysia since 1955 have been won by the
incumbent government, the BN. Table 3 below shows how the BN has been able to win
consistently more than two-thirds of the seats in Parliament, except in 1969 and 2008, yet
still have had the majority of votes to lead the country.
Table 3. Malaysia’s General Election Wins, 1969-2008
Incumbent BN

Opposition

Year

% vote

% seats

% vote

% seats

1969

49.3

65.97

50.7

34.03

1974

60.7

87.66

39.3

12.34

1978

57.2

84.42

42.8

15.58

1982

60.5

85.71

39.5

14.29

1986

55.8

83.62

41.5

16.38

1990

53.4

70.55

46.6

29.45

1995

65.2

84.38

34.8

15.62

1999

56.5

76.68

43.5

23.32

2004

63.9

90.41

36.1

9.59

2008

50.14

63.1

46.4

36.93

Sources: Abdul Rashid Moten
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Figure 3 below reveals the “hiccups” in general elections 1969, 1990, 1999, and
2008. The hiccup in 1969 was caused by the ethnic grievances and riots over distribution
of wealth; in 1990, the split of UMNO into Teams A and B; and in 1999, Malay votes
decreased because of the Anwar debacle. Despite some loses in these four elections, the
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UMNO-led BN continued to rule the country; although, now, its dominance is
deteriorating.407
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Figure 3. Parliamentary Seats Won in General Elections, 1959-2008
Sources: Data for 1959-1974 compiled by researcher; data for 1978-2004 can be assessed from
Election Commission of Malaysia (http://www.spr.gov.my/); data for 2008 was assessed from
New Straits Time, March 10, 2008.

It is also important to discuss the general electoral outcomes in 1999, 2004, and
2008, which reveal the development of the people’s control over the government’s
policies. Interestingly, during those three general elections, the number of parliamentary
seats held by the incumbent government plunged slightly in 1999, then boosted up in
2004, then again plunged even deeper in 2008. Analysts and observers claim that this
trend shows that the people of Malaysia were angry with the government’s discriminating
policies and with how they were manipulating the electoral system, and that the
Malaysian people communicated their anger through the ballot box.
407
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Analysts say that the 1999 general election result was essentially a repeat of the
past, that nothing much had changed between the incumbents in power (BN) and the
opposition; that is, the BN continued to rule and the opposition continued to oppose.408
The most significant aspect of the 1999 general election, however, was the “Anwar
factor”; observers claim that a significant number of Malay votes shifted from UMNO to
the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) as a sign of the Malays’ anger over how Mahathir
and UMNO had treated Anwar Ibrahim.
However, one of the main reasons the opposition parties had previously lost
elections to the BN was because the opposition had been unable to bridge the ideological
gaps among the DAP’s “Malaysian Malaysia” (seen as implying equal political rights for
all citizens), alienated Malay support, and the PAS who advocated creating an Islamic
state, which distanced ethnic non-Muslims.
In 2004, the number of seats won by the BN rose and UMNO-led BN won big,
indicating that the people had put their trust in the new premier Abdullah Badawi on his
promise to clean up the UMNO-led BN party of corrupt practices and leaders. However,
Badawi was not up to the expectations of the people in fulfilling his promises.
Consequently, in the 2008 election, dubbed a political “tsunami,”409 the ruling BN party
lost big to the opposition and it was the BN’s worst performance ever in Malaysia’s fifty
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years of independence. Crucially, for the first time since 1969, the BN lost the two-thirds
majority in Parliament, which is needed for amending the Constitution.410
Malaysia’s twelfth general election in 2008 witnessed the rise of people power
against perceived suppression and dissatisfactions over communal politics, governmentmanipulated elections, deteriorating socio-economic conditions (dubbed the “3Cs”411
factor), and continued marginalization of the ethnic Indian community. Large-scale
protests throughout 2007 and early 2008 before the election were mostly led by officials
from PAS, DAP, and PKR (National Justice Party). The protests, inspired by grievances
over distributive fairness, were most potent by ethnic Indians, who organized through the
Hindu Right Action Force (HINDRAF) as the Indians felt barred from Malaysia’s rapid
industrialization and neglected by the government. Protests also came from deprived
Malay and Chinese communities, who increasingly have raised doubts about distributions
from developmental performance and have decried that patronage from the government
mainly benefits a lucky few.
As Malaysian citizens collectively began scrutinizing common procedures, an
umbrella movement called Bersih412 (an acronym for a protest movement for “Clean and
Fair Elections”) took shape. Although the Bersih movement413 articulated diverse
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grievances, the center of attention was on the government’s electoral manipulation. The
movement leaders, led by Anwar Ibrahim and top PAS officials, organized the
demonstration, demanding electoral reforms.414
Conclusion
In general, Malaysia’s electoral system cannot be considered free and fair,
because it does not fulfill the functions of what an electoral democracy requires. The
Malaysian case serves as an example of a skewed, maneuvered electoral institution.
So, what is the answer to the overarching question, do elections give the people
control over their government and its policies? The answer is somewhat yes and no.
Some may argue that elections in Malaysia serve more to legitimatize the government
rather offer a change to the government. Others may see a glimpse of hope for
democracy; as seen in the 2008 election results, which showed a strong sign that
democratic choice was exercised and that there is a possibility of an “alternative
government” in sight.
One thing for sure, the government cannot ignore, anymore, the plight of the
peoples. Yet, according to Lim (2002), the opposition members and other malcontents
have focused attention on correcting the weakness of the present system rather than to
push for proportional representation.415 An interesting point from William Case (2010) in
describing the disappointment of the Malaysian people during elections: They do not so
much bring the opposition to power as show the government that they are angry with how
the government is manipulating the electoral system.
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Ultimately, until the unfairness of the electoral system is fixed, the incumbent is
risking being thrown out of office; as continues to be evidenced, such as in the results of
the 2013 election (see page 86).
Political Party System in Malaysia
Does the party system assist the working of democracy? This section discusses
the issues and political parties’ function in enhancing democracy in Malaysia.
Politics in Malaysia has mainly been articulated in communal terms; thus, the
main political parties have organized along ethnic lines: UMNO for Malay, MCA for the
Chinese, and MIC for the Indians. Commonly, each party has sought to maximize its
political power and economic benefits for a particular ethnic group and to promote group
interests in areas such as language, education, and culture. For instance, UMNO
presumably serves as the protector of the Malay communities.
The hybrid criteria of Malaysian politics have directed political activity and
accountability to political parties, without clear boundaries between the parties and the
state. In addition, this system undercuts the space available for democratic political
discourse and engagement, which has fostered a party-centric order with an autocratic
background.
Institutionalization of Malaysia’s Party System and Political Parties
Malaysia’s key political parties416 are well-institutionalized. Enduring and stable,
they are accepted and, across time, have gained stable roots in society. Moreover, with
the legitimate electoral institution, the main political parties in Malaysia have been given
416
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the mandate to rule the country and to carry on with the system. Malaysia’s hybrid
system consists of political parties that are least volatile in the region. More than fifty
years since independence, only once has the Parliament been suspended and democracy
collapsed and that was during the 1969 riots. Then, when in 2008 the opposition coalition
(PKR, PAS and DAP) succeeded in denying the incumbent two-thirds of the super
majority in Parliament, unlike in 1969 no ethnic tensions occurred. Also, even though the
elections system was designed to benefit the incumbent coalition (BN), the 2008 election
was proof that democracy is relatively alive in Malaysia, because the opposition was able
to win control of state governments.417
Parties in Malaysia have their general pattern of support in society, faith in
organized interests, and a remarkably stable foundation in the system. In terms of
longevity, the main party Barisan Nasional coalition members—UMNO, MCA, and
MIC—who emerged before independence, have remained persistent until today. The
opposition, comprised of two main parties—PAS418 and DAP—also have remained
persistent since independence. In 2003, another party emerged to rival the UMNO and
BN: the PKR.419
Parties in Malaysia at the earlier stage of independence defined themselves as
communal ideologies. Different parties appealed to particular ethnic groups. UMNO was
417
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for the Malays, the MCA for the Chinese, and the MIC for the Indians. On the
oppositions’ part, the PAS and DAP (Democratic Action Party) claimed that their
ideology was, contrary to BN, not communal issues but to represent all ethnicities in
Malaysia. Even so, voters always have related the PAS with representing Muslim
fundamentals and the DAP with representing Chinese communities.420
Parties in Malaysia remain a primary mode of political engagement among the
people, who show less interest in other forms of participation. However, since the
Reformasi 421 movement in 1998, Malaysians have gone into the streets in protest,
demonstrating their discontent, mostly toward the government and state policies. In 2007,
two major demonstrations took place in Kuala Lumpur, organized by HINDRAF and
Bersih.422
On the other hand, the government discourages such acts as demonstrating in the
streets; as seen in the many laws423 enacted that limit citizen participation in protest
activities, especially those regarding government policies. Jomo (1996) wrote that the BN
encouraged the idea of democratic participation through voting in elections rather than
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through extra-electoral engagements424 like organized public meetings, street protests and
demonstrations.
In a smaller earlier survey, Welsh (1996) wrote that Malaysians understand
democracy in terms of procedures and the performance of institutions and leaders, and
that most were satisfied with the regime, however illiberal.425 This tolerance of the
illiberal political system is because Malaysians have a narrow concept of democracy,
which is defined through involvement in registered political parties and participation in
multi-party elections that are conducted regularly; and, unlike elsewhere in Southeast
Asia (Singapore excluded), elections and party politics are the stuff of contemporary
Malaysia politics.426
Party organizations and disciplines are relatively solid and high in Malaysia. The
networks created between parties and supporters keep party leaders informed of
sentiments and priorities at the grassroots levels, which prepares a strong ground for
parties to create strategies to gain the absolute confidence and votes of supporters. One
main characteristic of parties in Malaysia is that they identify themselves through a
particularistic ground; for example, UMNO based its main agenda as the protector of the
Malay race and the Malays’ special positions, and the PAS are a Malay Muslim-based
party that appeals to the Islamic state as well as justice for all.
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The paradox of the party system in Malaysia is that it functions against the
principles of democracy. According to Weiss (2009), the case of Malaysia shows a
strongly institutionalized party system that is incompatible with democracy.427 Elements
of domination are obviously criteria in the system; one single party dominates the power
in the government, and the power structure is concentrated on a single party dominating
rather than power being shared with other less dominant parties.
Thus, not surprisingly, the party system in Malaysia contributes to the literature in
politics and government in terms of how party systems flourish in a semi-democratic
political regime like Malaysia. The interesting phenomenon in the studies of Malaysia’s
government is that coercive systems tend to reinforce stable party systems. The regime
often uses coercion, such as threat of detention or confinement, as a deterrent to causing
further trouble to the regime. This action might also have an exemplary function, in that it
warns other prospective opponents of the consequences of their actions. On a grander
scale, wholesale coercion in the form of a state of emergency might be employed in order
to displace or out-maneuver successful members of opposition parties.
To justify the control of its domestic legitimate opposition and dissidents who are
seen as a threat to the government’s agenda and interests, this application of coercion
thus works as a form of political strategy. For example, coercion might simultaneously
punish an opponent for his actions and prevent him from continuing them, while
providing a deterrent to others who might contemplate a similar action.
Several broad categories of coercion are readily identifiable. A regime might
employ coercive measures to prevent unwanted actions such as demonstrations and
427
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strikes, or the speeches, writings, and mobilizing activities of a particular leader. A
persistently troublesome opponent might find himself subjected to punitive coercion and
suffer a period of detention.
Coercion is the most appealing strategic option for a hybrid regime like Malaysia,
which seeks to balance constraints from the divided societies and regime’s political goals.
Thus, these acts of restraining divided societies through the mechanism of control are
claimed to be justified in order to maintain social harmony and economic development.
Political Engineering of the Party System in Malaysia
Political parties in Malaysia mobilize support along ethnic lines. As mentioned,
the BN and UMNO lay their ideology on the foundation of communal politics. Thus,
their political leaders usually conduct their campaigns by playing the “ethnic card.” This
often leads to increasing ethnic tensions and, in some instances, ethnic conflict. The
common argument that says democracy fares better in mono-ethnic societies than in
multi-ethnic ones is due to the particular ways that parties form, develop, and campaign
in ethnically divided societies. Not surprisingly, ethnic conflict is often a direct result of
ethnic politics imbued in the party system.428
In such a system, the easiest way to mobilize voter support at election time is to
appeal to the root insecurities of the population. For instance, during campaigns, the
UMNO always remind supporters that, if they do not vote and secure the power of
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UMNO, the tragedy of May 13, 1969 will repeat itself. The ideas of the May 13 riots
often create uneasy feelings among voters who are of different ethnic backgrounds.429
Sequencing the institutionalization of parties before state structures, specifically
before meaningful democratization, helps to explain both the patterns of party
development and the party-system institutionalization in Malaysia. Thus, a wellinstitutionalized system is unfavorable, rather than essential to democratic stability.
Complementing these effects has been a legacy of skewed rules of the game that
deny representation of particular interests and that shift citizens’ decisions on whether to
engage. The series of changes in these factors has yielded a polity in which elections are
more honored than honorable, and a well-institutionalized system that is harmful rather
than essential to democratic stability.430
Malaysia’s dominant party-institutionalized system limits prospects for real
democratization. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) see this as an asset, saying that
institutionalization means parties play a key role in structuring the political system, which
renders politics more predictable.431
Conclusion
Over time, most likely Malaysia’s institutionalized and strong party system will
remain institutionalized. However, the party system will become increasingly unclear as
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increased transparency and broader participation in extra-electoral channels are more
contingent on the lack of inspiring leadership in UMNO.
In sum, Malaysia’s institutionalized party system will not help move
democratization along. Only when the system wavers, will liberalization be possible.
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Chapter Seven: The Government’s Effectiveness and Accountability
It is very important for the development of a democracy if a government is
accountable in all of its activities. Basically, accountability relates to responsibility,
blameworthiness, answerability, and trust; and, thus, involves the obligation to explain
one’s actions and to justify what one does. In a democratic system, accountability is a
crucial factor in determining good governance and, hence, the legitimacy of power.
Regardless of the form of the ruling system used to govern a country, accountability is
the pillar of integrity and is the actual portrayal of the ruling government’s uprightness.
Figure 4 below shows the indicator of the voice and accountability that reflects
perceptions on the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free
media. The performance of the ASEAN six countries was not encouraging, including
Malaysia, which has performed low since 2006 and dropped in 2010, below Singapore
and only a little above Thailand, which has performed the worst. Indonesia shows an
impressive improvement, becoming the best in the ASEAN six in 2010.
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Figure 4. Malaysia’s Voice and Accountability Indicator
Issues with Malaysia’s Voice and Accountability Indicator
According to the Global Integrity Report,432 Malaysia scores poorly in many areas
of accountability, especially regarding the significant implementation gap between laws
on the books and their actual enforcement. Repressive laws in Malaysia hamper freedom
of expression and deny citizens’ access to government information; there is no right-toinformation law. Likewise, the separation of government powers in Malaysia is unclear,
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and the executive body appears to enjoy relatively unchecked power. A supreme audit
institution exists, but the public cannot access its reports.433
Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is not guaranteed in Malaysia either
constitutionally or through any specific legislation. The Malaysian government has
repeatedly rejected requests for FOIA legislation from opposition parliamentarians, civil
society representatives, and journalists. The government’s chief argument is that access
to information could affect race relations within the multi-ethnic population.434
Such laws as these, however, are very important in any functioning government,
because they can protect the people from corruption and help to promote transparency
and good governance. With such laws, the government must share information so that the
public is not in a state of ignorance regarding the government’s activities. When a
government is transparent, this increases public confidence and deepens the citizens’ trust
in their government.
The Centre of Independent Journalism (CIJ) in Malaysia has added to the calls for
the Malaysian government to introduce a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). With
Malaysia performing badly in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), for three
consecutive years (2009, 2010, 2011), it would be best for the country to have the FOIA
passed because it would be one of the best tools to keep corruption at bay.
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One big achievement in Malaysia regarding the FOIA is that in April 2011, the
Malaysian state Selangor435 passed an FOI Bill, the first in Malaysia. Following suite was
Penang in November 2011.436 Critics allege that those bills still have many discrepancies
and risk being overruled by the federal government’s Official Secrets Act (OSA), but are
the beginning of good signs to come regarding transparency in governance and
government accountability.
The FOI laws will face difficulties in implementation since they do not yet apply
to information controlled by the federal government and they do not have the power to
override OSA restrictions, which provides the government with broad discretion in
classifying any government-controlled information; and with draconian laws such as the
Internal Security Act (ISA), which sanctions imprisonment without trial of any
individuals deemed to be acting in any manner prejudicial to the interests of the security
of Malaysia. Moreover, the FOI laws require applicants to state the reason for and
purpose of their information requests, and provides for the arrest and detention of
individuals deemed to have used information contrary to the stated reason and purpose.
Official Secrets Act
Freedom of information is severely restricted in Malaysia, both by legislation,
including the Official Secrets Act (OSA), and a pervasive culture of secrecy. Information
on matters ranging from public health to government spending is classified. There also is
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no allowance for appeal to public interest when requesting documents, nor is there a
culture of protecting whistleblowers.437
According to Suaram,438 it can be fairly said that the amount of information
subject to classification as a state secret is potentially unlimited. The list of documents
and information provided in the schedule is extremely broad, placing even formally
adopted Cabinet documents in the realm of secrecy. This is contrary to fundamental
democratic principles of an open government.
In addition, any designated public official may, at any time and apparently for any
reason, classify anything at all as an official secret.439 The absence of any check or
balance on the powers of the minister or public officials to classify information is a
serious flaw. There also is no penalty for misclassifying information, and section 16A
attempts to place the decisions of even the most junior public official to classify a
particular document beyond judicial scrutiny. This results in one-sided legislation that
accords unlimited power to the state and its officials to deny the public information, and
enables the use of the Act to conceal corruption, abuse of public power, and
mismanagement of public resources, contrary to generally established principles of
administrative justice.440
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The OSA has created a culture of secrecy, which makes it difficult to access
documents even when there is a legal obligation for the government to make these public,
such as environmental impact assessments, budgets and local development plans. The
Act has also made it illegal for journalists to have access to almost all official documents.
As a result of these restrictions, the OSA is often invoked to silence dissidents.
Many leaders and members of opposition parties have been found guilty of receiving and
revealing information about the government’s excessive expenditures and misuse of
public funds. Persecution relies on revealing the so-called government secrets.
Another problem is that ministers and government officials are not obliged to
reveal the facts, even when the issue concerns the public interest. This is obvious during
the debate and question-and-answer sessions in Parliament, where the minister to whom a
question is directed can decide not to answer. This provision is available under
Parliamentary Standing Orders, which defeats the purpose of a parliamentary question
time. Even on minor non-sensitive issues, civil servants are often reluctant to speak
out.441 Due to the prevailing culture of secrecy in Malaysia, there is a long list of
information that is of public interest but which the public is unable to access; or, if it can
be accessed, red tape and bureaucracy prevent the public from obtaining the information.
Government Effectiveness
A government’s effectiveness is reflected in its citizens’ perceptions of the quality
of public services, the quality of civil service and the degree of its independence from
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political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
The most comprehensive and reliable source of information on government
performance is the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) first released in 1999 by
Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton.442 This indicator measures the quality of the civil
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to
such policies. If a government is effective, it should be able to deliver goods that
individuals need in order to improve their social welfare. At a minimum, an effective
government provides an environment where all citizens enjoy reliable access to sufficient
amounts of food. Malaysia since 1996 has been relatively consistent in the government
effectiveness indicator.
In Figure 5 below, the ranking indicator between the ASEAN five (Indonesia,
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand), as of 2010 the Malaysian government’s
effectiveness improved from 2009443 and ranks second after Singapore, which has been
consistent in the indicator.
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Figure 5. Government Effectiveness
Source: Country Data Report for MALAYSIA, 1996-2010. The Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI),444 The World Bank Group 2011.

Human Development Index 2011
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) found a strong positive association
between government effectiveness and human development. For example, countries with
higher accountability have had a more stable political environment, and more effective
governments have had lower infant mortality rates and higher literacy rates.
Also, improvements in government performance have a very large payoff in terms
of human development. The more effective the government, the higher the level of
human development. This is especially true in middle-income countries, where each year,
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higher governance-effective rankings have resulted in a higher Human Development
Index (HDI).

Figure 6. Human Development Index: Trends 1980-present
Source: The World Bank and researcher calculation

The Human Development Index (HDI) is based primarily on international data
from the UN Population Division, the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), and the
World Bank. The HDI is an average measure of basic human development achievements
in a country, represents a push for a broader definition of well-being, and provides a
composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education,
and income. Between 1980 and 2011, Malaysia showed progress in each of these HDI
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indicators, placing Malaysia above the regional average.445 In the broader picture,
government effectiveness in Malaysia is reflected in its high HDI.
Many studies have noted positive correlations between an effective government
and higher human development. Democracy promoters assume that democracy will
improve human development. Ironically, Malaysia performed well in human
development relative to it being a semi-democracy. Perhaps government effectiveness
and efficient government institutions somehow influence human development regardless
of the system of governance.
Like all averages, the HDI masks inequality in the distribution of human
development across the population at the country level. The HDI can be viewed as an
index of “potential” human development and inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) as an index
of actual human development. Due to a lack of relevant data, the IHDI on Malaysia has
not been calculated.446
Civilian Control of the Military and Police
Civilian control is implicitly defined as a lack of military coups and military rule;
or a low risk for such events.447 An uncontrolled military is a hinder toward full
democratization. Fortunate for democratization in Malaysia, there are no serious issues
with the military-civilian relationship. The military in Malaysia are fully controlled by
civilian-elected officials. The same applies to the police forces. In fact, Malaysia is one of
445
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the few countries in Southeast Asia where the military has not intervened in politics and
where the civilian authorities have continued in power since independence. Since there
are no real tensions between the armed forces and the political leadership in Malaysia, I
foresee no possibility of a military take-over in Malaysia in the near future.
Factors That Shape a Positive Relationship Between Military/Police and Civilian
Authority
Institutional Building of the Malaysia Armed Forces
Malaysia is a good example of a country where the civil-military relation is
constitutionally instituted.448 The Malaysia Armed Forces (MAF)449 is a corporate entity
that is completely loyal to the government and is subordinate to that civil power because
of the rule of law (the nation’s Constitution), tradition, and its own sense of military
professionalism. In this regard, the MAF adheres to the principle of civilian supremacy;
that, in a stable democracy, patterns of civil-military relations are established by public
law or constitutional tradition, assured control of the military by the civilian government,
and are observed by the government and accepted by the armed forces as part of the
military ethic.450
According to Zakaria Hj. Ahmad (1985), the institution building of the Malaysian
military itself is a factor that explains why there is no intervention by the MAF in
448
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domestic politics. Its role has been clearly defined in terms of internal and external
defense missions, and the military are clearly subservient toward the civilian authorities.
In this sense, the non-intervention of the military in the political process might be
attributed to the lack of opportunity and to their preoccupation with well-delineated
military tasks.451
Analysts report that the MAF had steadfastly stuck to its role in support of the
civilian authorities, such as in instances like the critical period of the May 13th ethnic
riots in Kuala Lumpur. When the army was called to restore order, it could easily have
seized the political power but did not do so; this occurrence demonstrated the noninterventionist stance of the MAF. Most importantly, the point remains that no matter
what changes that might happen in later Malaya and in present Malaysia, the MAF has
not transformed nor deviated from its role.452 Another example is that during the twelveyear Emergency Period (1948-1960), when the MAF had all the opportunity to take over
the country on the grounds of protecting the nation state against Communists insurgents,
there was no occurrence of the military taking over power from the civilian government.
In the Malaysian context, the military is mainly responsible for the country’s
internal and external defenses. They are focused on implementing rather than formulating
national defense and security policies. The concept of loyalty to country and king has
resulted in a deep-seated belief in subordination of the armed forces to the civilian
451
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administration; accordingly, the military’s code of honor emphasizes political neutrality.
The former army chief General Zain Hashim once remarked that the MAF’s primary
concern was to carry out the missions issued by the civilian administration. As far as he
was concerned, it is not even the duty of the armed forces to identify who the external foe
is. This statement reflects the military’s commitment to non-interference in the political
sphere.453
As a national institution confined by the control authority and Constitution, the
MAF has not changed much during the political transition of the country from colonial to
post-independence times. This is an important factor in explaining the military’s high
degree of organizational cohesion and institutional stability.
Dominant Political Party
Experts advise that if we want to explain the role of the military in politics, it is
not enough to focus on the military institution alone; we need to see the political system
as a whole. For example, in Malaysia, the features of political systems are that political
parties have deep roots in society. UMNO and its alliance partners have real organized
roots in society and there is no doubt that many Malays in Malaysia believe that UMNO
serves as a safeguard to their interests. The military elites and civilian elites are closely
linked, and disobedience toward the civilian government is very unlikely because both
parties share similar interests in the state.454
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Hence, civilian control in Malaysia refers to specific civilians (that is the Malays)
and if in case there is transition in the regime, there will be still military compliance for
as long as the new regime is still Malay dominated. So far, there have been no coups in
Malaysia because the military has only served under the same regime (UMNO-led BN)
since independence and only one ethnic community political control, the Malay and
UMNO.455 Understandably, civilian control of the military in a semi-democracy or
partially authoritarian political system like Malaysia is safeguarded by an informal
networking between military officers and the dominant government party (i.e., UMNOled Barisan Nasional).456
As stated in the Constitution, the MAF is part of the Malaysian Government
Department of civil service and is responsible for implementing government defense
policies. Therefore, the MAF does not intervene in political activities and is always
supportive of the ruling government; although this close relationship between the military
and the ruling parties invites claims that the MAF and the police forces are used as the
government’s apparatus to sustain the regime’s survivability.
Ethnicity and the Civilian-Military Stable Relationship
The question of ethnic relations remains an unresolved problem in MAF
institution building; thus, it may also be a key factor of the military’s non-intervention in
politics. According to Cynthia Enloe (1976), when discussing civilian control on the
military, the question should be which civilians control the military, with what resources,
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and for what ends?457 Ethnic considerations are vital in the social composition of the
military and its subordination to civilian authority. In Malaysia, the military has always
been identified with the Malay community; especially after the 1969 riots, when the
Malay community and political leadership came to view the military and the police force
as crucial to maintaining Malay dominance.
Harold Crouch (1997) argued that since Malaysia is sharply divided along ethnic
lines, the ethnic factor has actually contributed to stable civil-military relations. The
Malays are completely dominant in the armed forces and, since the government is also
dominated by the Malays, there is little conflict between the military and the government.
In fact, Malay military officers, Malay bureaucrats, and UMNO politicians are all part of
the same elite and are often related to each other by either blood or marriage.458 In
addition, the MAF are predominantly Malays and are controlled by the Malay highranking officers; thus, logically, they will not seize power because, basically, they enjoy
the same privileges and rewards and share similar values. Basically, the military in
Malaysia reinforces the Malay domination of the government.459
Others argue that the MAF will not seize power because they are controlled by the
Malays, and the key posts in the force are mostly held by Malays, with the composition
of members in the military also being predominantly Malays, implying that the forces
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will not change a system that supports Malay privileges. Even if there is an intra-Malays
power struggle,460 it would be unlikely to change the present structure and pattern of
civil-military relations in Malaysia. Nathan and Govindasamy (2001) theorized that the
MAF would politically take over power only if the Malays’ dominance and privileges
were threatened. Practically, as long as there is no direct threat to Malay power and its
privileges, the military will remain apolitical and independent.461
Strong and Stable Government Contributes to Stable Civilian-Military Relationship
It is common sense that an ineffective civilian government and its weak political
institutions can trigger interference from a strong military institution. We have seen
military interference in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and others in the region,
throughout the history of Southeast Asia. When civilian leaders fail to legitimize their
governmental authority in a sustainable manner, military interference is unavoidable.
Malaysia’s political legitimacy, which is based on Malay dominance, has had a high
degree of legitimacy and has been effective in delivering public goods and raising the
living standards of the people.462
Malaysia, since independence, has experienced decades of impressive economic
and social progress, enabling it to provide for the health and education of its people, to
eradicate poverty in large measure, to build an excellent infrastructure, and to become a
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major global exporter of goods and services.463 Political stability and economic growth
have sustained the political system in Malaysia, which can be seen in the people’s
endorsement of the ruling government through regularly held general elections.
The military in Malaysia are happy that their interests are well-looked after by the
government and that the Malays supremacy and Malay interests have remained
uninterrupted; which prompts the military not to interfere with the civilian authority.
Furthermore, the Malaysian government’s legitimacy is amplified by the constitutional
provisions of draconian laws,464 which are exercised by the legal body and the police
force.
The military, however, has been excluded from the exercise of the internal
political coercion. While important and evident, coercion is not the fortress of the
Malaysian government. Those laws are used on the grounds of enforcing authority and
maintaining social harmony. Critics, however, say otherwise and criticize that the
government uses coercion to buttress opposition and dissidents.
Police Force in Malaysia
The problem with police and security forces has been that they are always seen as
a police of the government, most of the time defending the political order along with the
government of the day. In addition, they are also against the opposition.
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The application of state coercion is rooted in legal provisions such as the Internal Security Act, which
allows restrictions on freedom of assembly, association, and expression freedom of movement that suppress
human rights. In addition, there are eleven other pieces of legislation that curtail and/or marginalize civil
rights in Malaysia.
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Lately, it has been reported by Amnesty International and human-rights groups
that acts of police brutality in Malaysia are rising against civilians and opposition
members465 as well as many deaths in police custody, with very few inquests conducted
and the vast majority uninvestigated.
A 2007 survey commissioned by Transparency International Malaysia and
conducted by the Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research found that the police are among
the least transparent government agencies; 56 percent of Malaysians have named the
police as the enforcement agency with the lowest level of integrity and transparency.
Between 1999 and 2003, 5,726 cases of corruption involving the police were reported,
more than any other government agency. Some officers had taken sizable bribes from
brothels and other criminal operations, and amassed millions of ringgit in their bank
accounts. The Royal Commission found a pattern of consistent neglect and abuse of
rights, apparently ingrained in police practices despite strong safeguards and compliance
with human rights in national laws.466
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their acts of human-rights abuse.
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Malaysia Military Spending
Malaysia’s defense budget is modest compared to many countries. Defense
allocation therefore depends on the question of affordability on the part of the
government. Malaysia spent money on defense whenever her budget allowed for it.
Figure 7 below shows that, on the government’s spending pattern on the military
from 1990 to 1995, the trend is upward; after 1995, the military spending decreased until
1998, after which military expenditures trended upward trend but in small increases year
to year. In general, Malaysia’s military expenditure as a percentage of the GDP has been
about 2.4 to 2.6 for the past fifteen years.467

Figure 7. Military Expenditure As Percentage of Malaysia’s GDP
Source: The World Bank World Development Indicators and researcher calculations

Internationally, Malaysia remained on the sidelines of the dangerous escalation of
tensions between China on one side and the Philippines and Vietnam on the other over
467

Based on data from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, and The World Bank.
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control of the South China Sea, despite Malaysia being one of the numerous claimants to
the disputed Spratly Islands. In fact, Malaysia has taken a notably pro-China stance on
the issue, assuring its fellow ASEAN members that Chinese involvement in the region is
to be encouraged rather than feared. Nonetheless, Malaysia has remained largely aloof
from defense co-operation with China, and held back from conducting any major joint
exercises with the Chinese, as other regional militaries now do. Tensions with traditional
rivals Indonesia and Singapore have remained at an historic low, with the Malaysian
government pushing for the formation of a joint parliamentary committee with Indonesia
to resolve the question of the two countries’ disputed land and maritime borders.468
Speculation over the emergence of a regional arms race has not translated into
defense spending increases on Malaysia’s part, perhaps impacted by the economic
downturn. In October 2011, the government said it would be spending marginally less on
defense in the coming year; according to the government’s figures, the budget was set to
dip from MYR13.8bn (US$4.44bn) to MYR13.7bn (US$4.41 bn).469
Conclusion
Malaysia’s mixed political system, often called “semi-democratic,”
understandably needs the backing of both the police and the military in managing public
order and security. In appreciating this imperative for peace and stability, the MAF and
the government complement each other under the rubric of national security and nationbuilding. Having said this, the system will remain the same because “entrenched
institutions and interests have largely blocked fundamental change.” The country’s
468
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history and politics and geo-location helped create deeply entrenched identities,
institutions and relations. Thus, any form of reform will be met with strong rejection for
those benefits from the system.470
Malaysia has scored well for its civilian-controlled relationship with the military.
Although it may not be to the complete satisfaction of all groups, the norms are already
entrenched in the system, through years since colonialism. The positive step forward is to
concentrate toward greater transparency and accountability in both institutions, both the
police force and the MAF.
Assessing Corruption in Malaysia
Although corruption471 in Malaysia has not attained epidemic proportions, it has
been on the increase in recent years.472 Professor Syed Hussein Alatas (1986) wrote that,
apart from Singapore, of all the developing countries of Asia, corruption is least
pandemic in Malaysia. The fear is that it is growing. Since 1957, the year of
independence, corruption has definitely been growing in Malaysia. We see numerous
political figures and others amassing wealth through being in office. It is public
knowledge that there is a great deal of corruption going on in customs, the highway
police, immigration, the courts, the land office, the supply acquisition units of the various
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ministries, the religious departments in the states of the federation, and the road transport
offices. [But] corruption in Malaysia has not reached the Indonesian and Indian
proportions to the degree of systemic malignancy.473

Malaysia’s CPI Score 2001 to 2010
No. of countries
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Figure 8. Malaysia’s CPI Score: 2001-2010

Source: Transparency International – Malaysia (Jul - Dec 2010)

The score in Figure 8 depicts Malaysia at its lowest rating ever by the graft
watchdog Transparency International. Malaysia is seen plunging down into serious
corruption, with an index score of 4.4. The index has a range of 0 to 10, 0 being highly
corrupt, 10 being very clean. An index score of 4.4 is deemed to be a serious corruption
score and is ranked at 56 out of 178 countries being rated (see Figure 9). The CPI scores
released in October 26, 2010 show that, since 2001, Malaysia has distressingly dropped
in the international rankings and corruption in Malaysia has reached a critical level;
Transparency International warned the government to act for fear of losing its
473
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competitiveness.474 Dato Paul Low, president of the local branch of Transparency

International – Malaysia, noted that the plunge was serious not only compared to the
country’s perceived past performances but, more importantly, in relation to other
countries worldwide, especially those within the ASEAN region. Drawing attention to
neighboring Indonesia, Low marked that though Malaysia ranks 111 and scored 2.8 on
the CPI, the country’s corruption level is seen to be improving steadily under the
administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.475
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Figure 9. CPI Scores: Selected ASEAN Countries and South Korea
Source: Transparency International – Malaysia (Jul - Dec 2010)

In 2010, while Malaysia was slipping in its rank, Indonesia was rising, moving up
fast and showing good improvement, mostly because of the political will of the country
to improve itself and eradicate corruption. Indonesia’s powerful Corruption Eradication
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Commission (KPK) so far has been successful in bringing the country’s ranking up under
CPI in the region. This brings one to suggest that the Malaysia Anti-Corruption
Commission (MACC) be given more prosecution power in order to be more effective like
what is practiced in Indonesia. Malaysia needs to be more proactive in addressing
corruption, especially those involving the “big fish,” if the government is serious about
improving their rank in the CPI. Although there have been many media reports about
high-profile corruption cases involving ruling party politicians and powerful individuals,
the public’s perception in Malaysia is that few are investigated or end up in court. In
addition, the MACC has been ineffective in catching any “big fish,” fueling a widespread
belief that the Commission is not completely independent.476
Recently, aside from a lack of political will and MACC’s lack of persecution
powers, Malaysia’s fight against corruption has lost ground due to selective investigation
and prosecution of graft cases. This lies solely with the attorney general who has made
odd decisions not to take further action in certain cases. One example of how graft cases
either go unnoticed or are not investigated is the Alcatel-Lucent bribery controversy in
December 2010 when the French telecom giant was accused by U.S. officials of bribing
officials in Latin America and Asia, including Malaysia; however, this case has gone
unnoticed in Malaysia. It is unfortunate that we needed a charge from a foreign
legislation (the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) to highlight incidences of possible
corruption in Malaysia.477
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Although there are good initiatives and the public’s confidence in the
government’s actions to fight corruption has jumped, as shown in Figure 10 below,
unfortunately there are indications of insufficient political will to eradicate corruption.
For example, no “big fish” being brought to book, poor progress in identifying and
prosecuting culpable persons in the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ) fiasco,478 no further
action by the Attorney General against those implicated in judicial appointmenttampering (Lingam tapes saga)479 despite the Royal Commission’s findings and
recommendations, and the continuing and snowballing practice of awarding mega
projects and contracts without open tenders or competitive bidding, and IPs yet to be
implemented.480
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Figure 10. Assessment of Malaysian Government’s Actions in the Fight Against
Corruption 2006-2010
Source: Transparency International – Malaysia (Jul - Dec 2010)

When Abdullah Badawi481 assumed office as Prime Minister on 31 October 2003,
he pledged to implement reforms that are embedded in the National Integrity Plan (NIP),
he tried to eradicate corruption and promote good governance and ethical values,482 and
pledged war against corruption in Malaysia. This explains how the Barisan Nasional was
able to capture 90 percent of parliamentary seats and won spectacularly in the 2004
general election. Under Badawi, the people finally had hope that the country was heading
in the right direction, as opposed to the uncompromising style of Mahathir. However,
Badawi’s glory did not last long, as critics said he had failed to keep up with his initial
plans. The lack of real change in terms of openness became more and more evident
throughout his tenure. Often, he stood by mutely as investigations into the corruption of
high-level officials collapsed and whistleblowers were penalized. For example, Eric Chia,
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a tycoon once close to Mahathir, was charged for making payments of RM76 million
($23 million) to a nonexistent company; he was acquitted for any wrong doing, and the
opposition leader Lim Kit Siang characterized the acquittal as a major setback for anticorruption.483
Also, to eliminate Malaysia’s endemic culture of patronage, Badawi ought to have
explained in full how his son Kamaluddin had secured the position of a leading
shareholder of Scomi Group, whose share price shot up by nearly 600 percent just a few
months before Badawi was scheduled to take over from Mahathir as prime minister,
making his son into a multi-millionaire overnight. The same thing happened with
Badawi’s son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin, whose meteoric rise to become the nation’s
most powerful young man took place during Badawi’s tenure when, in 2006, he made a
fortune in the merger between ECM Libra Capital Bhd. and the government-linked
Avenue Capital Resources Bhd.484
Transparency International – Malaysia (TI-M) urges the government to show
strong political will to fight corruption without fear or favor. Given Malaysia’s aspiration
to be a high income and developed country by the year 2020, the commitment to fight
corruption must be clear and firm. CPI results, as in the graph “Relationship Between CPI
Scores and GDP” have consistently shown a direct correlation between the level of
corruption and the economic development of a nation. Nations with good CPI scores (less
corrupt) are developed nations with a high Gross Development Products (GDP), such as
483
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Denmark, New Zealand, and Singapore (joint top three in the 2010 CPI ranking).
Conversely, countries with low scores (more corrupt) are low-income nations. This
indicates that Malaysia’s quest for a high-income economy will fail if corruption persists.
A high-income economy can only be achieved where there are efficient delivery systems,
and the organs of government and institutions govern and manage the country and its
resources professionally, responsibly, and with integrity, transparency, and good
governance in the interest of the nation and its citizens.485
Najib Tun Razak,486 as Malaysia’s new premier in 2009, tried to prove that he was
against corruption. Under his watch, ongoing high-profile court cases prosecuted by the
MACC included former transport minister and MCA president Tun Dr Ling Liong Sik
and former Selangor menteri besar Datuk Seri Dr Mohd Khir Toyo. Dr Ling was charged
for cheating the government over his alleged role in the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ)
scandal; Dr Mohd Khir was arrested and charged for alleged corruption linked to a land
deal. Another former transport minister, Tan Sri Chan Kong Choy, was also charged in
relation to the PKFZ case.487
Critics claim that such improvements and upgrades might do the trick of silencing
skeptics. However, what is more important is that the MACC should continue to curb
corruption in Malaysia, without fear or favor. Elements that facilitate “grand corruption”
are still prevalent; including the continued and snowballing practice of awarding mega

485
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projects and contracts without open tenders or competitive bidding, limited access to
information that contributes to a culture of secrecy and a lack of transparency, allegations
of inflated pricing in military purchases, and the continued close nexus between business
and politics in Malaysia.488
Corruption is a negative phenomenon often displayed in a hybrid political system.
This is because the political system provides an able environment that accommodates
corrupt practices.
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Chapter Eight: Civil Society, Popular Participation Media, and Democracy
This chapter answers the question: Do the media in Malaysia operate in a way
that sustains democratic values? In a healthy democracy, the power of the media is to
highlight issues that best serve the needs of the public. In order to perform effectively, it
is imperative for the mass media to operate in a free environment. Access to information
is a key; democracy depends on a knowledgeable citizenry whose access to a broad range
of information enables them to fully participate in public life, help determine priorities
for public spending, receive equal access to justice, and hold public officials
accountable.489
For a country pursuing a developed-nation status,490 there is a vital need for a
plurality of independent media in order to achieve a good democracy. A variety of free
and independent information sources, including the conventional media of printing and
broadcasting (i.e., television, radio) and increased access to the new media that is the
Internet (i.e., blogging, tweeting, social online networking), are essential in the
contemporary democratic environment.
489
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Media Freedom in Malaysia
Figure 11 below shows that the press media in Malaysia consistently have not
been free. The index provided by Freedom House shows that these results have been
consistent for about a decade: “Not Free”491 (2002-2011). Information gathered from
varieties of Human Rights Watch groups, Amnesty International, Reporters Without
Borders, and World Press Freedom Index reveals government crackdowns on journalists
and newspapers publications, especially news about criticizing and revealing government
inefficiency and corrupt dealings.
The index at its highest peak of “unfree” media in 2002 and 2003 covered the last
two years that Premier Mahathir was in office. These indicate a government ineffective in
Malaysia, which increasingly resorted to the crudest and most repressive legislations in
the Constitution; namely the ISA, OSA, and Sedition Act, to try to curb political
mobilization and scrutiny over the exercise of power and related media activities. The
year 2006 had the lowest indicator since 2002, and was the period when the new premier
Abdullah Badawi had promised to stop corruption and give more media freedom, which
had inspired positive expectations in Malaysia’s public and civil society. The other years
show signs of consistently slow progress in media freedom. However, the new media, the
Internet, has shown some good signs that it is not in the same “shoes” as the mainstream
media.
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Figure 11. Malaysia: Freedom of Press and Freedom of the Net Index 2002-2011
Main Issues on Media Freedom
In Malaysia, the concerns of a free and independent media involve two main
troubling issues: (1) the issue of ownership, and (2) regulatory issues.492 Regarding
ownership, much of the mainstream media in Malaysia is owned directly or indirectly by
entities linked to the ruling political party. Many local newspapers, especially the daily
published press, are either controlled or owned by either the government coalition parties
under BN or companies that have strong relations with the ruling party.493
For instance, UMNO controls the Fleet Company which owns major daily
newspapers in Malaysia, such as the New Straits Times, Berita Harian, Business Times,

492

Lim Ming Kuok, Mass Media and Democracy, http://www.projectmalaysia.org/articles.html.

493

Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, “Media Freedom in Malaysia,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 35, no. 3
(2005): 341.

206

the Malay Mail and Shin Min Daily News. In addition, the major Malay daily newspapers
(i.e., Utusan Melayu, Utusan Malaysia) are owned by companies with a direct link to
UMNO. Berjaya Group, the company that publishes The Star, The Sun, and Watan
newspapers, is owned by Vincent Tan, a close friend to Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad. The same goes with major Chinese newspapers, such as Nanyang Siangpao
and China Press bought by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA).494 Likewise,
Tamil newspapers, such as Tamil Nesan, Tamil Osai and Thinamani, have a close link
with leaders in the Malaysian Indian Congress party (MIC).495 These cases clearly show
the web of press ownership that directly links to the ruling Barisan Nasional, the longest
serving party in the regime.
Powerful politically connected business figures have increasingly looked to the
courts to silence and punish critical reporting through “mega-suits.” Two defamation
cases were brought by Mahathir’s son pertaining to an article about Malaysia Inc. in the
January 1999 edition of Asia Wall Street Journal (AWSJ); in another case, a RM200
million defamation suit was taken by Vincent Tan, Berjaya Group chairman and chief
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executive, in response to “Malaysia Props Up Crony Capitalists” penned by Malaysian
academic K. S. Jomo in the December 1998 edition of the AWSJ.496
As a result of dominance in ownership, a monopoly is clearly unavoidable. Since
almost all of the major media and daily newspapers in Malaysia, are under the BN
government’s possession, the Radio and TV Malaysia (RTM) is used by the ruling party
to spread its agenda and propaganda to the masses. All the media have been manipulated
to direct people’s attention and support in favor of the ruling political parties. On the
other hand, the opposition political parties are given bad reviews and negative media
coverage; they are not given a fair share of the public access media to inform the masses
of their political agenda and aspirations.497
Strict Regulations Confining Media Freedom in Malaysia
In addition to the issues of ownership in Malaysia, the media are confined via the
array of the government’s strict regulations and laws. The Malaysian Constitution
guarantees freedom of expression under Article 10, which provides each citizen the right
to freedom of speech and expression; but, at the same time, allows hordes of limitations
to this right. Well-known laws (i.e., Sedition Act, Internal Security Act, Official Secret
Act) and other harsh criminal-defamation laws are used regularly to impose restrictions
on the press and other critics of the government of its policies and unfavorable behavior.
The 1984 Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) requires all publishers and
496
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printing firms to obtain an annual operations permit, and gives the prime minister the
authority to revoke licenses at any time without judicial review.498
One of the many cases was the imprisonment of Lim Guan Eng,499 a Malaysian
opposition politician who spoke out against the rape of a schoolgirl by a government
minister. For speaking out, he was sentenced to three years imprisonment, the schoolgirl
to three years “protective custody,” and the minister so far has not been charged.500 Eng
had raised the irregularities of the case after one of his constituents, who was also the
girl’s grandmother, brought the case to him and sought his help. On 28 February 1995,
Eng was charged under the Sedition Act for prompting “disaffection with the
administration of justice in Malaysia.” On 17 March 1995, an additional charge was
brought under the Printing Presses and Publications Act for “maliciously printing” a
pamphlet containing “false information,” specifically that he had used the term
“imprisoned victim” to describe the rape victim.501
At his first trial in 1997, Lim Guan Eng was convicted on both counts and fined
RM 15,000 (US$6,000). The state appealed to the Court of Appeal against the “leniency”
of the sentence and, at a subsequent hearing before the Court of Appeal (1 April 1998),
the sentence was increased to three years imprisonment. A consequence of that sentence
is that Eng was automatically barred as a member of Parliament and is likely to be
498
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declared bankrupt. The persecution of Lim Guan Eng is seen not as just an attempt by the
government to silence a prominent critic, but as a warning to others. His constituents
have been denied representation in Parliament.502
Not only local journalists and activists are sued and jailed, but also international
journalists have faced the wrath of Malaysia’s controlled media freedom. The jailing of
FEER correspondent Murray Hiebert further highlights the seriousness of the situation.
For those who do take the risk, there is always the cautionary example of Murray Hiebert,
when Malaysia became the only Commonwealth country in half a century to jail a
reporter (and a foreigner at that) for contempt of court. Hiebert, at the time Kuala Lumpur
bureau chief for the Far Eastern Economic Review, was sent to prison for four weeks as a
result of a story he wrote that was critical of the Malaysian judiciary.
The ordeal of the two-year trial and appeals process, during which Hiebert was
barred from leaving the country, made him Malaysia’s press freedom poster child. “Why
are they doing this?” he was asked rhetorically one afternoon in his office before he lost
his appeal. “I think they want to send a message to reporters not to go too far in this
country,” he answered. 503 In an interview with the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS),
Hiebert said, “They used antiquated British contempt of court law that allowed them to
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put me in jail for writing an article that in most settings would have been viewed as very
innocuous.”504
With such a complex web of ownership, conflict of interest is unavoidable, and it
is hard to imagine that the mass media can be truly independent and free from the
influence of political parties and strict state regulations that restrict freedom of media and
expression. Media control through state legislation and shared ownership have brought a
great impact on the level of media freedom in Malaysia. When media are controlled by
shared ownership and legislation, media reports tend to be more biased toward
individuals and groups that are linked to media companies and the government. Only
selected news that is favorable to the government and its political parties is allowed to be
disseminated by the media, and news that is critical and negative toward the government
and its allies is intentionally avoided. In sum, the media serves the interests of the ruling
government instead of the welfare of the people. The mainstream media is used by the
government to suppress and demonize the opposition parties and dissidents.505
The “Unconventional” Media: The Internet
Due to the mainstream media control by the government, an increasing number of
Malaysians are turning to the Internet as their main source of news. In 1994, Malaysia
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became the first country in Southeast Asia to offer Internet access to the public.506 The
2011 Freedom House reported that the Internet had penetrated 56 percent of Malaysians,
or 28.9 million population.507
The online media have not only broken Malaysia’s information blockade,
democratizing access to critical perspectives, less-than-rosy news, details on opposition
parties, and a heap of mindless chatter, to boot; but also have arguably pressed
mainstream media to open up and incumbent politicians at least to gesture toward
interaction and, hence, accountability.508
Malaysians depend on the Internet as an alternative to the mainstream media for
obtaining and disseminating information. The unprecedented victory of the opposition
parties in Malaysia’s 2008 general election is proof of the successful role of the Internet.
The incumbent government reluctantly admitted that they had underestimated the power
of Internet.
Since 2009, the government has stepped up use of the Communications and
Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA) to silence critics online. The authorities have carried out
investigations against news portals and bloggers for making allegedly offensive
comments. On August 2010, The Malaysian Insider reported that Najib’s administration
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had started to evaluate the feasibility of using Internet filters to block undesirable
websites, but backed off from the plan after public outcry.509
Internet Freedom
The significant development of the Internet in Malaysia’s political backdrop was
the launch of the online Malaysiakini (Malaysia Now).510 This independent and critical
newspaper soon had over 110,000 readers daily and won international journalistic
acclaim. It exploited two loopholes: (1) existing laws did not require online media
publications to be licensed; and (2) the previous commitment by the government not to
censor the Internet.511 As an internationally respected, independent, non-party-political
source, the Malaysiakini has gained the trust of people who are concerned about the
government.
As shown in Figure 11, Malaysia Internet freedom is only party-free. The extent
of government surveillance of the Internet is unclear. In recent years, the authorities have
repeatedly hinted that they may take steps to register bloggers. Meanwhile, they have put
aside the plan of following protests by the blogging community and media outlets. The
509
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government so far has kept to its promise not to impose restrictions on the Internet as
mentioned in the Act in 1996.
The Freedom House study, however, found mounting threats to Internet freedom.
In 2001, the Prime Minister’s Department announced that a legislative review was under
way to curb use of the Internet to incite public disorder and violence against the
government; this included consideration of extending the embrace of the Printing Presses
and Publication Act (PPPA) to the Internet.512 According to Freedom on the Net 2011, A
Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media, cyber-attacks, politically motivated
censorship, and government control over Internet infrastructure are among the diverse
and growing threats to Internet freedom.513
These violations on Internet freedom come at a time of explosive growth in the
number of Internet users worldwide, which has doubled over the past five years.
Governments are responding to the increased influence of the new medium, by seeking to
control online activity, restrict the free flow of information, and otherwise infringe on the
rights of users. These detailed findings clearly show that Internet freedom cannot be
taken for granted, said David J. Kramer, executive director of Freedom House.
Nondemocratic regimes are devoting more attention and resources to censorship and
other forms of interference with online expression.514
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The New Media, Web 2.0
This new media is the latest achievement of the power of mass media technology
to offer the promise of true freedom of information and away from the control of big
corporations, political parties, and the government. Web 2.0 is a generic term used to
describe the group of media technology that enables user-generated content. Videosharing websites such as YouTube.com, social-networking websites such as Friendster
and Facebook, and blogs, are examples of Web 2.0. The main difference between Web
2.0 and conventional media is the user’s ability to publish their own content and for the
readers to respond without the interference of “gatekeeping” from editors. Web 2.0 also
allows users to circumvent existing laws and regulations that govern conventional media
such as print and broadcasting.515
Web bloggers are imperative in the respect of keeping check on the mainstream
media. Political bloggers, especially, perform on a regular basis, fact-checking the news
and challenging the predominant point of view in the mainstream media. These bloggers
highlight attention to issues that are, most of the time, neglected by the mainstream
media. In Malaysia, blogging is becoming a form of political participation. Recently,
there has been an apparent prominence of political blogs, in comparison to other Asian
countries.
However, lately, bloggers516 and “netizens” in Malaysia are under pressure from
the government. In 2007, legal action taken by government-prominent English
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newspapers against two prominent social-political bloggers sparked the formation of the
National Alliance of Bloggers (All-Blogs).517 A cyber sedition518 bill is said to be under
review. Introduced by the Council of Ministers in December 2010, it poses yet another
danger to online freedom of expression in Malaysia. Aside from the Sedition Act, some
thirty other laws may also be used to control the media and the Internet, including the
ISA, the 1984 Press and Publication Law, and the 1998 Communications and Multimedia
Act.519
Conclusion
Why are the media controlled in Malaysia? In theory, Malaysia claimed to be a
democratic state following its colonial master’s parliamentary system. In reality, the
democratic system is “flawed” and “fettered.” The argument made by the state is that
Malaysia being a developing country cannot practice a fully democratic system in support
of a developmental paradigm chosen over economic growth and stability; thus, some
form of authoritarian rule is necessary to ensure economic and political stability and good
governance, including stringent control of the media and other institutions in the country.
The relationship between the media and Malaysian’s semi-democracy emphasizes
the relevance of a “developmentalist” discourse that posits a payoff between stability and
defamation charges for suggesting that the current prime minister and his wife were involved in a murder
linked to a controversial government purchase of French submarines. [http://www.rsf/org/Malaysiamalaysia-12-03-12,42066.html]
517
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economic progress on the one hand, and democratic and human rights on the other. This
explains why the legislative restrictions on the media are still maintained. The leaders of
Malaysia are laboring under an old paradigm that says you can have development or
democracy, but not both. This fixed mindset is still inherent in Malaysia’s leaders,
especially the ruling government of UMNO-led BN where the ethnic card is still being
played to rule the country.
The truth is, ethnic politics are no longer relevant in Malaysia’s politics. The
people are now demanding good governance, with accountability, transparency and
justice at the forefront of the Malaysian political scenario. The Internet and the new
media are seen as the only channels that are free of government control. The online new
media have restructured Malaysians’ access to information and ability to challenge the
mainstream media that are controlled by the government. The new media technologies
offer a clear opportunity for greater freedom of information and, potentially,
democratization.
Figure 12 below shows that Malaysia is ranked as one of the best in terms of
media freedom in Southeast Asia. The lower score indicates the better freedom of press
in the country; 2011-2012 shows freedom of press in distress in the region. Malaysia
somehow has ranked ahead of other ASEAN countries like Singapore, Indonesia,
Thailand and the Philippines.
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Figure 12. Press Freedom Index 2002-2012: Malaysia Compared with ASEAN
Source: data from Reporters Without Borders – the Press Freedom Index and researcher calculations 520

Political Participation Assessment
This section focuses on the issues and present conditions faced by citizen
participation and civil society organizations (CSOs) in Malaysia. Understanding civil
society and citizen participation521 in politics is important for democratization in
Malaysia. Using the observed analysis of academic works from daily newspapers,
Internet bloggers, published academic journals and publications from experts and
analysts of Malaysia’s civil society organizations (CSOs), this section explores issues and
progress of CSOs in Malaysia, state relations with public participation in politics and the
government, and issues that concern them every day.
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The State-Society Relationship
Citizen participation in Malaysia is characterized by state-society relations. Since
the late 1990s, there has been active citizen participation in Malaysian politics. Analysts
see this as a strategy for improving governance processes and for attaining good
governance and democratization.
The state-society relationship has become a useful indicator to understanding
public engagement in politics. It is conventional wisdom in Malaysian politics that the
state is dominant in the society. The relationship has been variously characterized as softauthoritarianism,522 quasi-democracy,523 statist-democracy,524 repressive-responsive,525
semi-democracy,526 and many others examples found in Malaysian politics literature.
These literatures describe how the state has managed the society through its
policies and apparatus that regularly accommodate527 the different segments of society
and, most of the time, shield itself from critics and opponents through state apparatus in
the form of the restrictive laws that are sheltered by the nation’ Constitution.
For example, Jesudason (1995) wrote about how the Malaysian state has the
ability to protect itself from civil society influences; because, as an independent postcolonial government, it inherited a well-developed state structure and institutional
522
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patterns from the colonial state, which had been used to manage a society deeply divided
along ethnic and religious lines, thus forging an identity of interests between the state and
society in many areas of social life, with resulting limitations on the capabilities of civil
society in Malaysia.528
As a post-colonial state, Malaysia inherited a well-developed civil service and
bureaucracy from the British. Economic growth experienced by the young nation-state
after independence made Malaysia pursue a developmentalist strategy with the society,
and this strategy has effectively blocked civil society organizations (CSOs)529 from
providing direct services to the masses.530 The UMNO, since its establishment in 1946
and being the dominant party in the ruling coalition, by default has been the main
political party that sees to the needs and welfare of the people, especially the Malays. The
UMNO has managed to provide patronage worthy of its dominance, making it possible to
dispense various forms of assistance through various mechanisms. Thus, the Malays in
return have given the UMNO their electoral support in every election since
independence.
In her book, Vidhu Verma (2002)531 focuses on the relationship between the state
and society, which influences contemporary Malaysian politics, and which she sees is key
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to understanding future political developments. She acknowledges that civil society is
weak in Malaysia, due to the state limiting activities and development. However, she
does not see this weakness as something permanent, because the civil society is
undergoing a period of profound change in democratizing Malaysia. She predicts that the
UMNO is losing its traditional power and credibility among the Malays as their main
protection and, instead, they have turned to PAS as the savior.532
The State of Civil Society in Malaysia
Proponents of democracy claim that democratization is inevitable if a country
achieves economic growth, because that will galvanize political mobilization. Thus,
democratization is the outcome of the emergence of a civil society. Experts argue that the
civil society factor is another explanation for the limited democratization in Southeast
Asia in general, and Malaysia in particular. The paradox is that this claim is not realized
in Malaysia due to the resistance of a strong state.533
The conventional or liberal position on civil society claims that the general
welfare of society and the process of democratization are enhanced when groups,
organizations, and associations act as a shield to prevent the state from assuming too
much control of the society.534 The failure on the part of a democratically elected
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government failing to address basic issues pertaining to the welfare of the citizens will
bring a situation where the social forces play a more active role.535
In the last two decades, citizen participation in Malaysia has been based on the
ground of good governance (government accountability and transparency),536 electoral
reform,537 and social justice.538 People participation was galvanized by the Reformasi
movement in 1998. Reformasi (in Malay) is one form of social movements that have
taken place in Malaysia, mainly as a response to the 1997 economic crisis and Anwar
saga.539
Civil societies in Malaysia do not fit the theoretical ideal of a democratic country.
The Malaysian experience demonstrates the difficulty of assigning civil society as a
positive role for democratization. According to Jesudason (1995), the broader historical
process of state formation in Malaysia, in particular the origins of the state from external
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implantation, has critically shaped the role of civil society and determined its
development.540
The ethnic factor is another way of explaining the vertical relationship between
the state and society. Often in post-colonial politics, states have used ethnic and religious
consciousness to gain legitimacy and sustain incumbency. The UMNO, while respecting
other cultural rights of the non-Malays, has managed to position itself as the protector of
the Malay culture and Islam, using this mechanism to sustain the vertical ties of
dependency between the Malays and the UMNO elites. Hence, the state emerged as the
champion in acquiring social prestige and gained power over the civil society.541
Ethnic and religious consciousness have hurt the development of a civil society,
because it is difficult for larger communal groupings to cut across ethnic lines to emerge
and be powerful. For instance, the Perkasa, known as the ultra-Malays, will not negotiate
for anything when it comes to Malay special rights; and the Dong Zhong, the ultraChinese group that insists that Chinese schools have only Chinese teachers, accentuate
existing, conflicting narrow ideologies that will not work in developing a vibrant civil
society.
A civil society in Malaysia is also characterized through its communal
organizations. Some analysts say this phenomenon is the outcome of British divide-andrule policies; in other words, this colonial superstructure is still practiced by the state,
even after independence. These communitarian organizations have continued to play an
essential role in representing the interests of their respective communities. As a result,
540
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their exclusivity and hierarchical structures have somewhat impeded the formation of
cross-cutting civic organizations that promote equality and openness.
A recent study shows that collaboration among Malaysian civil society
organizations (CSOs) is difficult to find.542 Because Malaysia is a hybrid regime,
combining both democratic and autocratic attributes in running the system, civil society
activities are never autonomous and associational activities are heavily regulated by the
state.
The Societies Act of 1966 (revised in 1983) defines the relationship between the
state and civil society. The Registrar of Society (ROS) is responsible for monitoring the
activities of voluntary associations and is empowered to accept or reject any application
to form new associations.543 Oppressive laws, such as the Sedition Act of 1948, Internal
Security Act544 of 1960, and the Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998, have
created a culture of fear for people’s participation in Malaysia. The government passed an
amendment on the Official Secret Acts (OSA) despite heated protests from the National
Union of Journalists and other key civil societies actors.545 Increased intolerance toward
opposition views and dissidents on government’s policies have led to self-censorship and
have limited the opportunity for peoples’ participation and civil society organizations
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(CSOs) activities. Thus, civil society in Malaysia operates under the “watchful eyes” of
the state.
As a multi-ethnic country, Malaysia has given the government grounds to restrict
the activities of CSOs and warnings not to address certain issues that may incite ethnic or
religious tensions, all in the name of maintaining ethnic and religious harmony. The
government acknowledges that civil society is becoming increasingly influential. Yet,
despite the recent active movements of citizen participation, the people are still hampered
by stringent laws that restrict activities that the government designates to be subversive,
especially protests against government policies. Laws like the University and University
Colleges Act strictly forbid academicians, teachers, and students from entering into any
political form of political participation.
The Malaysian government has frequently resorted to using the ethnic card in its
attacks on civil society activities that go against its policies. Despite passing laws,
adopting policies, and issuing threats that discourage discussion of matters concerning
ethnicities, supposedly because this is too sensitive a topic, the government has
repeatedly used ethnic issues to delegitimize its opponents.
This exploitation of the people’s ethnicities, say analysts, is not because of the
heightened tension between ethnic groups in the country, but because the government
wants to distract the people’s attention from the rifts happening within the government
(e.g., internal divisions within UMNO).546
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Positive Expectations and Progress of Civil Societies
The civil society in Malaysia is relatively weak, compared to countries like South
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia. However, this condition is not stagnant. Civil
society organizations (CSOs) in Malaysia are gaining momentum since Reformasi in
1998 and are championing unpopular causes547 and criticizing the government’s
policies.548 The Malay middle class, who once shied away from criticizing the
government, has become more outspoken in criticizing the malpractices in UMNO. This
development, over time, will open the door to a vibrant and effective civil society in
Malaysia.
Civil Society As an Electoral Force
Remember the watershed election of 2008? The startling result revealed a
political alternative besides the ethnic politics of the incumbent BN government. It was a
civil society that mobilized the public toward achieving the alternative.
Since the Reformasi movement in late 1990s, civil society organizations (CSOs)
and activists have increasingly taken part in electoral politics, directly or indirectly. In the
context of Malaysian elections, civil society refers to the opposition forces. Although
these activists had played their roles in previous elections, the general election of 2008
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took on a new scope. According to Weiss (2006),549 CSOs promoted issues rather than
communal identity, and introduced new politicians without the baggage of old-school
politics, which boosted expectations for accountability and provided a new and
independent media to facilitate public participation.
The ideas of reform and change owe much to the CSOs and activists, more than
just the parties themselves. Political parties are much more confined in ideologies;
whereas, activists operating within civil societies are less constrained. They are freer to
go “outside the box” of the communal makeup and, effectively, cross ethnic and religious
boundaries by focusing on mutually shared concerns. It is within Malaysia’s civil society
that important new agendas were developed, from women’s rights and environmental
conservation to approaches to Islamization.550
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the development of civil society organizations
(CSOs) has been the new media, which indisputably altered the atmosphere and
outcomes of the campaigns. The ability to access and publicize information is a
fundamental need of a politically active civil society. A free media is the primary vehicle
for both state and society to communicate their interests and concerns. Therefore, a plural
array of nongovernmental, independent information sources, including print and
broadcast media and increased access to Internet connections, is essential.
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Conclusion
Proponents of democracy may argue that people participation via active civil
societies go hand-in-hand with democratization. However, in Malaysia this has not been
the case. Public participation in politics and CSO activities still have too many challenges
to overcome before a fully liberalized political system can be achieved. The limited
options of a civil society may not just be the result of state control, but an overlapping of
the interests of the state with other interest groups in the societies.
This assessment indicates that the condition of CSOs in Malaysia suits the
political paradox of being partly democratic and partly autocratic: having the rights of
participating through suffrage and, at the same time, those rights being restricted by laws
that were designed to restrict participation. This is not to suggest that reforms cannot take
place in the future. From what I have observed presently, positive transformations of
CSOs and citizen participation are taking place in Malaysia.
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Chapter Nine: Assessing the Government’s Responsiveness
This chapter addresses the question: Is the government responsive to the concerns
of its citizens? A government elected democratically through election has an obligation to
respond to its citizens who chose them to govern the country and take care of the people’s
welfare. Good government is appraised through its responsive and effective governance.
The Malaysian government has done a good job, so far, of effectively
implementing its policies in infrastructure development, education and healthcare,
poverty and inequality reduction, and economic development strategies.551 The
government’s effectiveness at addressing these critical social issues has earned politicians
a high level of public trust.552
However, when it comes to the government’s responsiveness to demands and
pressure from the people, this assessment has revealed that the government has used the
complex nature of its socio-political composition to respond with repressive measures to
stifle those who challenge the government’s policies, while simultaneously responding to
demands that will benefit the state and society.
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Three Factors Upon Which a Government Bases Its Responsiveness
Three factors serve as the backdrop upon which a government bases its
responsiveness to its citizens’ demands and concerns: (1) the regime is a “syncretic
state,”553 (2) the system is both “repressive and responsive,” and (3) the “strong state”
factor.
The Regime Is a “Syncretic State”
This approach was made known by Jesudason (2001) in his discourse on the statecentered554 model of Malaysian polity:
…a product of a particular historical-structural configuration that has allowed the
power holders to combine a broad array of economics, ideological and coercive
elements in managing the society, including limiting the effectiveness of the
opposition as a democratizing force.… The syncretic state operates at a
multidimensional level, mixing coercive elements with electoral and democratic
procedures; it propagates religion in society as it pursues secular economic goals;
it engages in ethnic mobilization while inculcating national feeling; and it pursues
a combination of economic practices ranging from liberal capitalism, state
economic intervention, to rentier arrangements. These features are important ways
a product of the externally implanted nature of the colonial state and the colonial
capitalist economy.555
A syncretic state combines a variety of ideological orientations and political
practices in managing the society. Thus, the management of a syncretic state can be
challenging and crisis-ridden; but, if successfully done, it allows for a high degree of
dominance. According to Jesudason, one of the interesting aspects of the syncretic state is
its ability to mix democratic procedures and coercive practices. Both features are legacies
553
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from the colonial period and were deep-rooted and implanted well when the post-colonial
state took over; the ruling elites sustained the system that they believed useful for future
state-building tasks.556
According to Tilly (1985), the top-down process of state-building under
colonialism made it possible for post-colonial states to “harbor powerful, unconstrained
organizations that easily overshadow all other organizations within their territories.”557
The legacies of democratic procedure, such as election, left by the colonial state, were
adopted by the new ruling elites of the post-colonial state. The new elites assumed and
maintained power through electoral and constitutional means. Hence, it was relatively
convenient for the new ruling elites to maintain power through the electoral mechanism
left behind by the colonial state. The vast power and resources left by the colonial state
enabled the elites to integrate vertically significant groups in the society.558
In Malaysia, class politics has declined due to the ethnically infused nature of the
nation’s politics since post-colonialism took over.559 This is because the ethnic Malays
have dominated the political landscape since the day they took over from the colonial
master, thus the franchise of power being automatic for the Malays and restricted for the
non-Malays. This is why it is more beneficial for the dominant ethnic group when issues
of race are focused as the main political issue rather than class issues.
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Ethnic politics continues to play an essential role in the constant process of giving
meaning to the concept of a Malaysian nation. Thus, in 1993, when Mahathir Mohamad
spoke to the United Nations General Assembly of the “multi-ethnic time bomb we
inherited from the colonial past,”560 he clearly still considered the multi-ethnic character
of Malaysian society to be its greatest fault line; which follows various rhetoric that
stability and ethnic harmony are more important than freedom and rights.
Democratic procedures, although highly manipulated by the political elites,
nonetheless have given legitimacy to the dominant party in Malaysia. The ability of the
elites to shape the electoral system has benefitted the UMNO-led BN (Barisan Nasional).
William Case (1993) wrote that the way the Malaysian elites manipulate the semidemocratic nature of the new state forges a greater legitimacy than what a full
authoritarian system could do and that, by avoiding full democratic procedures, should be
permitted to gain legitimacy.561
The appearance of democratic legitimacy allows coercion to be used as an
effective political strategy, especially if the coercion is protected by legal procedures. In
Malaysia, the laws that constrain the peoples’ freedom and suppress their rights are wellprotected in the Constitution. For instance, the Emergency Ordinance of 1960 has been
used against Kelantan, the opposition’s state government; and the Internal Security Act of
1969 has been used to detain individual opponents and dissidents. Also, coercion had
been used persistently in the past against the class-based opposition, especially against
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parties of the Left; from the 1980s, the trend was used against Islamic opponents of the
regime and political dissidents.
The interesting factor is that, in Malaysia, coercion for the most part has been
accepted by the general public as legitimate.562 Hence, the mix of coercion and electoral
mechanism in Malaysia that protects the dominant party from collective resentment by
the people, to the point that it hinders regime change.563 One of the accomplishments of
the ruling coalition in managing the syncretic state has been its remarkable ability to
combine a mix of ideological orientations, which has allowed political leadership to blur
the lines between state and society.564
The syncretic state also has successfully exploited ethnic issues to secure its
dominance. Unlike in the European experience, where the long process of state
development led to a relative cultural homogeneity of the population, from its beginning
as a post-colonial state, Malaysia has not needed to homogenize the population for the
purpose of governing; because the ethnic division is part of the original colonial
scheme.565
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However, since independence, to counter the ethnic issues, the Malay elites have
included the need for cooperation with party elites from the Chinese and Indian
communities. Also, through mobilizing ethnic attachments, high-growth policies and
selective co-optation, the UMNO leaders have been able to contain absolute rebellion by
the non-Malays.566
The syncretic state managerial role in the economy toward all major ethnicities is
mutually dependent for the government. Economic policies, while continuing to favor the
Malays, have been modified from time to time to ensure that no long-term damage would
be inflicted on the economy. Thus, the post-colonial syncretic state monitors internal and
external economic and political conditions, so that the state as well as the society
benefits.
In sum, the syncretic state has significant capabilities of structuring state-society
relations. The syncretic state that made possible authoritarian traits in the form of
repressive laws, at the same time has allowed democratic procedures like elections and
political participation as some form of legitimacy so that the state’s actions and policies
would have a foundation for how the government could respond to challengers.
The “Repressive and Responsive” System
In his analysis of Malaysia’s government and society, Harold Crouch (1996)567
wrote that, despite the fact that Malaysia had undergone a successful socio-economic
transformation since independence, it was still maintaining a conservative political
system; the government was still led by the UMNO-led BN party, which ruled through a
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mixture of repression, manipulation, and responsiveness.568 It is an ambiguous system,
wrote Crouch, that in certain circumstances Malaysia is democratic and, in certain
respects, the system has become more authoritarian.
This is Malaya’s political backdrop since she was a colonial state. After
independence, the mostly autocratic “strong state” institutions were sustained by the postcolonial state to run the country. At the same time, the country also sustained its
democratic Westminster model of democracy inherited from the colonial master. Thus,
despite the state acquisition of enhanced authoritarian powers, the system was far from
fully authoritarian. The same applies to democratic institutions and principles, which are
strong and stable and at the same time maneuvered.569 The constitutional framework is
democratic in form but cannot be described as democratic in practice, because it is
combined with repressive controls. The power structure is authoritarian, yet the
democratic political institutions (especially parties that contest in regular elections) force
the government to respond to pressures from society.570
The communal divisions in Malaysian society have also encouraged consultation
and compromise. Although the Malays have dominated the government, they could not
disregard the interests of other communities, for two main reasons: (1) the non-Malay
communities were too large to be repressed continuously, and (2) the severe repression of
non-Malays would have had disastrous economic consequences, because of the important
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role of the ethnic Chinese in the domestic sector. Thus, the strength of the non-Malay
communities meant it was far easier and, indeed, mutually beneficial for the
representatives of the main communities to work together in the government.571
The Malaysian political system was subjected to pressures that pushed
simultaneously in authoritarian and democratic directions. On the one hand, the state
exercised strong authoritarian powers to preserve political stability and the continued
domination of the Malay elites. On the other hand, it was faced with forces that limited its
powers, while regular competitive elections, although unfair toward the opposition,
managed to force the government to respond to popular pressures. Thus, the authoritarian
and democratic characteristics of the political system were not necessarily in
contradiction to each other but were often mutually supportive.572
The government frequently responded to challenges with a combination of
repressive and responsive measures, reflecting its combined authoritarian and democratic
character. A well-known example is Malaysia’s first bloody ethnic riots in 1969. The new
government reacted in an authoritarian way, with repressive measures of emergency
declaration, suspension of Parliament, and arrests of opposition activists. At the same
time, the government responded to popular grievances within the Malay communities
(the subject of the riots) by implementing affirmative action policies (e.g., the NEP) to
reconstruct the society.
Even though the policies after the 1969 riots were pro-Malay, nevertheless, the
Malay leaders knew they needed their non-Malay coalition partners in order to maintain
571
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an adequate level of popular support to win general elections. Therefore, the government
had to be responsive to non-Malay interests, even though not as much as to Malay
interests. Thus, despite the implementation of pro-Malay policies in response to the
demands of the Malay community in the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese businesses continued
to obtain licenses, permits, and contracts from the government agencies. The non-Malays
continued to be employed in the government’s bureaucracies and state enterprises; nonMalay students continued to obtain places in universities; Chinese and Indian children
continued to attend Chinese and Tamil primary schools; and non-Malays continued to
practice their cultures and religion.573 Although many Malay activists preferred the
government to limit the rights of non-Malays in these areas, the government insisted on
maintaining a substantial level of electoral support among the non-Malay communities
and was, therefore, reluctant to pursue policies that would turn the non-Malays
overwhelmingly against the BN government.574
Critics claim that the Malaysian government became more authoritarian in
responding to challengers in domestic politics. In the 1980s, many activists and
government critics were detained under ISA575; two Supreme Court judges were
dismissed by the executive body for challenging the Prime Minister for abuse of powers.
The government has made a series of amendments to strengthen restrictive laws, such as
the Printing Press and Publications Acts and Internal Security Acts (ISA) by removing
573
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them from judicial review. In the 1990s, the government sacked its vice-Prime Minister
for challenging the government’s policies, which provoked the Reformasi movement.
Many protesters were detained under ISA,576 along with their leader, Anwar Ibrahim.
Unprecedented protests against the government’s policies began during the
Reformasi movement in 1998. Then, in 2007, for the first time, thousands of ethnic
Indians, under the banner of Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF), walked in the
streets of Kuala Lumpur to protest the government’s discriminatory policies against them.
This was followed by the BERSIH (clean) movements, in which the people protested
against the government’s gerrymandered electoral system in Malaysia; the government
overzealously responded by sending state police to use tear gas and water cannons
against the protesters. The Malaysian government’s harsh response to the people’s
demands cost the ruling party its two-thirds super vote in the Parliament in the 2008
general election. The ethnic Indians cast their votes in favor of the opposition. The
government was also harshly criticized by the international community and civil-rights
movements for overreacting to this peaceful rally by the people. Amnesty International
called the event “the worst campaign of repression in the country for years.”
Consequent to the 2008 sea change in Malaysian politics, the authoritarian trends
by the government were matched by civil-society mobilization and democratic
competitiveness in the party system. Also, the government responded to the demand for a
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free and independent media by stating that it would not impose regulations on the new
Internet media. Thus, the Malaysian people had garnered a loophole.
After the Malaysian government has used the “repressive and responsive” method
continuously for many decades, in order to maintain the system, the question now is, Will
this trend persist in the future of Malaysian politics? I argue that the method will persist
for as long as the UMNO-led BN is still holding the power and using state apparatus and
repressive laws to silence critics.
The “Strong State” Factor
A “strong state” is a dominant state or government.577 In most multi-ethnic
developing societies, the state attempts to play a crucial role in managing the ethnic
variance and reconciling the diverse ethnic interests by undertaking relevant policies and
programs. In Malaysia, the state has used a wide range of affirmative action policies to
manage ethnic issues, because the ruling elites have believed that a relatively autonomous
and strong state is needed to manage a deeply divided society like Malaysia. As stated by
Mahathir, “Only the government was able to determine, from information it received,
what action was necessary to preserve the country’s stability and security.”578 Up to the
present, the Malaysian government has believed it is the job of the state, rather than the
public, to set priorities; that it is the state’s responsibility, and not the public’s, to
determine what is good or bad for them.
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Malaysia is a state in development,579 and a bleak feature shared by such states is
the combination of their sometimes brutal suppression of civil rights,580 their apparently
wide measure of legitimacy, and their generally sustained performance in delivering
developmental goods. Such states are dominated by strongly nationalist developmental
elites and combine varying degrees of repression and legitimacy in contexts where the
civil society has been weak or weakened. These states concentrate considerable power,
authority, autonomy, and competence in the central political and bureaucratic institutions
of the state, notably their economic bureaucracies, and generate pervasive infrastructural
capacity.581 The Malaysian state is the one that has determined incentives in order to
ensure that domestic and foreign interests have been harnessed, both to pursue their own
advantage and serve national developmental goals.
In the case of Malaysia, building on the British legacy, the state’s capacity has
been considerable; and even more so since the government undertook, from the early
1980s onward, enhanced efforts to improve the performance of the public sector and civil
service. The belief was that, in order to formulate national development strategies that
would transcend narrow particularistic interests, the government and state bureaucracy
must be autonomous and free from other social forces such as competing interests of civil
society groups, working classes, and peasants.
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According to Trezzini (2001), developmental states have to be either especially
consensual or authoritarian since they need to be able to co-opt or suppress demands of
outside interests other than the state because these demands might block change.582 The
darker side of developmental state theory lies in the possibility of a strong causal
connection between the state being both dominant and authoritarian. Analysts like
Johnsons deny that there is connection between a developmental state and
authoritarianism, saying that authoritarianism might solve the main political problem, for
instance by mobilizing a population to sacrifice for the sake of the government’s
developmental projects.583
Making things worse, in a dominant state system, the public is not brought in
when it comes to discussing the government’s policies. Thus, in the absence of any policy
discussions, ethnic and religious sentiments prevail, with the end result being a shortage
of public policy measures being used to evaluate the government’s responses and
capacity. This scenario has been slowly changing since the 2008 election (as evidenced
by the results of the recent April 2013 general election); however, there has not yet been
any significant development on public consultation.584
Within this framework, it can be concluded that the Malaysian government does
not function like a Western democracy, although it does respond to certain kinds of
political pressure. Government responsiveness exists, but through negotiation within the
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central coalition and through existing government policies. The ruling government, thus,
does not hesitate to pursue repressive strategies to outlaw particularly threatening or
“extreme” demands and pressures from the people, especially anything that threatens the
core system of ethnic accommodation.
Decentralization Under Malaysia’s Centralized Federalism
This section addresses the question, Are decisions taken at the level of
government most appropriate to the people affected? Decentralization is often viewed as
a shift of authority away from the central government toward state or local governments.
In a democratic government, decentralization is imperative to strengthen democratic
participation, representation and accountability, as well as improve the government’s
efficiency and effectiveness.585
The process of decentralization takes many forms; one is federalism.586 To
understand how decentralization works in Malaysia, it is important to know how
federalism is practiced, the arrangements made between the federal and state
governments, and the issues that come with the arrangements.587
Malaysia is officially a federalist state according to the Constitution588, and the
relationship between the federal and the states was designed in the Constitution.
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According to the Constitution, Malaysia has a multi-leveled system of government: (1) a
federal government, (2) the thirteen state governments589 and three federal territories,590
and (3) one-hundred fifty local authorities.591 The federation that Malaysia evolved into is
a union of several states and their governments, under the scope of a central592
government, with both the states and central government maintaining their autonomy
over several “determined matters”593 which were designed into the Ninth Schedule594 of
the Constitution and are specific responsibilities of the federal and state governments.
Malaysia still maintains its federal status because it still meets the conditions that
allow it to be called a federal country, meaning there still exists a division of powers and
responsibilities between the central and state governments.595 However, the actual
implementation of the functions does not conform to the standard patterns of federalism
as accepted conventionally.
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I argue that working decentralization into Malaysia depends on how federalism is
practiced; which is in accordance with the system of the regime itself, which is “a limited
procedural democracy” in a hybrid/mix political system. Consequently, federalism in
Malaysia is not practiced in its full sense; rather, it is limited and centralized. The
practice of federalism in Malaysia also depends on who is in control of the state: the
ruling coalition parties (BN) or the opposition parties (PKR).
Case (2007) claimed that Malaysia’s federation is a “minimalist federalism,”
arguing that federalist arrangements in Malaysia facilitate the country’s semi-democratic
political system, which helps the semi-democratic system in terms of patronage and
democratic space in order to gain support and legitimacy.596 Watts (2008) termed the
Malaysian federation an “executive federation” due to the highly dominant central
government.597 Mohmmad Agus (2001), an expert on federalist systems, wrote that a
country that is still observing federal principles although in a limited fashion is called a
“quasi-federal” state.598 Harding (1996) also concluded that Malaysia is not a true
federation but a “quasi-federation” because of the strong centripetal forces at work.599 For
example in one of the opposition’s states, Kelantan, despite the control the central
government had maintained in Kuala Lumpur, Kelantan’s state government still retained
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some autonomy over land matters (see cases of Pergau hydroelectric dam and
KESEDAR, land development schemes);600 Kelantan also has autonomy on issues
concerning Islam.601
The Five Factors That Impede Decentralization in Malaysia
The following five main factors hinder the effectiveness of the decentralization
process in Malaysia’s federalism: (1) Constitutional Provisions That Empower the
Central Government Over the States, (2) Finances/Monetary, (3) Dominant One-party
System and Party Politics, (4) Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies, and (5)
Local Governments and Civil Service.
1. Constitutional Provisions That Empower the Central Government Over the States
A major characteristic of Malaysia’s federalism is its design in the Constitution
(supposedly the highest law in the land), which is highly centralized and unfair602 toward
the thirteen component states. The Malaysian Constitution grants the central government
strong official powers over an extensive list of functions603 and is meant to be highly
centralized. The distribution of powers for the state and federal governments is binding in
the Constitution and will be enforced by courts of law. These provisions are seen as
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accommodating federal dominance over the state governments in many aspects. In short,
the federal government is so powerful that it can override state autonomy.
The provisions604 in the Constitution allow the federal to take precedence over
those of the states in case there happens to be conflict or inconsistency. These can be seen
in many aspects, including land issues: Although land is a state matter, the federal
government may acquire land for federal purposes by virtue of Article 83(1). Also, the
National Land Council, formed under Article 91, formulates land policy through the
federation and, although the states have a say in this body, the control lies with the
federal government, because any legislation enacted contrary to the directions of this
Council might be held to be unconstitutional.605
On issues regarding laws, federal laws are much more significant than state laws
and take precedence over state laws in matters of incompatibility. The federal can
overrule state laws, but states do not have the constitutional capacity to overrule federal
laws.606 On emergency laws, once a state of emergency has been proclaimed under
Article 150, where the executive “is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the
security, or the economic life, or public order of the federation or any part thereof is
threatened,”607 Parliament may make laws on any matter, regardless of the Ninth
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Schedule. In addition, during a declared state of emergency, the federal executive body
can extend on any matter within the legislative authority of the state and give directions
to the state’s government.608 On issues of membership, the Constitution ruled that the
states do not have a right of say in the federal government’s decision to include new
members in the federation;609 here lies a very significant indicator as to the strength of the
bias of the federal government.
2. Finances, Monetary
The most significant negative biases against the states is on fiscal arrangements
outlined in the Constitution. Financially, the federal government is dominant in Malaysia
and the Constitution clearly allocates responsibilities to the federal and state
governments. The pro-federal constitutional design of revenues and income from taxes
gives the federal government the power to lead fiscal centralization against state
governments.610 In addition, the fiscal arrangement is a factor of the states’ financial
dependency on the federal government.611 For instance, the states may borrow money but
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this is restricted to borrowing only from the federation, and borrowing from other
financial sources is subject to federal government conditions and approval.612
The financially dominant federal government of the UMNO-led BN (National
Front) for many years has adversely affected the states’ rights in many ways. Taxation, an
important source of state revenues, is monopolized by the federal government, leaving
the states with whatever little is left; this behavior has perpetuated a “culture of beggary”
by the states toward the central government for financial assistance. Critics say that the
monetary advantage of the federal government allows them to hold the “purse strings”
against the state and that this consequently weakens the states, especially those controlled
by the opposition parties such as Kelantan and the five new states that have broken away
from the federal since 2008.613
According to Mohamad Agus (2001), the government sees no reason to allocate
generous levels of funds to a state that is in the opposition’s hands. When PAS lost to
UMNO/BN in 1978, the state’s debt stood at RM74 million. In the twelve years that
UMNO ruled the state of Kelantan, the UMNO-led state government went on spending
freely, accumulating state debt to RM711.67 million plus RM10 million in interest. When
PAS assumed power once again in 1990, it inherited the large debt left by UMNO-BN.
Also, the federal government made a decree that, until the state government (PAS), made
payment, the federal government would cease new financial assistance to Kelantan. The
central government knew the present state government could not be held responsible for
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the debt made by the previous UMNO state government, but the issue was purposely
highlighted by the central government to send a message to the people that, without
financial assistance from the federal, no state government could function effectively
without the federal, or risk the consequences of underdevelopment.614
Despite these biases, the federal government obliged to provide two major grants
to state governments: the capitation grant (based on population size) and the state road
grant (based on size of the state). Hence, the distribution of revenue and financial
resources are very pro-federal. The leader of the opposition coalition party, Pakatan
Rakyat, has claimed that the federal government is discriminating against states that are
governed by the opposition party; for example, the state of Selangor (controlled by PR)
was given an unreasonable amount of the capitation grant allocated in the Constitution.615
This dominant monetary position of the federal government has not meant well
for the functioning of the federation. Politically determined and discriminatory payout of
revenues among the states by the federal government headed, by the Prime Minister
himself, is resented by many (e.g., scholars, analysts, the well–informed Malaysian
public, the affected states themselves). This resentment and discontent were actualized in
the twelfth and thirteenth general elections of 2008 and 2013.
3. Dominant One-Party System and Party Politics
The domination of a single party (i.e., UMNO-led BN party) that has ruled
Malaysia since independence in 1957 has further weakened the federation and
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decentralization in the political system. The political process that has allowed a single
party, the BN, to control the center for more than fifty years has further facilitated a
centralized federalism.
In Malaysia, it is impossible to understand the dynamics and complexity of
federal-state relations without understanding the political control exercised by UMNO.
Most of the component states have been governed by UMNO-led BN coalitions since
1957. Until the 2008 election, the UMNO-led BN government had retained power, with
strong majorities at each federal election.616
Mohammad Agus Yusoff (2006) wrote that the nature of federal–state relations in
Malaysia is highly political. The federal government has always actively sought to ensure
that state governments were formed from the same political party that ruled the center.
UMNO successfully used its party apparatus for party discipline, organization, and
financial incentives to align the center and state government.617
Because the ruling party has usually won the general elections, and controlled the
majorities in nine or more of the state assemblies, senators were appointed for their
loyalty and service to the ruling party; thus, making the senate an important source of
patronage for the ruling party. In practice, the senate has not defended state interests but,
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instead, has become primarily a rubber stamp for government-sponsored legislation from
the popularly elected lower house of Parliament (Dewan Rakyat).618
In Malaysia, a pattern of strong central dominance varies, based on the federal
government’s relationship state by state. The ruling coalition party (i.e., UMNO-led BN)
that controls the central government plays a prominent role in state government. States
under the ruling coalition party have an especially good relationship with the federal,
which is also under the ruling coalition party (BN). As a highly centralized, tightly knit
party, UMNO and its central apparatus have usually been able to prevail over a state’s
own politicians and officials.619
For example, in the history Malaysia federalism, the state of Kelantan has been
ruled the longest by the opposition party (Islamic Party of Malaysia, or PAS). One of the
ways to weaken opposition states is to reduce the state’s budgetary grants and revenues.
Since 1990, the year PAS took over Kelantan from the UMNO-led BN government, the
state government has been discriminated against by the federal government over
numerous issues. The obvious and most crucial issue has been the distribution of state
grants and revenues. For example, receiving an annual grant late from the federal
government, decrease of foreign investments in state economic activities; and, recently,
the federal government’s refusal to allow natural gas in Kelantan to be processed in the
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state and, instead, it is transferred to the federal.620 Since Kelantan is led by the
opposition party (PAS) and depends heavily on the central for its income, the federal
government has been able to keep Kelantan functioning, but poorly developed in
comparison to other Barisan-led states.
The same pattern of policy discrimination is seen in the federal government’s
actions toward the state of Terengganu when it was ruled by PAS in 1999 to 2004.
Mahathir’s then administration ordered PETRONAS621 to annul oil royalties promised to
Terengganu, on the grounds that the opposition party did not have the ability to manage
such large funds annually;622 therefore, the task should be given to the central
government.
4. Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies
A primary example of the affirmation action policies is the New Economic
Policies (NEP) that was instituted after the 1969 ethnic riots to improve the economic and
social conditions of the Malays, which further contributed to the expansion and
consolidation of the federal government’s power.623 The enforcement of safeguarding to
improve the position of Malays in public service, education, and industry were explicit
policy goals. If decentralization were to be implemented, it presumably would hamper the
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objectives and future goals of the government. Thus, in pursuit of implementing NEP, the
federal government must be dominant in making decisions, or risk distractions and
opposition from state and local governments, especially if they are under the ruling of
opposition political parties.
In addition, to meet the explicit target to restructure the society and eradicate
poverty, the NEP also serves as the federal government’s strategy to induce ownership
and control over state and local authorities. One of the many instances is through
establishment of the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) and regional
development authorities. FELDA was established with the purpose of helping the
government carry out rural land development and to uplift the economic status and living
standard of the rural community, especially among the Malays. According to Francis
Loh, through FELDA, the central government is able to penetrate into state jurisdictions,
which could enhance the power of the federal over state governments and local
authorities.624
One opposition party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), has offered to halt its
plan to set up branches inside FELDA schemes if UMNO agrees to dissolve its hundreds
of branches in the country. Critics claim that, in addition to developing rural lands for the
Malays, the federal government is using FELDA for political purposes and that FELDA
settlers are used for political gain, in terms of gaining voters for general elections.
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According to Lim Kit Siang (1987), “In Malaysia, land is being used as a political tool –
as incentive, pay-off, or reward to political supporters and opponents alike.”625
5. Local Governments and Civil Service
Under the Malaysian Constitution,626 bureaucratic and civil service in local
government is the responsibility of the states. However, the federal government also
exercises considerable power and influence over local government.627 Local governments
in Malaysia usually function within a framework of being politically, financially, and
economically subordinate to the federal government. Thus, this centralized relationship,
has restrained local governments’ ability to engage freely with the local communities,
and the system does little to encourage public participation at the local level.628
This rigid bureaucratic culture, which is usually shaped by internal interests from
the central and appointed state officials,629 is a factor regarding inefficiencies and bad
public services. Thus, it is not unusual to hear public outcry and dissatisfaction with local
government services. Various studies have revealed that, in addition to inefficiency in
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delivering services, local governments lack a transparent method for public participation
and consultation.630
In a growing tendency toward recentralization, under the excuse of providing
better services to the public, the central government is removing the traditional functions
of local government by privatizing them. Critic claims that this as an effort to further cut
back on local autonomy and make local governments rely more on central for help.631
In addition, state and local government autonomy is burdened by extra tasks that
are not designated to them in the first place, such as reducing urban poverty and urban
crime. These extra and major tasks have highly taxed both state and local governments’
financial and human resources, resulting in poor job performance and constant criticism
from the public for not delivering the best of services.632
Undemocratic trends in the system hamper decentralization from being
implemented. A clear example is regarding local government elections. Local council
elections were practiced in the past, but were abolished in the 1960s. The abolition of
local government elections took place when the Local Government Act was passed in
1976. The abolition of local authority elections has allowed the BN to further penetrate
the third tier of government, where their appointed councilors dominate municipalities,
town councils, and district councils.633 In addition, there is clearly potential for political

630

Phang Siew Nooi, “Decentralisation or Recentralisation? Trends in Local Government in Malaysia,”
Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 1 (May 2008).
631

Ibid., 128.

632

Ibid., 129.

633

Francis Loh Kok Wah, “Malaysia’s Centralized Federal System.” Aliran.com,
http://aliran.com/750.html.

255

interference and federal-state conflict if the federal appointee takes a different view of
matters from that adopted by the state.634
In the absence of a legitimate transfer of power via elections, the local leadership
may become primarily accountable to itself and local elites instead of the people. Without
elected local officials, further attempts to make local government more transparent,
accountable and efficient may be in vain. In addition, by appointing state officials instead
of them being elected by the people, the government has tarnished its record as well as
denied the democratic rights of the citizens.
Election 2008 and New Opportunities for Decentralization in Malaysia
Results of the twelfth general election of 2008 showed the people’s resentment
against the UMNO-led BN government. One of the factors was discontent over the
federal government’s control over state autonomy. For more than fifty years, the federal
government had consistently relied upon their power to amend the Constitution to enforce
their view on any matters of dispute in the federal system. However, that power ended in
2008, when they lost their two-thirds majority in Parliament. The BN can no longer
amend the Constitution as they wish. The political effect of this is that federal-state
relations are now more awkward and unpredictable than they have been for most of
Malaysia’s federation history. Some of the states won by the opposition coalition have
begun to use their legislative power to enact laws, such as the Freedom of Information
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(FoI) laws in Penang and Selangor, which is a sign of clear departure from central
government policies.635
There are now five state governments (i.e., Selangor, Penang, Kelantan, Kedah,
Perak636) that are not under the control of Barisan Nasional parties. These states have
now found their voice to challenge the federal-state relationship. The richest states in
Malaysia (i.e., Selangor and Penang) have put more pressure on the central government
for greater federalism, particularly on issues of the concentration of wealth at the federal
level.637 In addition, since the 2008 election, local councilors are appointed by state
governments without consultation with the federal government.
The federal government continues to be in the hands of the incumbent coalition,
and no formal restructuring of the federal system has yet occurred. Nevertheless, the
changing political landscape in Malaysia since 2008, is granting greater autonomy to
state governments. Hopefully, this will lead to better decentralization and better
participatory democracy and public involvement.
Conclusion
Analysts of Malaysian politics, and proponents of federalism and decentralization
of state and federal power, believe that federalism needs to be strengthened in order for
democracy to be practiced in full in Malaysia. The federation is not without issues and
challenges, but this does not mean federalism cannot be improved. In the case of
635
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Malaysia, its social, political, and economic diversity are simply too deep for a centrally
controlled regime to be practical.
State and local governments in Malaysia operate in very centralized conditions
where they are not free to interact with the public, which hampers encouraging public
participation at the local level. The state subordination under the central government will
impede transparency, accountability and participation, which are the principles of good
governance.
The virtue of decentralization, to strengthen democracy, is not being practiced in a
full sense in Malaysia. Instead, it facilitates a mixed political system or semi-democratic
system. One may even say that the semi-democratic model is shaping the operation of the
federalist principle of decentralization in Malaysia.638
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Chapter Ten: Final Analysis and Conclusions
Political literature has focused more on fully democratic countries and their
success stories. The functions of a “hybrid” political system have been less studied in
political science and comparative politics. Therefore, this study focused on evaluating the
positive and negative forces that affect political governance in a hybrid political setup,
and analyzed the frequency of the interplay of the positive and negative components. In
line with the claim that the Malaysian government is a paradigmatic case of a hybrid
political system, a thorough assessment of Malaysia’s regime dynamics was necessitated.
The International IDEA assessment framework helped with evaluating the
performance of the Malaysian “partial-democracy” in a “resilient hybrid regime,” and
also helped with assessing the quality of the regime’s governance. In this study, I applied
both a descriptive and analytical approach to the research methodology in order to form
three theoretical claims and apply them to this case study on Malaysia.
This case study of Malaysian politics revealed an ambiguous style of governing,
and displayed the approaches and variables in order to explain the complex issues and
challenges of the political system. As highlighted in chapter two, no master variables
were at the center of this analysis. Rather, I provided lists of important factors that are
commonly used by scholars and students who study Malaysian politics.
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Analysis Thesis One

Figure 13. Positive Components in a “Hybrid” Political System
The four positive components in Malaysia’s hybrid political system are: (1)
elections (chapter six), (2) Internet and new social media (chapter eight), (3) peaceful
social mobilization (e.g., HINDRAF and BERSIH movements in chapter six), and (4)
elites strategies (chapters four, five, six). Elections in Malaysia are the main democratic
attribute that has been loyally practiced by the regime for it to maintain the status
“partially democratic.” Elections had taken place consistently since 1955. Critics may
argue that since especially the 1980s and forward, elections have been badly tainted by
“unfair practices,” especially against opponents of the ruling government (chapter six).
However, proponents of elections in an “ambiguous regime” have claimed that elections
open doors of opportunity for democratization and regime transition.639 Recent
developments in Malaysia’s general elections, for example in 2008 and 2013, show that
even in an unfair environment elections in Malaysia are competitive enough to allow for
a change of government and, plausibly, regime change, too.
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The Internet and new social media (chapter eight) in Malaysia is the most positive
thing that could ever have happened in Malaysia’s hybrid political setup. The
conventional media had always been under the control and monopoly of the ruling
regime, rendering unfair and biased information to the people. The Internet media have
become a source of alternative media, thanks to no regulations restricting it. The
surprising surge of opposition challenges and participation since the Reformasi
movement in the late 1990s was galvanized by the new Internet communication media.
BERSIH and HINDRAF (chapters six, seven, nine) are two examples of peaceful
social mobilization and show the importance of social forces to organize peaceful protests
against the incumbent regime in Malaysia. The factor of social mobilization is important
in a hybrid regime for affecting the strategic choices made by political elites. 640 In
Malaysia, the people’s discontent and protests caused the incumbent to lose its two-thirds
majority in Parliament (chapter six). This positive factor in a hybrid political setup should
increase the likelihood of democratization in Malaysia.
However, elite strategies in Malaysia’s hybrid political setup do not provide much
of an effort to further democratize. This is because the ruling elites in Malaysia are too
cohesive, with support from the patronage network and clienteles politics, which renders
ineffective defection and cooperation with the opposition parties. The authoritarian
attributes in a hybrid system are primarily protracted by the ruling elite’s capacity to
maintain their elite cohesion by means of the policy concessions, distribution of
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patronage and privileges, manipulation of political institutions such as legislature and
parties to maintain elite unity, and the effectiveness of state coercive capacity.641
Analysis Thesis Two

Figure 14. Negative Components in a “Hybrid” Political System
Electoral manipulation and gerrymandering are, unfortunately, traits in Malaysia’s
hybrid political setup. However, these unhealthy practices going on for too long did
trigger protests from the people, changing the dynamics of the general elections starting
in 2008. The coalition of the political opposition has become more cohesive than ever,
with the help of the vibrant alternative media.
As a hybrid state, Malaysia acquires “highly developed coercive institutions.” The
dominant party UMNO inherited a “sophisticated coercive apparatus” from the British,
which allows them to monitor political activity throughout the country. With this
mechanism of control, they have been able to put down challenges and disturbances
resulting from dissidents and protestors against their policies (chapters five, seven, nine).
The state in Malaysia is so strong that it is capable of tightly controlling civil society
organizations and social movements. With repressive laws such as Societies Acts, the
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state has been able to bar nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from engaging in any
political activities for which they have not been officially registered. The UMNO also has
made use of their Internal Security Acts, which enshrined a colonial-era principle
whereby dissidents can be held indefinitely in detention camps without trial (chapters
five, eight).
The strong state has been supported by a dominant single-party rule in Malaysia’s
hybrid regime, maintaining a stable parliamentary regime in which the state and the
UMNO-BN party have regularly been returned to power. Notwithstanding its democratic
appearance, as a hybrid regime, Malaysia has been marked by an “uneven playing field.”
Opposition activities have been restricted by a range of authoritarian laws, with support
from illiberal practices from the powerful state and the dominant single-party rule.
The UMNO-BN has survived so far because of support from economic growth
and the overwhelming resources concentrated in their hands (chapter six). As the ruling
government, this party has used patronage and clienteles’ politics, favoring business and
political allies. Also, money politics has been rampant during elections, to influence
voters against the opposition parties. All of these practices became the source of rampant
corruption and cronyism in the regime (chapter seven). Nevertheless, the centralized
power vested in the ruling incumbent party UMNO-BN regime has held together a quite
cohesive state apparatus and a firm grip on the economy, while at the same time paying
much attention to disguising their authoritarian rule as a legitimate democracy. This
assessment has shown the ruling party’s effort to preserve its core, namely that to
maintain their power in the government they will resort to nondemocratic means.
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This mixing of democracy and authoritarian practices in Malaysia’s politics is
clearly shown in issues concerning individual liberties and civil liberties, such as freedom
of the press. However, the components of positive democratic traits, such as social
mobilization, can affect the electoral dynamics tremendously and may cause positive
liberal outcomes. Today, we can see from the general elections in 2008 and 2013, the
opposition’s coalitions and civil societies are more threatening to the ruling elite than
ever before.
The case of Malaysia has supported generally the growing theoretical claims of a
resilient hybrid political system. This study has sought to unravel how and which internal
factors in the hybrid political system have influenced the political situation in Malaysia,
which also include the ruling party’s resiliency and longevity.
Is political transition possible in Malaysia? In a press statement on the launch of
his State of Democracy Handbook, Dr. Patrick Molutsi said:
We can no longer simply assume that every nation that has rejected tyranny and
turned towards elections is in ‘transition’ to democracy We need far more
sophisticated tools for measuring the increasingly complex, varied and uncertain
paths towards democracy that nations of the world are taking.642
Alternative Findings
The framework to assess the state of democracy in Malaysia, prepared by
International IDEA, helped to evaluate the performance of the “partial-democracy” practiced
in the country; it also helped to assess the quality of the regime’s governance. For example,
this study found that factors of “good governance” (i.e., low corruption level, high
government accountability and transparency, effective and responsive government, along
642
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with decentralization) have further facilitated regime stability and sustainability. On the other
hand, “bad governance” (i.e., rampant corruption, low government accountability and
transparency, ineffective and unresponsive government, and centralization) has further
aggravated regime instability and triggered regime transition. This study found that the
notion of “good governance” can be a strong variable for regime longevity, and “bad
governance” for a regime in decay; that good governance can plausibly legitimize even an
illiberal hybrid state. The International IDEA assessment framework provided these
important factors for assessing the conditions of the regime’s governance (see Figure 15).

Figure 15. Elements of “Good Governance” and “Bad Governance” and their
Positive and Negative Impact on Regime Survival.
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Good and Bad Governance
In the Index for good governance, indicators are deteriorating in Malaysia (see
chapters seven, nine). The reasons are seen in the rampant practices of corruption,
cronyism, and nepotism. Corruption and abuse of power have increasingly been common
practices in Malaysia in recent years. The CPI index for Malaysia has dropped for four
years consecutively since 2009 (chapter seven). Failed promises and policies to stop
rampant corruption among government officers have been met with increasing criticism
and protests from the people (i.e., Reformasi, BERSIH, HINDRAF movements).
Evidence shows that ruling party’s electoral setbacks in the recent 2008 and 2013
general elections originated from their bad governance. After decades of malpractice and
corrupt activities by ruling coalition party members in UMNO-BN, the Malaysian people
have increasingly grown more agitated, showing their frustration and anger with their
votes.
Challenges to the Research
This study is the first time the International IDEA democracy assessment has been
used for dissertation research. Originally, the participants for this assessment involved
dozens of researchers from many sectors in society, including: academics, government
officials, students, civil society groups, civil servants, members of business communities,
advocacy groups, and stakeholders. Ultimately, I solely was the one assessing the
research questions, through painstaking efforts in library and Internet research; the
assessment answers were gleaned from various documentary reviews, academics and
non-academics, e-research, review of non-official and official government and non266

government documents, and Internet public forum. In some instances, the answers may
have had elements of bias, but I tried to be professional as a researcher and confine
myself to the theories and approaches employed in the framework prepared by the
International IDEA.
As explained previously, this study has analyzed the experience of the quality of
democracy in Malaysia’s hybrid political setup. While I hope to contribute ideas to the
debate on regime change in Malaysia, I also recognize the extraordinary theoretical and
political complexity of the problems that I wished to analyze. In conducting the research,
to find standard processes and variables to explain the subject matter of the study, I was
confronted with difficulties in gathering as well as interpreting the data collected.
I am well aware that the answers I have provided, within the context of the IDEA
assessments framework, are far from complete and at times may appear too ambiguous.
This may be due to the open-ended nature of this research and also the nature of
uncertainty in the democratization and transitions paradigm. However, I believe that
research of this nature, which tries to grasp and understand the real world and to interpret
and sum it up in the form of descriptive narration, is not an easy endeavor. In short, this
research is far from perfect and is subject to improvement in the future.
This study was an effort to promote tools that citizens can use to evaluate their
own regime type of democracy, and to generate public information about the problems
and challenges and provide recommendations for improving policies. My objective has
been to open a new vision of hybrid regime studies, beyond a pure democratic utopia.
Therefore, I hope the readers will take this research as a point of departure, rather than
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arrival, for studying democratization and regime change and will further explore those
topics through empirical research.
Conclusion
Malaysia’s political system has been widely described as “partial,” “semi,”
“quasi”, and an “illiberal” democracy; as well as soft-authoritarian, electoral
authoritarian, and many other ambiguous descriptions. Analysts more or less agree that
studies about Malaysian politics involve patterns of limited civil liberties,
institutionalized control systems, and at least a reasonably manipulated electoral system;
all driven by the strong state and its dominant one-party system that seeks to sustain its
incumbency. The ruling party in Malaysia has been able to maintain its incumbency with
support from its patronage politics, cohesion of its elites, historic loyalty of its military
and police, the less than ineffective middle class and civil society organizations, and the
weaknesses of the opposition parties.
It is the existence of such mechanisms that effectively have made the “hybrid”
regime more resilient, with its partially practiced democratic principles. These
mechanisms have blocked a transfer of power and regime transition, despite the existence
of democratic institutions and a degree of political freedom granted to the citizens of the
country. Malaysia’s resilient hybrid political system, however, may allow civil society to
operate and hold fairly competitive and open elections, though totally unfair toward the
opposition parties.
Nevertheless, it is the resiliency of the political system, or the configuration of its
political setup, that has caused this regime to be remarkably stable overtime. Resilient
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hybrid regimes do not stay in power through manipulation and repression alone. They
often enjoy a degree of popular support because they can deliver public goods that some
democratic governments are not capable of delivering. It is important to have good
governance to support regime survival and stall democratization. The problem with the
hybrid regime in Malaysia is that its “good governance” performance is deteriorating
badly; and the people are tired of the rampant corruption, cronyism, and unaccountability.
The main issue is not so much about changing the political system; it is actually about the
people demanding clean and good governance.
Scholars acknowledge that Malaysia’s experience marks the paradigmatic case on
the pattern of resiliency and survivability of a hybrid political system. However, being
claimed as a “halfway house” does not apply to the Malaysian case. This study shows
that even an unfinished transition has opened up opportunities for participation and
alternation of power through formal institutions such as elections.
Some analysts agree that there are anomalies in studies of the Malaysian case,
which make it more complex and challenging, mainly with the difficulty of applying just
one theoretical chosen model to Malaysia’s political system. So, I have proposed that the
reasons Malaysia is not acquiescent to a full democracy and regime change are very
much related to the political configuration of the regime itself. The regime’s political
setup, which combines both democratic and authoritarian attributes, creates a barrier to a
democratic utopia. However, this does not mean there will be no room for opportunities
that can lead to democratic openings and regime change. Therefore, I have suggested that
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the hybrid regime configuration provides components that, on one hand, are positive for
democratization and, on the other hand, negative for democratization.
The findings of this assessment show how Malaysia’s hybrid political system has
both advantages and disadvantages for democratization and regime change. The
assessment answers support my thesis about the relevance of partially practiced
democratic traits; for example, how elections, Internet and social media, elites’ strategies
and popular mobilization, serve as positive components in a hybrid political system and
cause it to be resilient, thus facilitating democratic openings and plausible regime change.
On the other hand, the partial authoritarian traits (e.g., control system, state power,
dominant single party, patron-clientelism, electoral manipulation and ineffective civil
participation) are negative components that will hamper the progress of democratization,
thus maintaining the regime’s incumbency and plausible survival.
Nevertheless, I have found from this assessment that the main elements of good
governance, if practiced by the regime even part and parcel, further facilitate the political
system to either sustain it or transform it. The assessment framework lay the ground for
analyzing the Malaysian government’s effectiveness, accountability, level of corruption,
decentralization, and position of the military. The analysis shows that good government
performance can help to sustain a regime and stabilize the whole political structure; “bad
governance,” vice-versa.
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Finally, as Jane Elliot wrote: “The wisest know that the best they can do … is not
good enough. The not so wise, in their accustomed manner, choose to believe that there is
no problem and that they have solved it.”643

643

Jane Elliot, Using Narrative in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (London ;
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2005), 134.
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Appendix
Malaysia: Summary of Federal and State Government Functions
Federal

State

1. External affairs
2. Defense
3. Internal security
4. Civil and criminal law and the
administration of justice

1. Muslim laws and custom
2. Land
3. Agriculture and forestry
4. Local government
5. Local public services: boarding
houses, burial grounds, pounds and cattle
trespass, markets and fairs, licensing of
theatres and cinemas
6. State works and water
7. State government machinery
8. State holidays
9. Inquiries for state purpose
10. Creation of offense and indemnities
related to state matters
11. Turtles and riverine fishery

5. Federal citizenship and alien
naturalization
6. Federal government machinery
7. Finance
8. Trade, commerce, and industry
9. Shipping, navigation, and fishery
10. Communication and transport
11. Federal works and power
12. Surveys, inquiries, and research

Supplementary list for Sabah and
Sarawak

13. Education
14. Medicine and health

12. Native law and custom
13. Incorporation of state authorities and
other bodies
14. Ports and harbors other than those
declared federal
15. Cadastral land surveys
16. In Sabah, the Sabah Railway

15. Labor and social security
16. Welfare of aborigines
17. Professional licensing
18. Federal holidays, standard of time
19. Unincorporated societies

Additional shared functions for Sabah
and Sarawak

20. Agricultural pest control
21. Publications

17. Personal law
18. Adulteration of foodstuff and other
goods
19. Shipping under fifteen tons
20. Water power
21. Agriculture and forestry research
22. Charities and charitable trusts

22. Censorship
23. Theatres and cinemas
24. Co-operative societies
25. Prevention of and extinguishing fires
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23. Theatres, cinemas and places of
amusement

Shared Functions
1. Social welfare
2. Scholarships
3. Protection of wild animals and birds,
national parks
4. Animal husbandry
5. Town and country planning
6. Vagrancy and itinerant hawkers
7. Public health
8. Drainage and irrigation
9. Rehabilitation of mining land, and land
that has suffered soil erosion
10. Fire safety measures
11. Culture and sports, housing

Source: Malaysia, Constitution of Malaysia – Ninth Schedule (Articles 74, 77) on
“Legislative Lists.”
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